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Abstract 
 
Societies burdened by the deep social and political divisions created by conflict struggle to move 
on from patterns of division, tension and mutual suspicion. Attitudes and negative beliefs about 
political opponents are made permanent parts of the social landscape by violence. Political 
settlements address the mechanics of governance and the organization of society, however, they 
fail to deal with the way deeply divided societies have evolved during the period of conflict. The 
cessation of violence and development of political solutions leaves in its wake many questions 
about how to tackle the injustices of the past and the reality of a divided society. The exploration 
of these questions and the attempt to address the challenge of deep divisions is central to any 
move towards reconciliation. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to offer a theological analysis of the political implications of the 
Christian doctrine of reconciliation. The discussion of reconciliation takes place within the 
context of Northern Ireland, a society burdened by deep divisions caused by decades of violent 
political conflict. By exploring a variety of models of reconciliation and attending to the 
particularities of the theology of reconciliation the analysis will attempt to develop a 
distinctively Christian interpretation of reconciliation and explain its meaning in the Northern 
Irish context. A discussion of the questions raised by justice and forgiveness will be given 
significant attention since these two themes are central to any attempt to address the past and 
move beyond deep societal divisions to a shared future.  
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Introduction 
 
Is it possible for a society to overcome a violent social and political conflict and make the 
transition from deep division to reconciliation? What does the Christian gospel contribute to 
situations of deep social and political division? The aim of this thesis is to offer a theological 
analysis of the political implications of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation. It will do this in 
the context of the deeply divided society, which has resulted from political conflict in Northern 
Ireland. The focus of our analysis will be to ask what precisely the distinctively Christian 
interpretation of ‘reconciliation’ might mean in and for that context. Politically, Northern Ireland 
has changed dramatically over the past twenty-five years. Yet, deep social divisions between 
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland remain and threaten to undermine a fragile peace 
process. It is after the cessation of violence that reconciliation is understood as the basis of 
addressing social divisions and providing the stability essential for political developments to 
succeed. High profile moves towards reconciliation, such as those witnessed in post-Apartheid 
South Africa, give the theme of reconciliation a certain prominence in contemporary discussions 
of the problem of social and political divisions. Yet, reconciliation’s importance is assumed 
while its content and meaning is frequently overlooked. As this thesis will contend, 
contemporary interest in reconciliation is not matched by the necessary conceptual clarity about 
what reconciliation entails and what it means for citizens of deeply divided societies. What does 
reconciliation require of those living in a deeply divided society? What does it mean to suggest 
that people need to be reconciled to the past? What sort of society is a reconciled society?  
By analysing the concept of reconciliation and evaluating some of the claims made about 
reconciliation this thesis will attempt to bring an element of conceptual clarity to the way we 
think and talk about reconciliation. Acknowledging reconciliation’s deeply theological origins, 
the discussion will pay particular attention to the development of a theology of social 
reconciliation. This is a particularly interesting question in Northern Ireland where the 
significance of theological claims and the role of the church have a disputed place in the 
conflict.1
The thesis can be broken into two distinct parts. The first includes an attempt to explore 
the language of reconciliation by way of a review of a number of contemporary approaches to 
reconciliation. By examining these concepts of reconciliation we hope to distil a more precise 
                                                 
1 See Nothing But Trouble?: Religion and the Irish Problem ed. Dennis Kennedy (Belfast: The Irish Association for 
Cultural, Economic and Social Relations), 2004 for a helpful introduction to this issue. 
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understanding of the set of ideas that are fundamental to the concept of reconciliation. This 
review is followed by an attempt to develop a theology of social reconciliation. Central to this 
discussion is the work of James B Torrance. It is hoped that Torrance’s expansive vision of 
Christology will enhance our discussion and suggest a way of exploring the significance of 
Christ’s life, death and resurrection for social relations. In this first half of the thesis it becomes 
evident that a fundamental challenge to overcoming serious social divisions is dealing with the 
past, indeed it becomes clear that there is no reconciled future unless we address the past. The 
second half of the thesis takes up the question of the past and looks at it by way of a discussion 
of the themes of firstly, justice and secondly forgiveness.  
It should be added that an analysis of reconciliation offers a vast array of topics and 
interrelated issues for examination. While this wide-range of material makes for an enriching 
and interesting project, it also requires that any study of reconciliation be controlled by strict 
parameters. From the outset it should be made clear that this project will not address every 
possible question raised by the theme of reconciliation. Given the range of the literature this 
would go beyond the limits of this project. As has already been indicated the present study 
locates its description and analysis of reconciliation in the social and political divisions 
particular to the so-called ‘modern troubles’ in Northern Ireland, a period that runs from 1969 to 
the present day.2 The choice of the term ‘social and political divisions’ is important. For 
divisions one could easily have substituted ‘upheavals’ or ‘violence’.3 The intention is not to 
downplay the severity of the situation in Northern Ireland; however, ‘divisions’ captures the 
particular element of the Northern Ireland problem that this thesis seeks to address. While 
forgiveness and justice have a central place in this discussion, it would be wrong to suggest that 
other issues are not important. However, it seems essential that these two issues be given serious 
attention, before attempting to come to terms with the other questions raised by reconciliation. It 
is hoped that by focusing in on these specific issues and locating the project in Northern Ireland 
this thesis will be able to offer helpful comment on set of questions that sit at the heart of the 
challenge of reconciliation.  
                                                 
2 While the paramilitary ceasefires and signing of the Good Friday Agreement suggest the end of the period known 
as ‘The Troubles’ these important events do not directly impinge upon the concerns of reconciliation. While 
political violence and the concomitant emphasis on security may have ceased to be a daily reality, Northern Ireland 
continues to bear all the hallmarks of a deeply divided society. This study is primarily concerned with the goal of 
reconciliation rather than a cessation of paramilitary violence.  
3 See Malachi O’Doherty’s The Trouble With Guns: Republican Strategy and the Provisional IRA (Belfast: The 
Blackstaff Press, 1998), p.93ff for a helpful discussion of the importance of being accurate in our description of the 
nature of the Northern Irish problem.  
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There is a particular challenge in writing a thesis that takes a contemporary situation as 
its topic. Much has happened in Northern Ireland since this research project began: elections and 
subsequent shifts in political power, numerous changes in political personnel and the launch of 
new initiatives to work towards future co-existence to name but a few. Yet the fundamental 
questions that a discussion of reconciliation in Northern Ireland raise remain highly relevant. At 
the time of writing the family of fifteen-year-old Michael McIlveen prepare for his funeral. 
Michael, a Catholic, was on his way home after a night out when he was beaten by a gang of 
Protestants. Forty-eight hours later he died in Hospital. One of those charged with his murder is 
also Fifteen years old. It has been widely reported that Michael McIlveen was attacked with 
baseball bats, feet and fists because he was a Catholic. Both Michael and at least one of those 
who attacked and killed him were approximately seven years old when politicians in Northern 
Ireland signed the Good Friday Agreement. Therefore those who killed him can have little or no 
memory of the worst periods in recent Northern Irish history. Yet, these young men are 
continuing the cycle of sectarian violence that Northern Ireland has suffered for decades. 
Writing about racism in America, Jim Wallis quotes lines from the musical South Pacific 
“You’ve got to be taught to be afraid of people whose eyes are oddly made, or people whose 
skin is a different shade, you’ve got to be carefully taught. You’ve got to be taught before it’s 
too late, before you are six or seven or eight, to hate all the people your relatives hate, you’ve 
got to be carefully taught.”4 The murder of Michael McIlveen serves as a tragic reminder that 
serious social divisions in Northern Ireland teach sectarianism to children and perpetuate the 
politics of narrow identities and fear. The past continues to hold sway over contemporary life in 
Northern Ireland. Even those who have little or no memory of that past seem animated by a 
history of violence and enmity towards their neighbours. Until we begin to explore ways of 
looking at our past and taking serious steps towards reconciliation there is little to suggest that 
recent political developments are an accurate reflection of the way people live in Northern 
Ireland. The following discussion will not answer every question about the potential for 
reconciliation in Northern Ireland, however, it is hoped it will offer some useful insight into the 
way we should approach the task of healing divided communities.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Oscar Hammerstein II,  “You’ve Got to be Taught,” lyrics from the 1949 musical South Pacific by Richard 
Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein II. Quoted in Jim Wallis, God’s Politics: Why the American Right get it Wrong 
and the Left doesn’t Care (Oxford: Lion, 2005), 310.  
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Chapter One 
 
Towards a Definition of Reconciliation 
 
The passion of hatred is so long lived and so obstinate a malady that the surest sign of 
death in a sick person is their desire for reconciliation 
Jean De La Bruyere 
 
 
 
 
What is reconciliation? The unremitting violence that characterises contemporary armed 
conflicts suggests that De La Bruyere is a sage rather than a pessimist. Yet, despite the evidence 
reconciliation’s significance is unrivalled. As a means of resolving conflict, healing divided 
societies and dealing with the dark moments of the past it is the concept of reconciliation that 
has captured the imagination of a diverse range of politicians and thinkers. In an increasingly 
divided world interest in reconciliation persists across a wide range of disciplines.5  
But what is reconciliation? Despite its recent popularity there is a distinct lack of 
conceptual clarity concerning both its meaning and requirements. General observations and local 
definitions abound; however, an agreed classification of reconciliation remains elusive.6 Any 
depiction of contemporary interpretations of reconciliation would result in a confusing and 
complex arrangement. Yet, as this chapter will demonstrate, a clear understanding of what 
reconciliation means is central to its success. By reviewing some of the wide-ranging 
‘reconciliation literature’ this chapter will attempt to understand reconciliation’s apparent 
ambiguity. By focusing on Northern Ireland as an example of a situation where reconciliation is 
                                                 
5 South Africa and Northern Ireland are just two prominent examples taken from a list of many others countries 
where reconciliation is high on the social and political agenda. A history of violence ensures that moves towards 
reconciliation will receive a great deal of attentions. However, situations of protracted civil conflict are not the only 
situations where reconciliation is given significant attention.  For example reconciliation between Australia’s 
‘melting pot’ of races and cultures is a topic of earnest discussion in the Australian media and amongst academics 
and politicians.  
6 In 1993 the Irish School of Ecumenics began a research project that culminated in an inter-disciplinary seminar 
held in Belfast. The proceedings of the seminar were subsequently published in the volume Reconciliation in 
Religion and Society (Belfast: Inst. of Irish Studies, 1994). The structure of the book reflects the common tendency 
of studies of reconciliation to avoid conceptual clarity by assuming either a) we know what reconciliation means or 
b) the way to understand reconciliation is to explore it in a variety of different contexts. Thus the chapters explore 
‘History and Reconciliation,’ ‘Bible and Reconciliation,’ ‘Justice and Reconciliation,’ Ecology and Reconciliation,’ 
Politics and Reconciliation,’ and ‘Gender and Reconciliation’. Developing one single definition of reconciliation 
would of course be reductionistic, however, a chapter that flagged the main themes of reconciliation would greatly 
help our attempts to apply the idea of reconciliation in varied arenas.  
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needed, this chapter will explore a number of contemporary models of reconciliation and attempt 
to arrive at a clearer understanding of what we mean by reconciliation.  
 
1. Reconciliation: An Ambiguous Term? 
 
Reconciliation is notoriously difficult to define. Much of the literature displays a high tolerance 
for flexible terminology when it comes to describing reconciliation. A number of factors prevent 
a precise definition. Firstly, the concept of reconciliation contains an inherent temporal 
ambiguity. This is seen in the way reconciliation is discussed as a process or a goal or as a 
combination of process and goal. This dynamic is evident in the various metaphors used to 
describe and discuss reconciliation and its concomitant activities. For example, reconciliation is 
a ‘quest,’ a ‘journey,’ a ‘process,’ a ‘movement’, a ‘state’ or a ‘goal’. Commenting on Hegel’s 
understanding of political reconciliation, Michael Hardimon makes a distinction between 
reconciliation as process and result, “The process may be variously described as a process of 
overcoming conflict, division, enmity, alienation or estrangement; the result, as the restoration 
of harmony, unity, peace, friendship, or love.”7  The relational focus of reconciliation means 
that the terms of reference are frequently gathered from the sphere of human relationships, a 
sphere where precise definitions battle against the essential ambiguity and variety of personal 
experience.  
Secondly, reconciliation can refer to activities on both the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’ levels. 
The former is perhaps the most everyday version of reconciliation and includes the sort of 
activities typically associated with a version of reconciliation whereby members of a family 
overcome relational difficulties. Macro level reconciliation is concerned with overcoming 
differences or divisions at the national or international level. On the macro level a country is 
reconciled to its past, groups involved in interstate conflict cease hostilities or two countries 
declare peace after a period of warfare. Reconciliation’s flexibility is also related to its unique 
relationship to time. When we speak of reconciliation we are at once referring to events in the 
past, the present and the future. A process of reconciliation may look back to a past relationship 
and the events that lead to its dissolution while also exploring the present possibilities for 
                                                 
7 Michael Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 85.  
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restoration. Thus reconciliation is motivated by both the memory of the positive past and the 
promise of restoration in the future.8  
Reconciliation’s ambiguity has both positive and negative ramifications. Much of the 
success of reconciliation rests on how it is perceived by those to whom it is directed. 
Unsatisfactory understandings of reconciliation can lead to the creation of major obstacles to its 
implementation. While a certain flexibility regarding definition is typically attractive in the 
realm of political negotiation, an erratic conceptualisation will counteract the intentions of those 
who embrace a flexible frame of reference. A combination of reconciliation’s inherent 
ambiguity and the increasing popularity of reconciliation language can lead to definitions of 
reconciliation that are entirely unhelpful. A recent example of a reconciling misnomer illustrates 
the potential pitfalls of an overly flexible notion of reconciliation. In 1985 the ‘Anglo-Irish 
Agreement’ was described in certain quarters of Northern Ireland as an ‘instrument of 
reconciliation’.9 While this may have been little more than political rhetoric the repercussions 
were severe. Large portions of the Protestant population saw the agreement as an unjust, unfair 
and undemocratic betrayal. As a result the concept of reconciliation became associated with 
unwanted political concessions and betrayal. Twenty years later a deep-seated suspicion of the 
language of reconciliation continues to present a significant challenge to contemporary political 
settlement.10  
 
1.1 From thick to thin 
A wide range of metaphors is employed to describe the particular type of reconciliation an 
author is discussing. Reconciliation is therefore variously described as ‘strong,’ ‘weak,’ 
‘soaring,’ ‘thick,’ and ‘thin’. David Crocker offers three general meanings of reconciliation that 
range from the thin to the thick: 1) ‘simple coexistence’ sees an end to violence and the 
institution of a modus vivendi; 2) a ‘liberal social solidarity’ seeks a society where former 
enemies respect each other as fellow citizens as well as merely coexisting. Stronger still is 3) the 
‘holistic vision’ of reconciliation that includes an emphasis on forgiveness, mercy, a shared 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that movements towards reconciliation may not always look to an earlier time of positive 
relationships. Antjie Krog questions the appropriateness of the usage of the term ‘reconciliation’ in South Africa 
noting that there was nothing to return to, “In this country there was nothing to go back to, no previous state or 
relationship one would wish to restore – in these stark circumstances ‘reconciliation’ does not seem like the right 
word.” Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa 
(New York: Random House, 1998), 143. 
9 The Anglo-Irish Agreement, signed by the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) Garret Fitzgerald and the British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on 15 November 1985, deals with the status of Northern Ireland, political, 
security and legal matters, cross-border co-operation and interparliamentary relations. 
10 Mervyn T. Love, Peace Building Through Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), 8. 
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comprehensive vision, mutual healing and harmony.11 P.E. Digeser describes this ‘thick’ version 
as a “soaring use” of reconciliation.12  Alternatively, Norman Porter prefers to describe 
reconciliation as ‘strong’ rather than ‘thick’; however Porter’s summary of what he means by 
strong reconciliation demonstrates an affinity with the definition of ‘thick’ on David Crocker’s 
continuum. Calling for ‘strong’ reconciliation Porter explains 
Reconciliation is a priority for a divided society…it poses a challenge to our prejudices 
and many of our practices that cannot be plausibly ignored. [Reconciliation] invokes the 
non-instrumental acts and practices of embrace and engagement that are properly 
conducted in a spirit of openness. These acts and practices entail risk and vulnerability, 
as we expose ourselves to others in a critically reflective way. They call upon such 
virtues as reasonableness, magnanimity and forgiveness. In the absence of these sorts of 
acts, practices and virtues, it is hard to see how reconciliation will not be emptied of 
much of its content. It is hard to see, in other words, how without them our horizons will 
be expanded, our destructive divisions healed and common purposes articulated. These 
are aims that a strong conception of reconciliation refuses to forfeit.13
 
Porter’s talk of healing divisions and expanding horizons is an inspiring recommendation of 
reconciliation’s benefits, however, the report on reconciliation is not always positive. Warning 
of an “objectionable” reconciliation, which signals acquiescence or submission, Digeser notes, 
“One may be reconciled to a political settlement, not because it expresses a greater sense of 
unity or harmony but because one has no other choice.”14 The potential ‘abuse’ of reconciliation 
is raised in a number of other quarters. The well-known Kairos Document protested against the 
suggestion of a concept of reconciliation that ignored widespread injustice in Apartheid South 
Africa.15 Feminist theologians voice similar concerns about reconciliation. In a feminist 
rehearsal of the standard query concerning reconciliation and the question of justice, Mary Grey 
notes, “The very word ‘reconciliation’ can disguise assimilation, forced agreement, imbalance of 
power and hypocrisy.”16 Obviously reconciliation’s political potential makes it a useful tool in 
the hands of politicians wishing to expedite a difficult political settlement or cover the tracks of 
an ignominious history. However, potential abuses should not detract from the promise of 
reconciliation. Damaging uses of reconciliation are perhaps enabled by the ambiguity 
surrounding the precise meaning of reconciliation. Therefore one possible way to circumvent 
                                                 
11 David A. Crocker, ‘Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,’ Ethics & International Affairs vol. 
3 (1999): 59-60.  
12 P.E. Digeser, Political Forgiveness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001) 65. 
13 Norman Porter, The Elusive Quest: Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2003), 93. 
14 Digeser, Political Forgiveness, 65.  
15  World Council of Churches, The Kairos Document, Challenge to the Church: Theological Comment on the 
Political Crisis in South Africa (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1985). 
16 Mary Grey, ‘To Struggle with a Reconciled Heart: Reconciliation and Justice,’ New Blackfriars Vol. 85, Issue 
995, (January 2004), 57.  
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‘cheap’ reconciliation might be to strive for a clearer understanding of what we mean by the 
term.  
 
 
1.2 The South African Experience 
 
The Kairos Document, published in 1985, is a salutary example of reconciliation’s ambiguity. 
Central to the concerns of the Kairos theologians was an attempt to critique the prevailing state 
theology that did little to challenge apartheid and presented a significant theological obstacle to 
the Church’s ability to call for justice. This challenge to the Church included a correction of a 
particular notion of reconciliation from the perspective of liberation. ‘Church theologians’ 
encouraged reconciliation as if there had been a misunderstanding between two equals, failing to 
acknowledge the crucial point that one side had been oppressed and the other the oppressor. 
Kairos challenged this attempt to initiate reconciliation without addressing widespread injustice. 
According to Kairos 
 
The fallacy here is that ‘Reconciliation’ has been made into an absolute principle that 
must be applied in all cases of conflict or dissension. But not all cases of conflict are the 
same…there are conflicts where one side is a fully armed and violent oppressor while the 
other side is defenceless and oppressed. These are conflicts that can only be described as 
the struggle between justice and injustice, good and evil, God and the Devil. To speak of 
reconciling these two is not only a mistaken application of the Christian idea of 
reconciliation, it is a total betrayal of all that Christian faith has ever meant…In our 
situation in South Africa today it would be totally unchristian to plead for reconciliation 
and peace before the present injustices have been removed.17
 
This quotation captures the determination of the Kairos theologians to oppose the appropriation 
of the language of reconciliation on the part of the theologians of the state. Rather than being an 
outright rejection of reconciliation their challenge is more accurately described as an attempt at 
conceptual clarification. Reconciliation’s ambiguity allowed Church theologians to interpret it 
according to their own terms of reference. Kairos represents a robust protest against their 
interpretation of the term.  
 
For many the recent history of South Africa represents a by-word for both the promise and the 
pain of reconciliation. Ten years after the first democratic elections, the seemingly endless 
                                                 
17 World Council of Churches, The Kairos Document, Challenge to the Church: Theological Comment on the 
Political Crisis in South Africa (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1985), 17. 
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interest in South Africa’s ‘journey’ from apartheid to democracy confirms the importance of the 
South African experiment in reconciliation. Yet, even South Africa’s explicitly institutionalised 
form of reconciliation embodied in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission remains faithful to 
the tradition of reconciliation’s ambiguity. Richard A. Wilson’s provocative study, The Politics 
of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimising the Post-Apartheid State, offers an 
insightful exploration of the place of reconciliation in South Africa’s transition. Wilson observes 
that, although ‘reconciliation’ is increasingly significant in the discourse of political transition it 
has no legal standing, like proportionality or gross human rights violation. Wilson sees this lack 
of precision as an essential part of reconciliation’s appeal in situations of political transition. His 
suspicion of reconciliation is confirmed when he describes it as: 
 
The Trojan horse used to smuggle an unpleasant aspect of the past (that is, impunity) into 
the present political order, to transform political compromises into transcendental moral 
principles. Reconciliation talk structures a field of discourse in order to render 
commonsensical and acceptable the abjuring of legal retribution against past offenders. It 
creates a moral imperative, which portrays retributive justice as blood lust and ‘wild-
justice’ and as an affront to democratisation and the new constitutional order.18
 
 
Leaving a discussion of Wilson’s scepticism to one side we note that his account of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission highlights the centrality of ideas such as: confession, 
forgiveness, sacrifice, redemption and liberation. “Reconciliation,” according to Wilson, “is a 
quasi-religious term that became a guiding principle for new rituals of civic nationalism.”19 
Noting the diversity of opinions surrounding reconciliation in the transitional South Africa, 
Wilson asserts that no single version of reconciliation was ever fixed, even in the minds of those 
conducting the hearings of the Commission. Instead of one idea of reconciliation, Wilson 
identifies what he describes as, “three main narratives of reconciliation,” the legal-procedural, 
the mandarin-intellectual and the religious redemptive.”20 His description of the particularities 
of each narrative demonstrates the various strands of reconciliation. According to Wilson, the 
‘Legal-procedural narrative,’ was “a legal positivist, procedural view of reconciliation concerned 
with creating fairness in individual cases of gross human rights violations.”21 The ‘mandarin-
intellectual narrative,’ was “a notion of reconciliation which lent towards a more abstract focus 
                                                 
18 Richard A. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimising the Post-Apartheid 
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 97. 
19 Ibid. 98. 
20 Ibid. 104. 
21 Ibid. 98. 
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on the nation, shifting from the ‘people’ to the ‘nation’ as the focus of who or what was to be 
reconciled.”22 The ‘religious-redemptive narrative,’ pursued a substantive notion of 
reconciliation as a common good, defined by confession, forgiveness and redemption and the 
exclusion of vengeance. “[This approach] sought not just the reconciliation of ‘the nation’ but 
also reconciliation between individuals within the nation.”23  Rather than claiming that 
individuals held closely to a pure formulation of one of these narratives, Wilson suggests that 
the narratives are porous and were articulated in a mixed form. However, important distinctions 
arise when he notes that the first two narratives were more appealing to lawyers and intellectuals 
respectively, the third “was more the idiom of members of the Commission who were 
politicians, those who had religious backgrounds and those from the caring professions.”24 Our 
purpose here is not to explore the particularities of Richard Wilson’s typology of reconciliation 
in South Africa. However, his study represents a compelling elaboration of the observation that 
reconciliation is a profoundly ambiguous term. In a situation where reconciliation had been 
made a priority by the executive and a great deal of energy had been devoted to the project of 
reconciliation, competing versions of reconciliation persisted and were perhaps encouraged. 
 While reconciliation has been less institutionalised in Northern Ireland, there is a similar 
situation whereby multiple definitions of reconciliation abound. “Reconciliation’s inherent 
complexity,” writes Mervyn Love, “is complicated further by the fact that there exists in 
Northern Ireland so many ‘reconciliation groups’ [who] each have their own ideas and 
interpretation of what they mean by this word.”25 At a general level the move towards 
reconciliation is inclusive as the ambiguity of the term allows divergent groups to cooperate in 
an attempt to highlight it as a political and social priority. However, when reconciliation 
becomes less theoretical and practical attempts are taken towards achieving it a diverse range of 
versions of reconciliation come to the surface. When this happens reconciliation can mean, in 
the words of Mervyn Love, “all things to all men (sic)”.26
 
 
 
2. Characteristics of Deeply Divided Societies 
 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 107. 
23 Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation, 109. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Mervyn T. Love, Peace Building Through Reconciliation, 8. 
26 Mervyn T. Love, Peace Building Through Reconciliation, 8.  
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In order to comprehend the way reconciliation is understood in contemporary usage it is helpful 
to understand accurately the type of society where reconciliation is seen as an appropriate means 
of dealing with the aftermath of conflict. As has already been mentioned, increased interest in 
reconciliation demonstrates a shift both in terms of the type of conflicts that dominate global 
affairs and the methods implemented in order to bring resolution.  
What does an unreconciled society look like? John Paul Lederach uses the phrase 
“deeply divided societies” to capture the combination of factors involved in the life of a society 
at war with itself.  Lederach highlights three interrelated factors: (1) The narrowing of identities; 
(2) Diffusion of power and confusion about representation; (3) Long-term nature of internal 
conflicts and attendant social-psychological factors.  Rather than beginning with an analysis of 
substantive issues Lederach points to the phenomenon of ‘narrowing identities’ that is universal 
in contemporary armed conflicts. People who are threatened and insecure tend to seek security 
in narrow identities.27 This is based on a long-standing experience of fear and distrust directed 
towards political opponents. There is a sense of paranoia when even the most innocuous of 
political activities such as a formal meeting between leaders becomes highly charged and creates 
politicised moments of tension. These feelings are reinforced by immediate experience of 
violence that in turn “exacerbates the hatred and fear that fuel the conflict.”28 A narrowing of 
identity sharpens the definitions of external threats and enemies, polarizes groups who are living 
side-by-side and obscures commonalities. Geography plays a crucial role in contemporary 
internal conflicts and marks an important contrast with international conflicts. The experience of 
fear and violence is immediate, rather than played out on the ‘world stage.’ The conflicting 
groups live in close proximity and share common histories.29 Given the immediacy of a 
localised conflict the narrowing of identity is not based on ideology, but rather on a desire for 
security.  
Along with the narrowing of identity, Lederach highlights the diffusion of power in 
situations of internal conflict. Where access to weapons creates a mandate and a multiplicity of 
groups claim to represent the interests of ‘the people’ there is little hope of reaching settlement 
by following the traditional line of diplomacy based on statist hierarchies of power. There are 
difficult questions about the relationship between political groups and the people they claim to 
represent and equally difficult is the development of mechanisms for establishing representation 
                                                 
27 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace, 13. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid.  
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within a population.30 Even within one group there will be a narrowing of identity, a preference 
for one leader over another and a lack of continuity or shared political goals.31  
Violent internal conflicts of the sort witnessed since the late 90s, such as those in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Liberia, Chechnya and Sierra Leone are typically based on long standing 
relationships. Described as “protracted” by the media the long-term nature of these conflicts 
means that fear, animosity, stereotyping and divisions are all deep-rooted, often handed down by 
two or three generations. This dynamic is coupled with the close proximity of the conflicting 
groups and results in a highly charged environment where political leaders effectively employ 
propaganda. “Where there is deep, long-term fear and direct experiences of violence that sustain 
an image of the enemy,” writes Lederach, “people are extremely vulnerable and easily 
manipulated.”32 Lederach concludes that the resulting social-psychological factors such as 
perceptions of the enemy; emotions and experiences of violence are the key issues for any 
project of reconciliation.  
 
2.1 Northern Ireland: An Anatomy of Deep Division 
 
Lederach’s description and analysis of deeply divided societies precisely articulates the problem 
of social, cultural and political division in Northern Ireland. The three characteristics he 
identifies can be illustrated by the history of the Northern Irish conflict. Moreover, his analysis 
importantly demonstrates that political settlements alone are unable to address long-standing 
patterns of alienation and division.  
The political impasse that has followed the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998 is a result of a society burdened by a long history of division, a division that can only be 
overcome through social and political reconciliation. Social and political identities in Northern 
Ireland have been narrow and exclusive for decades. A increasing sense of insecurity and 
uncertainty is typical amongst Protestant Unionists33 and Loyalists34. Increasingly unsure about 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 14. 
31 This phenomenon can be seen in the splintering of both political and terrorist groups in Northern Ireland. 
Amongst paramilitaries the sharp divergence between former comrades has lead to turf wars as groups vie for 
control of a particular locale. On the political front the splitting of the unionist bloc amongst a wide range of 
representatives caused some to be propelled into political leadership and others see their majority disappear 
overnight.  
32 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace, 15. 
33 The term Unionist refers to the political successors of those who opposed Home Rule in the nineteenth century 
and eventually agreed to the formation of the state of Northern Ireland. The two main unionist parties are the Ulster 
Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).  
34 The term Loyalist can also refer to Unionists, but carries with it certain cultural references that frequently connect 
one’s political preferences with cultural and religious identities.  
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the status of Northern Ireland and witnessing historic reconfigurations in the realms of politics 
and society, large portions of the Protestant population are fearful for the future of their 
community and seek security in a strong Protestant identity. Commenting on the findings of the 
Opsahl Commission,35 Marianne Elliot, notes, “The fear of Catholicism as a powerful political 
system was found by the Commission at every level of the Protestant community. It is one 
element which unites an otherwise diverse, even divided community.”36 A similar malaise 
haunts Roman Catholic identities. An awareness of historically recent injustices against their 
communities and continued grievances encourages the strict demarcation of Catholic identity.  A 
combination of this sense of insecurity with an attempt to bolster communal identity is typical 
on both sides of the religious divide. The question of representation is also an issue in Northern 
Ireland. Various groups claim to speak for the differing sides of the community divide. 
However, the popularity of non-political reconciliation groups and attempts towards community 
relations demonstrates the disjunction between political representatives and those they claim to 
represent. The superstructure of narrow identities is supported by an historical foundation that 
includes hundreds of years of history mixed with the potent glue of blood and soil. All of the 
social-psychological factors included in Lederach’s analysis are present in contemporary 
Northern Irish society. Narrowed identities and a violent history are combined with intimately 
localised violence and geographic realities that place the two communities in close proximity, 
thus creating a situation were social-psychological factors eclipse the divisive capabilities of 
substantive political issues. The final result is a society where the patterns of the past continue to 
exert a malevolent influence over the possibilities for the future. “Ingrained cultural 
differences,” notes Marianne Elliot, “have meant that the two communities have frequently 
bypassed each other in every attempt at compromise and the differences in outlook have fed into 
many other areas of the Northern Ireland crisis, notably law, justice and security.”37 Security 
outweighs other concerns, but while walls are built higher and communities seal themselves off 
from each other the type of society described by Lederach’s theoretical analysis is concretely 
manifest in Northern Ireland.38  
                                                 
35 The Opsahl Commission was an independent inquiry into ways forward in Northern Ireland held during 1992and 
1993. A final report was published in June 1993. The Commission received submissions from approximately 3,000 
people and held public meetings and hearings throughout the province. See A Citizen’s Inquiry: The Opsahl Report 
on Northern Ireland, ed. Andy Pollak (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1993.) 
36 Marianne Elliot, ‘Religion and Identity in Northern Ireland,’ in The Long Road to Peace in Northern Ireland, ed. 
Marianne Elliot (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002), 170. 
37 Marianne Elliot, ‘Religion and Identity in Northern Ireland,’ 176. 
38 For confirmation that John Paul Lederach’s definition of a deeply divided society applies in Northern Ireland see: 
Tim Pat Coogan The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal, 1966-1995 & the Search for Peace (London: Hutchinson, 1995); 
David McKittrick Despatches from Belfast (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1989); Joseph Liechty & Cecelia Clegg 
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Understanding the importance of context we now move to an exploration of a number of 
contemporary models of reconciliation. An analysis of these varied approaches to overcoming 
deep division will further aid our attempt to move towards a definition of reconciliation.  
 
 
3. Four Models of Reconciliation 
 
3.1. Norman Porter: Reconciliation as a Moral Imperative 
 
In his 2003 publication, The Elusive Quest: Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, Norman Porter 
attempts to make a constructive contribution to the ongoing discussion of reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland.39 Porter is concerned about the failure of attempts towards reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland and his account lays much of the blame at the feet of Northern Irish political 
representatives and the prevailing political culture. After listing the seemingly endless stream of 
efforts towards reconciliation, Porter notes that “Northern Ireland [should] by now be a model of 
reconciliation.”40 However, despite the signing of an ‘historic’ agreement and the initial 
euphoria of the ceasefires: 
Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided society. The legacy of a generation of 
violence has left scars of bitterness and fear among citizens of all religions and political 
persuasions; cultural differences between unionists and nationalists are as pronounced as 
they have ever been and continue to create tense situations; housing and educational 
segregation between Protestants and Catholics in working-class areas of Belfast, for 
example, is virtually complete and shows little sign of changing; and, in general, a 
climate of mistrust exists between large numbers of unionists and nationalists and 
stretches reconciliation’s spirit to the limit.41
 
Porter’s diagnosis of contemporary Northern Irish society reads like a particularisation of 
Lederach’s concept of ‘deeply divided societies’. A reading of Porter’s work allows one to 
                                                                                                                                                            
Moving Beyond Sectarianism: Religion, Conflict and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Dublin: The Columba 
Press, 2001); John Whyte Interpreting Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). 
39 Norman Porter is a Political Scientist who is currently a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Irish 
Studies, Queens University Belfast. 
40 Porter, Elusive Quest, 36. These efforts include: “Personal contacts, government-sponsored initiatives, low 
budget, locally run, cross-community social and cultural events, as well as high budget, officially backed economic 
and political partnerships. Promoting reconciliation consumes the energies of many community organisations, 
voluntary associations and Church groups. Reconciliation in Northern Ireland is also an international affair. Projects 
designed to enhance its prospects may receive funding from European Union and US sources. Unprecedented 
political initiatives to encourage reconciliation run alongside international economic inducements. Four historic 
visits to Northern Ireland by Bill Clinton, for example, the pivotal role played by US Senator George Mitchell in 
chairing political talks at Stormont, and the duties assumed by the Canadian General John de Chastelain and his 
colleagues in overseeing the process of decommissioning weapons attest to the type of commitments major 
international political players are prepared to make for the sake of reconciliation in the North [of Ireland].” 
41 Porter, Elusive Quest, 3.  
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understand what he means by reconciliation and how reconciliation should function in divided 
societies. Norman Porter’s account of reconciliation displays a number of central concerns. 
 Firstly reconciliation is essentially from above, in other words, political representatives 
are central to his discussion. Porter understands that societal division in Northern Ireland is a 
product of a long history of violence and political instability combined with the structural 
divisions of housing and education. However his account of reconciliation is particularly 
concerned with a) offering a critique of Northern Irish political culture and b) offering an 
alternative vision of interaction at the political level. Porter acknowledges that, what he terms, 
‘fair interactions’ are the responsibility of us all. However, he notes, “it may be that the 
responsibility falls most heavily on political representatives.”42 Three characteristics of the 
current political culture present an obstacle to reconciliation: Firstly, Northern Irish politicians 
all too often engage in defending their political corner and thus reduce political dialogue to “a 
species of hard-headed enterprise bargaining.”43 Porter believes that a “non-instrumental 
intercultural dialogue… is uniquely capable of throwing up fresh insights and grounds for 
agreement, even as it calls into question any number of our prejudices.”44 Secondly, Porter sees 
reconciliation’s demands diminished by a politics of cultural self-interest. This allows political 
representatives to interpret the conflict in Northern Ireland exclusively from the perspective of 
their own community. Thus decisions at the political level are shaped by “habits of cultural self-
interest.”45 Thirdly, Porter believes that one of the main reasons for Northern Ireland’s 
unhealthy political culture is a misunderstanding over language, a misunderstanding that 
obscures two different ways of talking about political problems.46 Porter’s vision of 
reconciliation requires a “view of language that simply does not resonate across the North’s 
political divide…[where] unionists and republicans invoke different moral and political 
vocabularies and succeed mostly in speaking past one another.”47 Confusion over language 
allows old prejudices to remain undisturbed and is ultimately inimical to any sort of dialogue. 
Porter recommends that political representatives learn what Alasdair MacIntyre calls “a second 
first language…a common idiom allowing conversation.”48
                                                 
42 Porter, Elusive Quest, 96. 
43 Ibid. 87. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. 102. 
46 See Porter’s helpful discussion on pp. 111-132.  
47 Ibid. 112. 
48 Ibid. 113.  Porter goes on to offer an account of the two views of language that dominate political discourse in 
Northern Ireland. Both are linked to a predominately instrumental view of language. He notes a propensity for 
republicans to engage in the language of violence, “a view that subordinates dialogue to a type of violence that is 
presumed to speak with a peculiarly powerful voice.” Unionists, on the other hand, understand language as a tool. 
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 Secondly, Porter offers a view of reconciliation as a moral imperative. He speaks of “the 
irreducible moral content of reconciliation,” a content that cannot be obscured by the “squabbles 
between unionists and republicans.”49 The moral aspect of reconciliation requires that it be a 
political priority that “calls other of our priorities to account.”50 As a result unionist and 
nationalist politicians  
are answerable to the moral challenge of reconciliation [a challenge that cannot be] 
qualified through calculations of unionist or nationalist interests, which encourage 
treating others in instrumental ways…unless we think of reconciliation as a priority, 
which has a call on our allegiances, the chances of overcoming our most serious 
divisions in Northern Society are remote.51  
 
Porter’s knowledge of Northern Ireland’s political culture forces him to conclude that the future 
of reconciliation is bleak if the modus operandi of contemporary politicians is not challenged. 
The highly partisan and insular politics of Northern Ireland needs to be superseded by a politics 
that emphasizes the particular importance of overcoming societal divisions and avoiding the 
politics of exclusive identities. In order to achieve this Porter constructs a definition of 
reconciliation that claims the moral high ground over day-to-day political priorities and the long-
standing traditions of opposition and protest. This view of reconciliation has been unpopular in 
certain quarters. Reviewing Porter’s work, David Trimble described it as “a highly moralistic 
approach to politics.”52 In a comment that succinctly illustrates Porter’s description of the 
politics of cultural self-interest, Trimble complains, “Reconciliation, we are told, is a moral 
ideal. But a moral ideal which ignores the key question of who bears the responsibility for by far 
the greatest amount of death, injury and destruction over the period of the Troubles- the 
Provisional IRA- is a deeply flawed one.”53
 Thirdly, Porter’s vision of reconciliation as a political priority requires a radical overhaul 
of Northern Ireland’s political culture. According to Porter this requires at least three things: (1) 
“Fair interactions, (2) overcoming divisions by occupying common ground and (3) the presence 
                                                                                                                                                            
On this view words are useful tools for achieving a given set of purposes. He notes a preference for confrontation 
over dialogue and a reliance on devices (such as confrontation) that are “politically inept at healing divisions in an 
unreconciled society.” Porter notes the ‘Prophetic witness’ style of political discourse and draws a connection 
between this the pervasive influence of Presbyterianism in Unionist culture. If the Sermon is a model for discourse 
there is little room for dialogue, “the message is accepted or rejected, not debated.”  Thus there is a belief amongst 
unionists that words function as “precise tools of truth and control” this is witnessed by the fixation on the literal 
sense of words and the unionist infatuation with precision. See Porter’s discussion 111-132.  
49 Porter, Elusive Quest, 92. 
50 Ibid. 91.  
51 Ibid. 92. 
52 David Trimble, review of The Elusive Quest, by Norman Porter, Times Literary Supplement No 5220, April 18 
2003, 7. 
53 Ibid. 8. 
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of a society in which all citizens have a sense of belonging.”54 Fair interactions will operate at a 
number of levels from the political to the communal, from formal to informal. “Reconciliation,” 
according to Porter, “calls for interactions to be fair in the sense that all interlocutors are given 
their due, that is, allowed to speak in their own voice, are given opportunity to express their 
views, are permitted to tell their own stories and are listened to with respect.”55 Porter’s 
challenge to the prevailing political culture also involves an emphasis on ‘civic virtues’ such as 
forgiveness, magnanimity and reasonableness.56  
 
Porter’s model of reconciliation expresses a frustration with the politics of a divided society. He 
sees the current political culture as inextricably linked to the perpetuation of division and so 
develops a model of reconciliation that will tackle this head-on. While he is critical of current 
political practices he is clearly hopeful that a political solution to societal division is possible, if 
only politicians will hear the moral obligation of reconciliation and adjust their behaviour 
accordingly.  
 
3.2. John Paul Lederach: Reconciliation as Table Fellowship 
 
John Paul Lederach has for many years been a third party in peace building initiatives. His 
understanding of reconciliation is based on his own experiences and finds mature expression in 
his Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided Societies.57 Lederach has described 
reconciliation as ‘Relationship-Centric’58 and sees ‘Relationship as the basis of conflict and its 
long-term solution’.59 His burden is the creation of societies that can cope with the social and 
political frictions that may threaten reconciliation. Sustainable reconciliation rather than simply 
reconciliation; the difference is an emphasis on achieving “profound reconciliation that will 
endure,” writes Richard Solomon, “because it is sustained by a society-wide network of 
relationships and mechanisms that promote justice and address the root causes of enmity before 
they can regenerate destabilizing tensions.”60 Lederach’s ‘relationship-centric’ approach is 
informed by his investigation of what he describes as “the uniquely human dimensions of the 
                                                 
54 Porter, The Elusive Quest, 94. 
55 Ibid. 95. 
56 See Porter’s discussion, pp. 95-111. 
57 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided Societies Washington D.C.: United 
States Inst. of Peace Press, 1997. 
58 See: ‘Five Qualities of Practice in Support of Reconciliation Practices,’ in Forgiveness and Reconciliation, ed. 
Helmick and Petersen (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001), 185-86. 
59 Ibid. 26.  
60 Ibid. Richard H. Solomon’s, Introduction ix. 
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types of conflict under consideration.”61 As we have seen, Lederach identifies these dimensions 
as: living in close proximity, direct experience of violence and a long history of enmity. In a 
situation of intrastate conflict, neighbors are locked into a generational cycle “characterized by 
deep-rooted intense animosity: fear and severe stereo-typing.”62 If a peace-making initiative is to 
be of any success in situations like this Lederach believes it must “be rooted in and responsive to 
the experiential and subjective realities shaping people’s perspectives and needs.”63 It is this 
impulse toward meeting subjective needs and the creation of relationships between divided 
people that prompts Lederach to reject traditional models of conflict resolution that address 
issues rather than focusing on relationships.  
 Lederach’s model of reconciliation is highly theological. He bases his attempt to offer a 
working definition of reconciliation on a reading of Psalm 85:10, which he translates as “Truth 
and mercy have met together; peace and justice have kissed.”64 According to Lederach truth, 
mercy, justice and peace are the four major concepts of reconciliation. The Psalmist’s 
combination of these concepts inspires Lederach to conceive reconciliation as a “social space,” 
the place where these four concepts meet.65  
Reconciliation involves the creation of the social space where both truth and forgiveness 
are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into an encounter in which one 
must win out over the other or envisioned as fragmented and separated parts.66
 
Given Lederach’s assumption that relationships are both the basis of conflict and its long-term 
solution, meetings between divided parties and antagonists are central. This ‘place’ is of 
paramount importance in Lederach’s presentation. The creation of this place called 
reconciliation allows the paradoxes of conflict to be addressed by providing  
an encounter between the open-expression of the painful past, on the one hand, and the 
search for the articulation of a long-term interdependent future on the other…a place for 
truth and mercy to meet…and [recognizing] the need to give time and place to both 
justice and peace, where addressing the wrong is held together with the envisioning of a 
common, connected future.67
 
Lederach’s understanding of reconciliation is closely related to his concern that we grasp the 
defining characteristics and patterns of contemporary armed conflicts. The place called 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 23.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 24. 
64 Ibid. 28.  
65 Ibid. 29. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Lederach, Building Peace, 31. 
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reconciliation is an arena that is strong enough to accommodate the presence of these four 
divergent aspects. Their co-existence is a mirror image of the co-existence of enemies.  
 Perhaps Lederach’s model is best captured in the metaphor of ‘table fellowship’. He is 
particularly interested in the events that took place as part of the so-called ‘Oslo channel’ that 
lead to the famous handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin on the Whitehouse 
lawn in 1993. Prior to this very public step towards peace there had been a number of 
confidential encounters between high-ranking representatives from both sides. Teje Larsen, a 
Norwegian, academic and his wife Mona Juul, a member of Norway’s Foreign Ministry, hosted 
and mediated these meetings, doing everything they could to create an intimate atmosphere. 
Lederach notes 
 “The participants stayed in a summer lodge, slept under the same roof and took all of 
their meals together…living, eating and above all working together. Relationships 
developed in new, different and more holistic ways. The participants did not relate to one 
and other exclusively as enemies or political adversaries, rather they shared time and 
space and came to see one another as individuals as well as antagonists.”68
 
Lederach sees this as an example of how important it is to create a shared social space where 
narrow identities can be overcome and perceptions of the ‘other’ based on stereotyping can be 
replaced by relationships based on authentic understandings and encounter. Of course simply 
sharing table fellowship will not bring about a complete resolution to long-standing conflicts. In 
this case, the ‘Oslo channel’ did not ignore the need to work towards a framework for a 
negotiated settlement on substantive issues. However, according to Lederach, “It clearly attest[s] 
to the need for a paradigm of reconciliation as a tool for developing relationships as part of the 
micro dynamics that became crucial for sustaining the discussions.”69
 
Lederach’s model of reconciliation and his emphasis on the creation of relationships are directly 
related to his description of deeply divided societies and his emphasis on the creation of 
relationships is consistent with his understanding of deeply divided societies. His 
conceptualisation of reconciliation as a social space aims to break down the barriers of enmity 
and overcome fear, alienation, suspicion and stereotyping. The objective is to construct 
relationships that are robust enough to handle the political instability that will undoubtedly 
challenge a society that is recovering from years of division and violent conflict. 
 
                                                 
68 Lederach, Building Peace, 33.  
69 Ibid. 34.  
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3.3. Miroslav Volf: Reconciliation as Embrace 
 
In his award winning volume, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, 
Otherness and Reconciliation, the Croatian theologian Miroslav Volf offers a unique account of 
reconciliation from the perspective of the victim.70 Summarising the components of his study 
Volf begins with a moving description of a conversation with Jürgen Moltmann following a 
lecture when Volf had stressed the importance of embracing our enemies as God has embraced 
us in Christ. “But can you embrace a četnik?” asked Moltmann.71 Volf replied, “No I cannot – 
but as a follower of Christ I think I should be able to.”72 Exclusion and Embrace is an 
investigation of the tensions and difficulties thrown up by Moltmann’s question and an account 
of Volf’s attempt to make sense of questions surrounding the justification of such an embrace 
and the implications for the identity of a victim who embraces an enemy. Rather than a general 
discussion of the dynamics of reconciliation the locus of Volf’s enquiry is the particular 
experience of the victim. Signalling an intention to emphasise the priority of forgiveness, he 
states, “I will speak mainly to those of us who see ourselves as ‘victims’ about why it makes 
sense to imitate the self-giving love of the triune God in a world of enmity.”73 Volf’s account of 
reconciliation includes four main components, an analysis of exclusion, an articulation of his 
central thesis, a redefinition of the ‘victim’ and a final analysis of embrace. 
Volf begins his study with a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of exclusion. 
Drawing on a wide range of sources such as scripture, theology and modern and continental 
philosophy Volf describes the existential contours of exclusion. In its own way this is similar to 
Lederach’s description of the characteristics of deeply divided societies. While Volf is 
concerned about the social and structural aspects of exclusion the central metaphor of embrace 
determines the direction of his analysis and results in a highly personalised account that is 
particularly focused on the relational dynamics of embrace. 
The central thesis of Volf’s model of reconciliation stems from a belief that God’s 
actions towards the world in Christ require a correspondence in creation. “God’s reception of 
hostile humanity into divine communion,” writes Volf, “is a model for how human beings 
should relate to one another.”74 For Volf this divine ‘reception’ is encapsulated in the story of 
                                                 
70 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and Reconciliation 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996).  
71 Volf explains, “The notorious Serbian fighters called četnik had been sowing desolation in my native country, 
herding people into concentration camps, raping women, burning down churches and destroying cities.” Ibid. 9. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 100. 
74 Ibid.  
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‘The Prodigal Son’ (Luke 15:11-32), a parable that “originally triggered the idea of a theology of 
embrace.”75 In essence Exclusion & Embrace is Volf’s attempt to unpack the social significance 
of the story of ‘The Prodigal Son.’ 
As we have already noted, the sui generis aspect of Volf’s account of reconciliation is 
found in his decision to develop a model from the perspective of the victim. Reconciliation 
requires a combination of four movements on the part of the victim: (1) repentance, (2) 
forgiveness, (3) making space in oneself for the other and (4) the healing of memory.76 
Realising the potentially controversial nature of a call for victims to repent, Volf offers an 
extensive justification that entails the redefinition of the ‘victim.’ Picking up on the two pillars 
of Jesus’ preaching, the unconditional love of God and the need to repent, Volf questions the 
traditional moral polarities of just/unjust, pure/defiled and innocent/guilty.77 The repentance 
required of the oppressed and their oppressors is the same; both need to “make a turnabout of a 
profound and moral import…a recognition that one has sinned.”78 While the victim has no need 
to repent of the oppression of another, his or her repentance is crucial to the success of 
reconciliation. “For a victim to repent,” notes Volf, “means not to allow the oppressors to 
determine the terms under which social conflict is carried out, the values around which the 
conflict is raging and the means by which it is fought. Repentance thus empowers the victims 
and disempowers the oppressors.”79 The rest of this section follows a similar logic. Unless the 
victim truly forgives or makes space for the other, there can be no true reconciliation. Volf has 
previously observed, “For reconciliation to take place the inscriptions of hatred must be 
carefully erased and the threads of violence gently removed.”80 Each of these four movements of 
reconciliation plays a part in erasing the inscriptions of hatred and the threads of violence that 
Volf has identified in his analysis of exclusion.81
                                                 
75 Ibid. 156. 
76 Ibid. 111-140. 
77 See Volf’s ‘Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Justice: A Christian Contribution to a More Peaceful Social 
Environment,’ in Forgiveness and Reconciliation, ed. Helmick and Petersen, 42.  
78 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 113. 
79 Ibid. 116.  
80 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 111.  
81 Volf’s understanding of the healing of memory is perhaps the most controversial aspect of his model of 
reconciliation. His thoughts in this section are controlled by a central thesis that claims “no final redemption is 
possible without the redemption of the past and since every attempt to redeem the past through reflection must fail 
because no theodicy can succeed, the final redemption is unthinkable without a certain kind of forgetting.” (135) 
This central thesis is tied to an account of God’s forgetfulness regarding our sin. Space does not permit a full 
evaluation of Volf’s understanding of memory, however, it is clear that he raises some important question regarding 
memory and identity and the place of suffering in the Christian life. What is less clear is whether or not he has 
successfully answered these questions and offered a sufficiently comprehensive theology of forgetting. For an 
alternative account of forgetfulness see L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness: A Theological Analysis (Grand 
Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 1995), 279-302. 
 26
Volf completes his model of reconciliation with a theoretical analysis of embrace that is similar 
to his earlier account of exclusion. This includes an account of the four structural elements of 
embrace and a description of the four notable features of a successful embrace.82 These elements 
and features all feed into a final reworking of the story of the ‘Prodigal Son’, a story central to 
Volf’s account of reconciliation. The two central moments of the story, the Father’s giving 
himself to his estranged Son and his receiving his son back to his household are clearly the 
founding movements in Volf’s understanding of reconciliation and explain why he places such 
emphasis on the metaphor of embrace. 
 
Volf’s model of reconciliation concurs with the prevailing emphasis on relationships. However, 
his articulation of the dynamics of reconciliation differs considerably from those we have looked 
at. Central to Volf’s account is the idea that human social life can and should in some sense 
correspond to God’s movement of gracious love towards humanity. It is this insight, rather than 
his life experiences, that provides the conceptual framework for a model of reconciliation that is 
developed from the perspective of the victim. Volf explores traditional Christian concepts such 
as sin, repentance and forgiveness in the context of a highly sophisticated account of the 
interpersonal dynamics of exclusion and embrace. Insightful and provocative, Volf’s model of 
reconciliation perhaps suffers only due to the ambitious scope of the questions it seeks to 
address. The subtitle signals this ambition, describing the work as a  “Theological exploration of 
Identity, Otherness and Reconciliation.”  
 
3.4 John de Gruchy: A Public Theology of Reconciliation 
 
John W. de Gruchy’s career spans a unique period in the history of his native South Africa.83 
Apartheid, the fight for racial equality and civil rights, the transition to democracy and the 
experience of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have all taken place during de Gruchy’s 
adult life. Reconciliation: Restoring Justice, an adaptation of the Hulsean Lectures, delivered in 
Cambridge during May 2002 is the product of de Gruchy’s intellectual and personal experiences 
during South Africa’s recent history.84 Following the conventional format for a Christian 
theologian De Gruchy’s introductory chapter ‘How Dare we Speak of Reconciliation?’ offers a 
theoretical legitimisation of the project. This is followed by an exposition of ‘Reconciliation in 
                                                 
82 Volf, Exclusion & Embrace, 141-147. 
83 John W. De Gruchy is Professor of Christian Studies at the University of Cape Town.  
84 John W. de Gruchy, Reconciliation: Restoring Justice (London: SCM Press, 2002). 
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the Christian Tradition,’ a chapter marked by a particular focus on the theology of the Apostle 
Paul and modern theologians such as Barth, Bonhoeffer, P.T. Forsyth, James Denney and 
Wolfhart Pannenberg. Two components of de Gruchy’s project stand out. Firstly, he places all 
that he says about reconciliation within the context of South Africa’s attempts towards national 
reconciliation. Secondly, his reflection moves towards the development of a Public theology of 
reconciliation.  
 
De Gruchy’s decision to locate his discussion of reconciliation within the context of South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has a number of material implications. Firstly, 
his conceptualisation of reconciliation is constantly balanced by the practical reality of creating 
reconciliation in South Africa. As de Gruchy points out, “the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission gives contextual continuity and concreteness to the discussion throughout.”85 This 
decision sets de Gruchy’s project on a particular trajectory. While South Africa’s TRC was 
highly praised across the world, it raised a number of difficult questions about justice. For many 
the amnesties given to those guilty of ‘political crimes’ were a high price, perhaps too high, to 
pay for a reconciled society. As the South African artist William Kentridge observed, “As 
people give more and more evidence of the things they have done, they get closer and closer to 
amnesty, and it gets more and more intolerable that these people should be given amnesty.”86 De 
Gruchy’s focus on South Africa means that he must face these questions. This goes some way to 
explaining the emphasis placed on ‘restoring justice’; restorative justice is central to his 
understanding of reconciliation. A preoccupation with justice and its attendant issues has been a 
part of de Gruchy’s work in the past. De Gruchy’s notes Miroslav Volf’s criticism of his earlier 
tendency to give a primacy to justice rather than reconciliation.87 In the current volume de 
Gruchy incorporates Volf’s considerations into his understanding of reconciliation and continues 
to explore the relationship between reconciliation and justice. Observing the lack of a coherent 
universal understanding of justice, de Gruchy continues with an exploration of the significance 
of restorative justice over against the traditional preference for retributive justice.88  
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A second significant component of de Gruchy’s project is his overall vision of the 
relationship between theology and politics. A number of points of emphasis in his work on 
reconciliation are a subsidiary part of his commitment to the development of a Public 
theology.89 De Gruchy’s version of Public theology continues in the tradition of those who have 
sought to deduce the social significance of central Christian doctrines in an attempt to create a 
Christian public philosophy. In essence this involves developing political values that correspond 
to the basic convictions and principles of the Christian faith.90 De Gruchy signals his attempt to 
develop a Public theology by stressing from the beginning that the aim of his work is “to explore 
the relationship between the politics of reconciliation and the Christian doctrine of 
reconciliation.”91 Operating within the structures of Public theology de Gruchy is particularly 
concerned with translating Christian values and ideas into political realities. He explains this 
process as “bridging the gap between Christian vision and political reality.”92 At this point we 
note a coalescing of de Gruchy’s major concerns. The need to create a Public theology of 
reconciliation that will translate to political realities sees de Gruchy focus on the importance of 
the theme of covenant. Additionally, the theme of covenant allows de Gruchy to continue his 
interest in the theme of justice.  
 An exploration of covenant is central to de Gruchy’s conception of reconciliation. 
“Covenant,” according to de Gruchy, “can provide the framework within which we can think 
and act together to overcome and heal the past, restructure power relations, restore justice and 
develop a common vision for the future.”93 De Gruchy locates the doctrine of reconciliation 
within the framework of God’s covenant with creation. Thus covenant signals “God’s gracious 
commitment to heal and restore God’s relationship to the world so that it might be brought to 
perfection.”94 De Gruchy notes that a covenantal understanding of reconciliation cannot be 
applied directly in the political sphere; however, there exists what he describes as an “analogous 
relationship.”95 Covenant “implies a new commitment to one another that transcends simply 
agreeing to co-exist, with hostility continuing to simmer beneath the surface and periodically 
breaking out in another round of violence.”96 The connection to the political sphere is found in 
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de Gruchy’s assertion that “a covenantal relationship goes further than a social contract because 
it is concerned about reconciliation rather than mere co-existence…whatever its drawbacks a 
covenant relationship is qualitatively different from that of a social contract.”97 A social contract 
binds society together based on natural claims to equality, a covenant, according to de Gruchy’s 
interpretation, binds people together on the basis of the Imago Dei and the universality of sin. 
This goes beyond the individualism of western democracy by affirming human solidarity and a 
commitment to transcending self-interest. The shift away from self-interest and individualism is 
particularly evident in the demands of a covenant, for de Gruchy these demands refer to the 
maintenance of justice. God’s covenant with the world has an analogy in a covenant in creation 
where people are bound together by virtue of their being created in the image of God and the 
universality of sin. The demands of this covenant are found in doing justice and maintaining 
peace. If this is carried out then we will witness the transformation of the social order and 
environment as a whole.98 This is de Gruchy’s vision of reconciliation. A vision that creates a 
Public theology based on God’s covenant with creation, a covenant that offers a way to maintain 
justice, based on restorative principles rather than retribution and moves beyond the 
individualism and self-interest of a social contract. All of these concerns come together when de 
Gruchy comments, “Restorative justice has to do with renewing God’s covenant and therefore 
the establishing of just power relations without which reconciliation remains elusive.”99
The emphasis on covenant and the South African experience prompts de Gruchy to make 
a strong case for restorative justice. Restorative justice is the judicial correlate of covenant as it 
rebuilds God’s intended network of relations rather than merely punishing. De Gruchy attempts 
to strengthen his case by observing that biblical justice was relational and social rather than 
abstract and was marked by a concern for embrace and the healing of social wounds. As an 
example of a translation of this idea of justice into the public sphere, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission represents an attempt to implement restorative justice and attempt to 
“forge a relationship between forgiveness and justice.”100
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4. The Themes of Reconciliation 
 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates a precise definition of what reconciliation means is 
frequently absent in the work of its exponents. Often its meaning is simply assumed, as we have 
seen this can have serious consequences. As an attempt to bring clarity to a definition of 
reconciliation we now turn to a description of what our analysis highlights as the themes of 
reconciliation. This section will endeavour to delineate the key factors involved in reconciliation 
and demonstrate what these ideas and terms mean when used to refer to reconciliation and its 
attendant activities.  
 
4.1 Relationships at the Centre 
Where reconciliation is recommended there is typically a belief that relationships are at the heart 
of both the problem and its solution. “Reconciliation,” writes Mervyn Love, “is a relationship 
word.”101 In an expansion of Love’s statement, Michael Hurley observes, “Reconciliation is 
primarily about persons, people, parties, groups [and] only secondarily about issues.”102 An 
issue-based approach to reconciliation looks at the external symptoms of conflict and seeks to 
address those issues by way of political settlement or concessions. While tackling issues may 
bring about a cessation of violence it does not address the internal factors involved in violent 
conflict. “Reconciliation looks through what is visible,” according to John Paul Lederach, “and 
penetrates processes of perceptions, understandings and interpretations of the purpose and 
meaning of a relationship.”103 The approach of reconciliation initiatives is markedly different 
from that of Conflict Resolution. Groups involved in protracted violent conflicts may have no 
living memory of healthy interrelations. There is an absence of trust and a surplus of 
stereotyping and fear. The emphasis on relationships attempts to address these fundamental 
components of violent conflict. Trust is eroded and destroyed by protracted violence. Political 
solutions will not, in and of themselves, bring about the restoration of trust that is required for an 
agreement to be translated into restored relationships. This translation is essential if a society is 
to recover from a protracted conflict and not merely co-exist, but cooperate. The concentration 
on relationships is the product of a thoughtful consideration of the particularities of 
contemporary violent conflicts. As has already been mentioned, the vast majority of these 
conflicts take place within nation states and involve neighbours and citizens who share the same 
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space. While political issues are involved in reaching a settlement, the problem has deeper roots. 
In an account of conflict in Ireland, Geraldine Smyth notes, “Brokenness, division and 
separation are words that come to mind when we reflect on the civic and Christian reality of 
Ireland.”104 Smyth might have mentioned any number of political issues, ranging from the 
constitutional to the practical, in an attempt to describe contemporary conflict in Ireland. 
However, an account of these issues would fail to articulate the central problems of social and 
cultural separation, fear and suspicion that abound in Northern Irish life. Lederach acknowledges 
that it is his first hand experience of conflict resolution that has caused him to rethink his 
conceptualisation of conflict and shift away “from a concern with the resolution of issues and 
toward a frame of reference that provides a focus on the restoration and rebuilding of 
relationships.”105  
While the shift from issues to relationships is clearly an attempt to get to the heart of the 
problem it is not without its difficulties. Talking about reconciliation in terms of relationships 
reminds one that reconciliation is first and foremost concerned with individuals and 
interpersonal conflicts. However, this raises questions concerning the feasibility of translating a 
personal and interpersonal dynamic into broader socio-political initiatives. It is certainly true to 
say that ethnic conflicts are frequently concerned with relationships. This however is only to 
provide a diagnosis. The problem of dealing with relational difficulties at the group level 
remains. 
 
Two traditional conceptualisations of reconciliation that are both prominent in current literature 
emphasise the importance of relationships in reconciliation. These are the Christian 
understanding of reconciliation and the African concept of ubuntu. While religion is blamed for 
the origins and sustenance of a great deal of the world’s violent conflicts, non-religious thinkers 
have been employing religious language while exploring new avenues for the resolution of 
violent conflicts. Alongside the central metaphor of reconciliation, discussions of political 
repentance, healing, forgiveness and justice are familiar components of ‘secular’ projects.  
“Reconciliation,” argues Robert Cushman, “is pre-eminently a New Testament word, a 
Pauline word.”106 While it is fair to say that the concept has gone through a period of evolution 
and political development, its roots remain profoundly Christian. Although Paul’s use of the 
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word katallagē is not as common as one might imagine, (the Greek words translated 
‘reconciliation’ and ‘reconcile’ only occur 15 times in the New Testament) Ralph Martin argues 
that “the theme of reconciliation [expresses] the centre of Paul’s thought and ministry.”107 
Katallagē means literally an ‘exchange,’ “Christ has come,” writes J.B. Torrance, “and taken our 
enmity, to give us love in exchange; our alienation and hostility, to give us his friendship in 
exchange; our sin, our condemnation, our death, to give us forgiveness, righteousness and 
eternal life in exchange.”108 Central to the New Testament’s understanding of reconciliation is 
the problem of humanity’s estrangement from God. The New Testament presents, in a variety of 
forms, an account of how this estrangement has been overcome by way of the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus, at the heart of this understanding of reconciliation is a 
relationship; namely the dysfunctional relationship between humanity and God. At a secondary 
level the restoration of this primary relationship requires the reordering of relationships between 
human beings in families, Churches and society. Although Christians have traditionally made a 
distinction between vertical reconciliation (between God and humanity) and horizontal 
reconciliation (between human beings) the New Testament tends to see the horizontal as an 
essential outworking of the vertical. A stark dichotomy between the two forms of reconciliation 
tends to distort the intention of the texts. “God initiated the work of reconciliation,” notes Cecil 
McCullough, “and made [human beings] agents of that reconciliation.”109
 
In South Africa’s search for social and political reconciliation the Christian sense of 
reconciliation coalesced with the ancient African concept of ubuntu. Derived from the Xhosa 
expression Umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye bantu, meaning ‘People are people through other 
people’ Ubuntu’s combination with Christian ideals created a compelling force in the country’s 
attempt to deal with its past, a force that had relationships at the centre. Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu gives voice to the question that many have raised when confronted with South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “What is it that constrained so many to choose to forgive 
rather than to demand retribution, to be so magnanimous and ready to forgive rather than wreak 
revenge?”110 Tutu goes on to explain the significance of ubuntu for black South Africans. While 
it is difficult to render ubuntu in western languages, the word speaks of what it is to be a human 
being, it says, “My humanity is caught up [and] is inextricably bound up, in yours.” We belong 
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in a bundle of life…it says I am human because I belong. I participate. I share.”111 Individuals 
do not possess personhood in and of themselves, but receive personhood by being involved and 
connected with the lives of other people. Tutu goes on to explain that the concept of ubuntu has 
significance for how South Africans dealt with the past, especially with the difficult issue of 
justice. In the spirit of ubuntu, the goal of justice was not retribution, but rather “the healing of 
breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to 
rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be 
reintegrated into the community he has injured by his offence.”112 In a study of Tutu’s ‘theology 
of ubuntu’ Michael Battle argues that ubuntu provides a corrective hermeneutic for an overly 
individualistic western conception of salvation. This correction allows Tutu to offer a 
theological rendering of ubuntu that speaks to the particular challenges of South African society.  
Battle observes, 
Tutu’s theological model seeks to restore the oppressor’s humanity by releasing and 
enabling the oppressed to see their oppressors as peers under God. In this can be a 
mutual understanding, as Jesus teaches, through friendship (John 15:15). For Tutu, 
ubuntu expresses this mutuality. The relationship of oppressor and oppressed and the 
resulting definition of humanity through racial classification are broken through ubuntu, 
an alternative way of being in a hostile world.113
 
Tutu’s articulation of ubuntu demonstrates the centrality of relationships in the project of 
reconciliation sought in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Capturing the 
mixture of Christian and African ideals in Tutu’s understanding of reconciliation, Antjie Krog 
writes, “for Tutu, reconciliation is the beginning of the transformative process, one must be able 
to transcend one’s selfish inclinations before one can transform oneself and one’s society.”114
 
 
 
4.2 Forgiveness 
It is difficult to imagine an understanding of reconciliation that did not involve a strong element 
of forgiveness. The literature on reconciliation is unanimous in voicing the centrality of 
forgiveness. Reflecting on forgiveness and politics, Andre Dumas observes, “If there is no 
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procedure for forgiveness, we are left with the endless circle of self-propagating vengeance.”115 
An understanding of the limits of political settlements and the social-psychological 
characteristics of divided societies demonstrates that any progress towards the healing of society 
requires an initiative that gets at the heart of these issues. Forgiveness addresses the past, 
questions exclusive identities, overcomes fears and suspicions and supersedes the limits of a 
purely political settlement. On one hand the promise of forgiveness is rich and compelling. 
However, forgiveness of any sort presents a number of painful problems. Firstly, a genuine 
forgiveness cannot be demanded, only encouraged. Even if the importance of forgiveness is 
acknowledged it may be the case that those who most need forgiveness remain unforgiven by 
their victims. Secondly, there is the problem of agency. Who forgives on behalf of the dead, the 
victims no longer present? Thirdly, there are the issues encapsulated in the terms ‘repentance,’ 
‘cost’ and ‘reparation.’ Suspicious of mere forgiveness many citizens want to see evidence of 
forgiveness, demanding sufficient repentance or at least a demonstration that contrition is more 
than vocal. This raises a number of difficult questions concerning models of forgiveness and the 
relationship between forgiveness and repentance.116  
 
4.3 Justice 
The suggestion of forgiveness in a divided society inevitably raises the question of justice. 
Moves towards reconciliation are marked by their efforts to hold together the frequently 
competing claims of forgiveness and justice. A collection of essays entitled Reconciliation in a 
World of Conflicts (London: SCM Press, 2003) demonstrates the importance of justice in 
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reflection on reconciliation117. The three sections of the book offer contributions from a variety 
of individuals under the headings of 1) Justice and Rights: Initiatives towards Reconciliation, 2) 
Justice and Hope: Perspectives on Reconciliation from the Religious Traditions, and 3) Justice 
and Peace: Prevention of Conflict and Process of Reconciliation. The arrangement of the 
material show that the editors are clearly under the impression that justice is central to the 
question of reconciliation.  
A number of observations allow an appreciation of the dilemmas of justice. Firstly, the 
political context: Societies that have suffered violent conflicts are typically unstable. When 
violence and civil unrest cease, the society begins a transition. This time of transition is 
notoriously delicate and a careful politics is required.118 Under such circumstances politicians 
often feel compelled to make a choice between justice and reconciliation.119 The choice of 
reconciliation appears to be determined according to Michael Humphrey because, “The 
problems faced in reconstructing nationally fractured communities often dictate the choice of 
reconciliation…the state is not strong enough to pursue the path of justice.”120  
A second consideration is related to this phenomenon. Intrastate conflicts rarely produce 
a clear ‘victor’. Compromises are made on both sides and the cessation of violence marks the 
beginning of a process of coming to terms with the past and deciding on the shape of the future. 
In such a situation a pure justice, such as that implemented at the Nuremberg trials, is not 
possible. Noting the complexity of implementing justice after an intrastate conflict, Judge 
Marvin Frankel writes, “the trial of war criminals of a defeated nation [is] simplicity itself as 
compared to the subtle and dangerous issues that can divide a country when it undertakes to 
punish its own violators.”121 Besides the contradictory perceptions of ‘victory’ both sides are 
now asked to return to living side by side, in an attempt to overcome the social ramifications of 
protracted conflict. A strict implementation of justice would undermine this process. “While the 
allies could pack up and go home after Nuremberg,” notes Archbishop Tutu, “we in South 
Africa had to live with one another.”122 This is the logic that lay behind South Africa’s Truth 
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and Reconciliation Commission. A related issue concerns the conditions for peace. A discussion 
of mechanisms for justice will be part and parcel of the activities that lead to peaceful 
settlements. It is highly unlikely that those who have been involved in violence will support a 
process that concludes with their indefinite imprisonment.123
Thirdly, reconciliation raises painful questions about the limits of forgiveness and the 
very meaning of justice. Such questions witness the clash of concepts and experiences as 
abstract definitions of justice collide with the reality of creating justice in a divided society. 
Differing concepts of justice often compete for attention. One side interprets justice in terms of 
individual victims; the other develops an understanding of justice based on the experiences of an 
oppressed community. Both sides have legitimate claims; the challenge lies in representing these 
claims and creating mechanisms or even rituals where they can be expressed.  
Fourthly, similar to forgiveness there is a problem of agency. In violent conflicts the vast 
majority of victims are dead. Often these lost names and faces are the most compelling 
representatives in competing demands for justice. However, this raises difficult questions about 
bringing justice for the deceased. Who can speak for the dead and articulate what they would 
determine to be just?  
 
David Stevens offered an understanding of justice that draws together a number of the factors 
this chapter raises: 
What do we mean by justice? In the Judeo-Christian tradition justice is a relational 
concept. It is not primarily about material possessions or having ‘rights’. Justice is about 
having a place, being included in the community, to be given what is needed to make a 
contribution, to be taken into account, to be treated as a human. Justice in a divided 
society is what is required to share the space together without domination or 
victimisation. It is integral to authentic reconciliation.124
 
Reflecting on South Africa’s experience of dealing with justice Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
speaks of “balancing the requirements of justice, accountability, stability, peace and 
reconciliation.”125 Tutu points out that objections to South Africa’s solution are usually based on 
a concept of retributive justice, rather than the restorative justice that lies at the heart of South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The preference for restorative justice is an 
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implication of the South African concept of ubuntu. Rather than focusing on the punitive aspect 
of justice, restorative justice carries the concerns of ubuntu such as healing breaches, redressing 
imbalances, restoring broken relationships and the attempted rehabilitation of both the victim the 
perpetrator.126
 
4.4 Truth 
Leaflets publicizing South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission proclaimed, “Truth: 
The Road to Reconciliation”. While a large number of truth commissions have taken place 
during the past two decades, it is South Africa’s project of national reconciliation that is most 
frequently associated with the phenomenon of truth commissions.127 The South African 
experience brings the issue of establishing the truth to the forefront of the majority of 
contemporary efforts towards reconciliation. It is assumed that bringing the ‘sins’ of the past 
into the light of the present is an essential part of any move towards reconciliation. Moreover the 
South African example implies that reconciliation is impossible without truth. In favouring 
slogans such as, “Revealing is Healing,” South Africa’s TRC depicted the South African nation 
as a diseased body in need of healing. The desired healing was national reconciliation and the 
suggested therapy was telling the truth about the past.128 The perceived success of South 
Africa’s TRC is an inspiring example for those involved in the difficult process of dealing with 
their past.129 “If reconciliation in any of its several senses is to take place, there must be some 
agreement about what happened and why,” notes David Crocker, “Former enemies are unlikely 
to be reconciled if what count as lies for one side are verities for the other.”130
However, this optimism, according to Brandon Hamber, “has encouraged the drawing of 
simplistic conclusions about trauma and its treatments.”131 Hamber’s analysis of truth 
commissions questions the popular conception of a causal relationship between ‘full disclosure’ 
(truth) and ‘healing’ (reconciliation), raising important questions about what exactly an 
excavation of the truth achieves. While the TRC made strong claims for the success of truth 
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telling, Hamber is more cautious, adding the caveat, “despite successes it would be an error to 
exaggerate the ability of truth commissions or public testimony to address en masse the needs of 
individuals struggling with a personal and social history of human rights abuses.”132
Establishing the truth about the past is closely associated with the other main themes of 
reconciliation. Truth is central to the question of justice, crucial if forgiveness is to take place, an 
important aspect of the restoration of relationships, and part of the restoration of humanity. 
However, despite the centrality of truth in the process of reconciliation, truth commissions are 
not without their problems. In the forum of a truth commission, truth becomes public property 
and we witness the tension between the internal needs of victims and the bureaucratic needs of a 
society in transition. While the participants of a truth commission hope for personal healing and 
seek truth for justice or vindication, the political wheels that provide the momentum for a TRC 
seek a national healing that will contribute to the forming of a new national identity. South 
Africa is probably the best example of this tension between victims recounting human rights 
violations and politicians using, in Richard Wilson’s words, “human rights talk to construct a 
new national identity.”133 Truth, memory, justice and identity create an emotive argument for 
the creation of a truth commission, yet in reality in South Africa the full truth was never 
heard.134 The benefits and indeed the possibilities of ‘full disclosure’ may be debated. However, 
the point of this section has been to observe (1) the almost universal assumption that truth is an 
essential component of any move towards reconciliation and (2) the accepted wisdom that the 
best way of ‘dealing’ with truth or ‘the past’ is to initiate a truth commission.  
 
Reconciliation as both a process and a goal includes a wide range of themes. From a 
consideration of the characteristics of deeply divided societies we have seen that reconciliation 
moves beyond the realm of substantive issues and political settlements and focuses on the 
creation, healing and restoration of human relationships. Addressing the social and 
psychological factors of individuals and communities, reconciliation attempts to overcome 
alienation, suspicion and stereotyping and begins to reverse the process of creating exclusive 
identities. With forgiveness at its centre, reconciliation challenges fixed notions of justice and 
attempts to deal with the violence of the past in a way that avoids division in the future. In order 
to further our attempt to offer a definition of reconciliation we will now turn to an analysis of 
several contemporary models of reconciliation. 
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Conclusion: Reconciliation and the Restoration of Humanity 
South Africa’s journey towards reconciliation raises another significant element in definitions of 
reconciliation, namely the restoration of humanity. Along with the emphasis on relationships 
captured by ubuntu there is the importance of the restoration of humanity, both the humanity of 
the oppressed and the oppressor. A process of dehumanisation or depersonalisation typically 
marks situations of violent conflict. This allows oppression to become a reality in a variety of 
forms, from the denial of basic human rights such as representation or basic health care and 
housing to the breathtaking violence of ethnic cleansing. Common to both is the dehumanisation 
of ‘the other.’ Robert J. Schreiter notes seven ways of perceiving ‘the other’ that permit this 
dehumanisation to take place: (1) demonising the other; (2) romanticizing the other; (3) 
colonising the other; (3) generalising the other; (4) trivialising the other; (4) homogenising the 
other and (7) vaporising the other.135 One of the key aspects of the relational aspect of 
reconciliation is a move towards restoring the lost humanity of ‘the other.’ This can range from 
the act of reconfiguring one’s perception of ‘the other’ by challenging long held assumptions 
and stereotypes or acknowledging the reality of one’s participation in oppression and or 
violence. This will also require the restoration of one’s own humanity and therefore a 
questioning of exclusive identities and superior attitudes. By oppressing another, one has denied 
not only their humanity but also one’s own.  
Attempting to define reconciliation has required that we attend to a wide-ranging variety 
of issues and concerns. Rather than isolate one particular definition we have instead emphasized 
the main themes of reconciliation while offering an account of its contemporary appeal and the 
inherent tendency towards ambiguity. Any usage of the language of reconciliation is context 
specific and there is no ‘one size fits all’ version. At the heart of reconciliation lies the desire to 
move beyond the shortcomings of political settlements. An analysis of deeply divided societies 
shows that although substantive political issues are involved in the development of conflict they 
are not the only significant factors. Political settlements can answer “political” questions. Too 
often they fail, however, to reach the social and psychological factors that perpetuate violent 
conflict.  
No single definition of reconciliation exists, yet it seems appropriate that our preliminary 
discussion of reconciliation concludes with a close pairing of reconciliation and the restoration 
of humanity. Lamenting F. W. De Klerk’s disappointing testimony to the Truth and 
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Reconciliation Commission, Tutu comments, “I cried for De Klerk – because he spurned the 
opportunity to become human.”136
 
                                                 
136 Krog, Country of My Skull, 210. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
   Constructing a Theology of Social Reconciliation 
 
Reconciliation presupposes a problem. Regardless of what we mean when we use the term, a 
concern for reconciliation appears only when a rupture in relations of some severity has taken 
place. Thus while the term connotes positive, reparative activity, it prescribes a negative 
judgment on that which has past. Our first chapter attempted to explore the way the concept of 
reconciliation has been understood in its varied uses and contexts. By way of John Paul 
Lederach’s diagnosis of deeply divided societies and an analysis of a series of contemporary 
accounts of reconciliation we sought to isolate a number of themes that continually recur in the 
literature on reconciliation. While one version of reconciliation may emphasize one theme over 
another it is safe to say that each of these themes in its own way and in dialogue with a 
particular context contributes to a definition of what reconciliation means. One of the 
characteristics noted in chapter one was reconciliation’s capacity for ambiguity. While this may 
prove helpful in the midst of a process of reconciliation it can prevent us from developing a 
precise understanding of what we mean by reconciliation and how it is that we will seek to 
achieve particular goals. Violence is not our primary concern, but rather the deep divisions of 
Northern Irish society; where vast portions of the population live, learn, work, worship, relax 
and die in isolation from those of a differing religion. Writing in 1996 Norman Porter offers a 
depressingly accurate account of Northern Irish society. We note that his description is not 
focused on violence, but rather deep societal division of the sort described by John Paul 
Lederach.137
Social and political life in Northern Ireland is in a sorry condition. Some say it has always been; 
few dispute that it has been since 1969. Its condition is sorry not only because many citizens 
experience serious social deprivation but also because Northern Ireland is a deeply divided 
society. Conflicting political aspirations lie at the heart of its divisions and sectarianism remains 
an ugly blight on the social and political landscape producing as it does practices of violence, 
discrimination and segregation. The reality of sectarianism makes trust among opposing political 
actors a scarce commodity and contributes to an impasse that characterizes many aspects of 
political affairs. One result is a politics of constitutional standoff between unionists and 
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nationalists which drains politics of much of its meaning for citizens. It also cramps political 
possibilities and inhibits progress beyond the current form of undemocratic government 
prevailing in Northern Ireland.138  
 
Despite its near ten-year vintage, Porter’s description resonates with the contemporary socio-
political situation. A review of both political developments and news coverage of Northern 
Ireland since 1996 serves only to put flesh on the bones of Porter’s depiction. While gun attacks 
and bombings have mercifully receded into the background the psychological and physical 
barriers of violent conflict continue to shape Northern Irish life. 
 
Theology and Social Relations 
 
This chapter attempts to offer a theological contribution to the situation Porter describes. In 
attempting to formulate that contribution it will make the following argument: the message of 
the Christian gospel is a message of reconciliation, both reconciliation between God and 
humanity and between human beings at the social level. This message provides an analysis of 
the problem of deep division and a proposal for the reconciling of deeply divided societies. 
Alongside the suggestion that a vision of reconciliation is central to the Christian gospel we will 
argue that this vision requires that we attend to the particulars of Christology and understand the 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ as the basis of any theology of social reconciliation. 
This move results firstly, in a critique of approaches to social reconciliation that pay insufficient 
attention to Christology and, secondly, in the suggestion that the Christology of J. B. Torrance 
offers a way of making the required connections between theology and society. Our argument 
requires that we attend to a number of facets of the theology of social reconciliation. Firstly, a 
diagnosis of the problem we seek to resolve, secondly, an exploration of how we conceptualize 
the goal or goals of reconciliation, thirdly, a discussion of the foundation or basis of a Christian 
understanding of social reconciliation and finally a proposal for a theological approach to social 
reconciliation.  
By combining theology, reconciliation and Northern Ireland our discussion raises a 
question that is both obvious and important: Does theology have anything useful to say to a 
deeply divided society, especially a society where theology, of some description, is a constituent 
part of the problem? There is an important debate about the extent to which Northern Ireland’s 
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‘troubles’ can be described as religious or theological.139 While it is clear that paramilitaries are 
not fighting over the theology of the Eucharist, it is vital that we recognize the theological 
component of Northern Ireland’s social divisions. It is undeniable that sectarianism with all its 
religious and theological connections is central to Northern Ireland’s experience of long-term 
social division. Surely the most rational response to Northern Ireland’s problems would be to 
advocate less theology and not more. Three observations suggest a way forward. Firstly, it 
seems illogical to suggest that because there is a theological element in Northern Ireland’s social 
divisions that should rule out any positive theological contribution. Secondly, if indeed there is a 
theological element in the perpetuation of sectarian attitudes and behaviour then a theological 
solution is surely the most appropriate response. By offering critique and correction it may be 
possible to prevent people from using powerful religious rituals and symbols to sanctify the 
politics of self-interest. To jettison all theological content merely allows the continuation of 
questionable theological practice.140 Thirdly, the South African experience is instructive. 
Despite the important theological element to both the origins and preservation of Apartheid, the 
Christian theology of forgiveness and reconciliation was central to South Africa’s peaceful 
transition from tyranny to democracy. This is exemplified by the centrality of Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu to the success of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.141 It is therefore 
precisely because there is a theological element to Northern Ireland’s problems of social division 
that the gospel of reconciliation remains a vital resource for social reconciliation. Central to our 
argument is the suggestion that social reconciliation will be well served by a recovery of a 
Christian theology of reconciliation that is conceived on a Christological basis. This suggestion 
raises the question of how, or even why, we relate discussions of social relations to the Christian 
gospel. 
 As a means of helping to clear some conceptual ground Alan J. Torrance suggests there 
are three reasons why the Christian theologian who seeks to understand what it is to be human 
and the nature of human relationships must begin with Jesus Christ.142 The reasons may be 
summarised as (1) methodological, (2) epistemological and (3) ontological. Firstly, Jesus Christ 
is the beginning and the end of God’s purpose for humanity. To engage in an attempt to 
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understand God’s purpose on any other basis is a rejection of God’s self-presentation. As 
Torrance notes, “For the Eternal Word to become incarnate requires to be understood as divine 
endorsement of how God intends himself and his purposes to be known.”143 Thus when we 
come to think about humanity and human relationships we should begin with this Word rather 
than beginning elsewhere and then attempt to coordinate our preconceived understanding of 
ourselves with the self-presentation of God. Secondly, to say that Jesus Christ represents God’s 
self-presentation to humanity is not merely a statement about who God is; it is simultaneously a 
declaration of what it is to be human. “The incarnate Word,” writes Torrance, “constitutes the 
mediation not only of the one true God but also of the one true human. In him, therefore we 
know what humanity is created to be and to become – that is, we know humanity not in its 
supernatural but in its natural state.”144 Finally, we should not think of this process of coming to 
understand God’s self-presentation as merely an exchange of information. Thus, “revelation is 
not simply the communication of ideas, ethical instructions or information but God’s self-
communication in an event of communion as this involves the creation of a creaturely context of 
noetic, epistemic and semantic participation in the divine life.”145 Revelation on this scheme is 
not merely the addition of new information to the container that is our mind. It is rather the 
transformation of our language and categories of interpretation or classification.146 In expanding 
our understanding of revelation we note that the event of revelation occurs through and with 
participation by the Spirit in the life of the Body of Christ. The Church or ecclesia is the 
community created by and for revelation. God’s pneumatological communion with humanity 
has the effect of establishing community between human beings at the horizontal, or social level. 
“God was in Christ reconciling the world,” writes Torrance, “not some hermetically sealed 
Church. Intrinsic to revelation, therefore, is the reconciliation of our orientations and attitudes 
both toward God and toward others.”147 Torrance’s primary intention in setting out these three 
reasons demonstrates a desire to see Christian theologians engage in theological reflection when 
presented with anthropological or sociopolitical questions. While this may sound somewhat 
tautological the propensity for Christian theologians to jettison both their Christian and 
theological commitments when it comes to addressing social questions is worryingly 
noteworthy. However, aside from methodological instruction, Torrance presents us with the 
                                                 
143 Ibid. 2 
144 Ibid.  
145 Ibid.  
146 See Dietrich Bonehoffer’s lectures on Christology for an extended discussion of this understanding of revelation.  
147 Alan J. Torrance, ‘The Theological Grounds of Advocating Forgiveness and Reconciliation in the Socio-Political 
Realm,’ in The Politics of Past Evil: Religion, Reconciliation and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, ed. Daniel 
Philpott (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). 
 45
beginnings of a way to forge a connection between Christology and social ethics. In the event of 
revelation we are presented with a way of thinking about the questions of human nature, but also 
with a way of being human. This way of being is not the suggestion of a new ethical code or 
way of life to imitate, but the presentation of how the incarnation has impacted human 
personhood, an impact that does not rely on our apprehension but is objectively real by virtue of 
Christ’s assumption of human flesh. It is humanity’s participation in this reality that will form 
the basis of our attempt to think about the theology of social reconciliation. 
 
The Goal of Reconciliation: 
Utopian or Realist? 
 
Surely reconciliation is a good thing? Scholarly literature, public perceptions and the media 
coalesce on this verdict. While people may differ in their approach or practice the individual 
opposed to reconciliation would find herself in a minority position. However, besides the rather 
vague notion of ‘overcoming division’ it is frequently unclear precisely what a successfully 
reconciled society would look like. Aside from the obvious, the goal of reconciliation frequently 
remains indistinct. Yet, for a number of reasons it is important that we reflect on what we expect 
when we begin a quest for reconciliation. For our purposes in this chapter it is important that we 
ask what vision of society should fire the engines of a theology of social reconciliation. The 
importance of this question can be illustrated in a number of ways. 
Firstly, this is important because what we believe about reconciliation will necessarily 
shape how we approach the whole business of making reconciliation happen. Or in the negative 
sense, if our assumptions about the nature of reconciliation are hopelessly utopian our practical 
approach may simply be to hope, pray or wish for some miraculous intervention before we 
arrive at a distant land flowing with milk and honey and inhabited by lions that lie down with 
lambs. While the concept of a utopia is usually associated with a positive hope or aspiration 
there is a risk that a conception of reconciliation that is highly improbable or miraculous will 
only rob us of our hope and leave us with a nebulous dream of implausible scenarios.148 The less 
realistic our picture of reconciliation the less chance we have of realising reconciliation in the 
present tense. To borrow a phrase from the playwright David Mamet, reconciliation can become 
a “dramatic abstraction”. According to Mamet, “dramatic abstractions have no referents in 
reality and are understood to mean: ‘when strife is gone. When things have been resolved. When 
                                                 
148 It might be suggested that Christian versions of social action that tend towards passivity are more focused on the 
final coming of reconciliation rather than working to achieve reconciliation in the here and now. 
 46
there is no more uncertainty in my life.’”149 In other words they mean very little and only serve 
to undermine attempts towards action in the here and now.  
 Secondly, there is a theological dimension to the question of how we envisage 
reconciliation. In our theological reflection on reconciliation it is important that we be clear 
about the basis of our assessment of the problem of deeply divided societies and how we 
conceive reconciliation. As we have explained in chapter 1, Lederach outlines three ‘broad-
brush’ characteristics of deeply divided societies: (1) The narrowing of identities; (2) Diffusion 
of power and confusion about representation; (3) The long-term nature of internal conflicts and 
attendant social-psychological factors.150 By juxtaposing Lederach’s characteristics with 
Porter’s description of the ‘sorry condition’ of social and political life in Northern Ireland we are 
given a sense of the problem we face. What is clear is the picture of a society divided along 
narrow identity lines that are unable to deal with differences in culture, religion or political 
aspirations in a way that prioritises dialogue and the interests of society as a whole, rather than 
the narrow interests of a particular group. Ceasefires and political progress have not halted the 
parallel lives lived by people in Northern Ireland. In an article assessing the impact of socio-
cultural divisions on children in Northern Ireland, Karen Trew makes the following observation. 
Most children in Northern Ireland are not surrounded by the public manifestations of 
division such as political murals, which characterise the more deprived working-class 
neighbourhoods. However, the religious segregation of housing and education ensures 
that most Catholic and Protestant children grow up among coreligionists with their views 
shaped by indirect rather than direct involvement with other groups. Even in 
neighbourhoods where Catholic and Protestant children live in close proximity to each 
other, the vast majority attend segregated schools that are characterised by the religious 
homogeneity of the staff and students. In these circumstances it is natural that children 
will mix with those who share their background and become involved with them in the 
many recreational activities that revolve around neighbourhood, school and church. In 
addition, daily events within segregated schools underlie exclusivity and difference 
rather than inclusivity and commonality.151
 
Trew’s observations about the junior members of the population encapsulate an important aspect 
of the problem. Educational segregation embodies a wider societal norm where exclusivity and 
difference trump inclusivity and commonality. It is important to recall that in Northern Ireland 
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the problem we face is the legacy of violence and social separation, rather than violence per 
se.152
 From the perspective of Christian theology the condition of Northern Irish social and 
political life runs against the vision of social life exhibited in the narrative of the New 
Testament. Where politics becomes a game of calculating gestures and where social life is 
marred by violence, discrimination and segregation it is safe to say that something is deeply 
wrong. Even where expectations for societal cohesion are at their lowest, Northern Ireland’s 
record of exclusivity and difference occluding inclusivity and commonality is surely 
unsatisfactory. While post-enlightenment democracies are based on the logic of social contract 
theory, the New Testament envisages the breaking-in of a society framed by fellowship and a 
dismantling of the sexual, political, economic and cultural barriers that pervade human social 
life.153
 
A theology of social reconciliation should be informed by a vision of reconciliation that is 
‘realistically utopian’. By this phrase we aim to hold together two disparate trajectories. On the 
one hand our vision of a reconciled society needs to avoid becoming so utopian that there is little 
chance of achieving anything other than the frustration of unfulfilled expectations. However, an 
overly cautious and unambitious attempt to implement the reconciling vision enshrined in the 
Christian gospel is perhaps worse. As we think of the concrete realities of division in Northern 
Irish society, especially where these divisions follow the fault lines of theological affiliations, it 
is clear that a movement towards reconciliation is urgently needed. However, the question of the 
particularity of Northern Ireland’s move towards reconciliation remains. At this point, it is 
suggested that at the heart of that move is an understanding of what life together for human 
beings should look like. James B. Torrance appeals to John Macmurray in this regard, noting the 
theological importance of Macmurray’s distinction between ‘society’ and ‘community’. 
[Macmurray] defined society as a collection of individuals indirectly related to one 
another by law, by employment, by contract, to meet needs (economic, financial, 
physical etc.). Community, on the other hand, he defined as a collection of persons in 
relation, directly related by love…The concept of community, Macmurray contended is a 
religious notion, deriving from a Hebrew Christian consciousness. From a trinitarian 
standpoint, God is in the business of creating community. We are, of course, social 
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beings who live in society with our economic, financial and political needs, but a 
compassionate government should seek to make a loving, caring community possible.154
 
Where the normal societal bonds have broken down and persons in society are drawn into a 
fragmented and antagonistic existence the need for a recovery of community is vital. In Northern 
Ireland the term ‘two-communities’ is an acceptable way of describing the current arrangement 
of society. Yet, Macmurray’s vision and more importantly that of the New Testament makes the 
language of ‘two-communities’ oxymoronic, or at least challenges this version of community. A 
number of positive implications follow from making a vision of community fundamental to our 
understanding of reconciliation. Firstly, we address the important question of whether or not 
reconciliation requires that we move towards a homogeneous society where for the sake of peace 
particularity is neutered. This is an understandable concern as one possible way of achieving 
reconciliation is to attempt to sterilize the perceived causes of conflict. Thus in Northern Ireland 
we call people out of their distinctive cultural or religious identities into a new, inclusive vision 
of citizenship. Social identity theory suggests something like this when it claims that a new 
social category could be employed to bring members of two conflicting categories together 
under an inclusive, superordinate category of identity.155 Thus in Northern Ireland Catholics and 
Protestants could throw off their internecine social and religious identities and come together 
under some other all-embracing categorisation. While the worry that this suggestion may lead to 
a homogeneous society is valid, it seems more salient to question the idea that one’s social 
identity can simply be thrown off, like an article of clothing. Another problem with social 
identity theory is that it suggests that the locus of the problem is found in our social or religious 
identities thus suggesting that there is something inherent or irrepressible about conflict between 
Protestants and Catholics. Finally, one wonders what this superordinate social identity might be? 
The sceptic might point to the 1980s conflict between Iran and Iraq, nations united by their 
shared adherence to Islam, yet locked in a bitter conflict. While social identity theory is 
important in thinking about the role played by identity in conflict and can inform those who are 
attempting to create dialogue between conflicted parties it is surely unhelpful to suggest that 
denying our particularities is the essence of reconciliation. 
 It is for this reason that the concept of community, in particular the New Testament’s 
emphasis on the way our differences are simultaneously retained yet relativised, offers a 
provocative way of thinking about reconciliation. This principle seems to be at the heart of 
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Pauline thought when it is suggested that in Christ, “there is neither Jew, nor Greek, slave nor 
free, male nor female.”156 Of course the New Testament continues to maintain social and gender 
distinctions, its pages speak frequently of the slave and the free and men and women. However, 
Paul’s christology and his insistence that human beings are en Christo requires that these 
categories are not the final say on who we are as human beings. God’s community in Christ 
embraces particularity while simultaneously affirming our place en Christo. Thus the church 
exists at the local level as a gathering of a diverse group of individuals and at the global level as 
a gathering of diverse congregations. 
 
Avoiding an ethic of self improvement 
By suggesting that Christology is central to a theology of social reconciliation it is important that 
we do not overlook the failure of theological approaches to social issues to think carefully about 
how they understand the connection between Christology and society. As we shall demonstrate, 
there is a tendency on the part of theologians engaged with social issues towards advocating an 
ethic of self-improvement. This is essentially a message that correctly diagnoses a problem and 
then simply holds out the example of Christ or a call to discipleship as a solution. This approach 
is not limited to those offering a theological solution to the problem of social division. Thus we 
begin with Norman Porter’s treatment of reconciliation and then turn to those in the theological 
camp. 
Norman Porter’s reflection on reconciliation makes an excellent contribution to the 
debate about the future of Northern Ireland and there is much in his approach to be 
recommended. Yet, at a foundational level Porter’s understanding of reconciliation is weakened 
by an over reliance on an abstract ideal. The fuel that propels Porter’s vision of a reconciled 
society is essentially the ideal of citizenship.  This results in two problems. Firstly, by making 
the ideal of citizenship foundational Porter runs the risk of individuals interpreting citizenship 
according to their own particular cultural or political agenda. The ideal of citizenship could be 
hijacked by other ideals such as patriotism, loyalty and solidarity. In a situation of deep division 
these ideals are far from benign and are typically filtered by one’s cultural or political 
allegiances. Secondly, Porter’s suggestion for the way we create a reconciled society calls for a 
higher degree of citizenship, or as he puts it “a multi-faceted understanding of citizenship”157 
Thus the ideal of citizenship represents both the hope and solution for reconciliation in Northern 
Ireland. In a representative passage, Porter writes 
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I am claiming that a reconciled society, unlike a perfect one, is a reasonable possibility; 
that it is a possibility that hangs on the realisation of inclusive citizen belonging; that 
such a realisation is best understood in terms of recognition of individual, cultural and 
political modes of citizen dignity; and that these modes are the entitlements of all 
citizens rather than the exclusive or privileged preserve of members of one tradition or 
another.158
 
Of course a criticism of Porter’s belief in the ideal of citizenship is not to say that the values and 
behaviours he uses to define citizenship are not important goals for society, especially one 
plagued by decades of violent political division. The distinct lack of positive behaviour by 
citizens is certainly a contributing factor in the perpetuation of ‘traditional divisions’ in Northern 
Ireland. The problem with Porter’s understanding of reconciliation is that, in the final analysis, it 
insists that reconciliation requires that the population of a divided society improve themselves 
and quite simply, become better people. The final word on reconciliation’s requirements 
suggests that people enrich their understanding of citizenship and act accordingly. 
It is Porter’s call for a greater emphasis on citizenship that is most troubling. By urging 
dysfunctional citizens in Northern Ireland to embrace a greater understanding of citizenship and 
commit to better behaviour, Porter places himself in good company.159 Whether the ethical 
arena is political or ecclesial there is rarely an alternative to pointing people towards their own 
resources and obeying the ethical prescriptions of moral philosophers and theologians. One 
potential model is found in the concept of the imago Dei. Not only do human beings have a 
shared humanity, but they are also created in the image of God. This, it is suggested, offers a 
possible social ethic or means for building peace. In a study of trinitarian theology, David 
Cunningham combines trinitarian reflection with the concept of the imago Dei to argue the case 
for Christian peacemaking. Cunningham writes, “Created as we are in the image of God, human 
beings bear the stamp of God’s likeness and are capable of modelling the peaceableness of the 
triune God.”160 He adds “the violation of the other is ultimately a violation of self. This follows 
necessarily from the claim that all human beings are created in the image of God and that their 
particularity does not isolate them from one another.”161 Our concern with this particular 
utilisation of the imago Dei is that it does not seem to take the fall into consideration. While it 
may be difficult to argue that the image of God has been completely erased from humanity, it is 
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surely consistent with the biblical narrative to suggest that the image has been distorted due to 
sin. Cunningham’s use of the image fails to consider the ramifications of the fall from grace by 
supposing that sharing in the imago Dei is a sufficient cause for peacemaking.  A second 
concern focuses on the way Cunningham’s model throws us back on ourselves. What is the basis 
of the putative link between the imago Dei and the capability of human beings to model the 
peaceableness of the trinity? By stressing shared humanity and the imago Dei Cunningham 
offers a version of the self-improvement ethic that demands that we respond from our own 
resources.  
 Another possible foundation for Christian social ethics is found in Latin American 
liberation theology. In the Christological thinking of both Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino we 
detect a social ethics based on the concept of imitation. Jesus Christ has walked ahead of us on 
the road to liberation, thus paving the way for our liberation. Therefore the fundamental 
challenge of Jesus Christ, according to Sobrino, is to “reproduce his own way of life in oneself 
and one’s life.”162 Boff offers a similar understanding with the observation that Jesus is the first 
to arrive at the goal “we will follow him.” 163Our criticism of Liberation theology’s attempts to 
find a theological foundation for social ethics runs along the same lines as our critique of David 
Cunningham. They confront us with the exemplary life and teachings of Jesus but leave us on 
our own when it comes to putting this life into practice.  
 Miroslav Volf’s celebrated theology of reconciliation, Exclusion and Embrace, exhibits a 
similar tendency by failing to make any ontological connection between the movement of God 
towards the world and the actions of human beings.164 Central to Volf’s picture of embrace is 
the belief that human social life should in some sense correspond to God’s gracious love towards 
humanity.165 In Volf’s case the victim is called upon to forgive her enemy. However, while Volf 
takes time to make a connection between the acts of the victim and the example of Christ there is 
no space given to the importance of Christ’s vicarious humanity.  
The Christian version of urging better behaviour is perhaps most problematic since it 
creates a sharp distinction between the event of Christ’s death and our active response. For the 
purposes of our argument it is this theological version that is most interesting. In raising this question 
we approach the territory typically marked for a debate about the connection, or lack thereof, between 
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justification and sanctification. How far do the effects of Christ’s death and resurrection run? Do they 
provide for Christian holiness or merely create the potential for individual Christians to emulate or 
embody the actions of Jesus Christ? This is an important question for those engaged in the development 
of a theological model of reconciliation.  By making Christology the basis of a model of reconciliation 
we are forced to ask about the connection between what we base our ethics on and what the goal of social 
ethics requires of us.  In an attempt to articulate what he means by the term ‘Incarnational Social Ethics,’ 
Todd H. Speidell helps us highlight the difference between our two options. 
In Christ, God himself was present reconciling all things to himself. The vicarious humanity of 
Christ provides an objective reality of reconciliation, over against a subjective potentiality of 
making ourselves good. Christian ethics must not become an autonomous subject separate from 
theology, for in his humanity Christ both reveals God to us and reconciles us to God and one 
another. Christian ethics, therefore, presupposes intrinsic ontological grounds for reconciliation 
in the humanity of Christ, rather than abstract, independent or universal moral laws.166
 
Speidell’s distinction between “an objective reality” and “subjective potentiality” and the 
“intrinsic ontological grounds for reconciliation” and “abstract, independent or universal moral 
laws,” offers a precise distillation of the point we are trying to make. Christ’s reconciling life, 
death and resurrection has significance for both the beginning and the end of our social ethics. 
Christ does not merely set an example to follow, but actually achieves our reconciliation. Rather 
than turning to abstract moral ideals, Spiedell suggests we explore an ontology of reconciliation 
built on the humanity of Jesus Christ.  
To make sense of an argument that suggests that Jesus Christ brings about reconciliation between God 
and humanity and between human beings requires that we explicate the Christology of J B Torrance, 
paying particular attention to his understanding of the vicarious humanity of Christ and the concept of 
participation.  
 
A Proposal for a Theology of Social Reconciliation 
 
Christ does not heal us as an ordinary doctor might, by standing over against us, 
diagnosing our sickness, prescribing medicine for us to get better as we follow his 
instructions. No, he becomes the patient! He assumes the very humanity, which is in need 
of redemption, and by being anointed by the Spirit in our humanity, by a life of perfect 
obedience, by dying and rising again, for us, our humanity is healed in him, in his 
person.167
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We began this chapter by suggesting that the Christian gospel is a message of reconciliation and 
that this message has profound implications for our understanding of the social order, in 
particular the way we should approach the development of an understanding of reconciliation in 
situations of deep social division. Thus far we have made some methodological observations and 
offered a critique of unsatisfactory approaches to the theology of social reconciliation. 
 We turn now to the constructive portion of our chapter, what we are suggesting 
represents a proposal for a theology of social reconciliation. As will become clear our proposal 
rests on a number of ideas gleaned from the theological corpus of the Scottish theologian James 
B. Torrance. During the course of his career Torrance sought to bring the full weight of his 
theological insights to bear on the social challenges of his day. In particular Torrance, wrote, 
lectured and conversed on the deeply divisive social conflicts in Apartheid South Africa and 
Pre-Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland.168 Space does not permit a full appraisal of 
Torrance’s theological oeuvre, what follows is a summary of some of the main points of his 
research and an exploration of how they contribute to a theology of social reconciliation.  
 
Covenant vs. Contract 
Anyone familiar with the work of James B. Torrance will recall that the distinction between a 
covenant and a contract was central to his theological work. It was his idée fixe. Familiarity 
perhaps allows one to forget the importance of the distinction, yet its relevance to contemporary 
theological discourse remains. An understanding of the distinction between a covenant and a 
contract begins with an appreciation for the theological framework of Federal Calvinism; an 
influential school of theology that J.B. Torrance believed obscured the New Testament meaning 
of grace.169 Developed in the late 16th and 17th centuries, Federal Calvinism took root in 
England, Scotland, Holland and Puritan New England. The concept of covenant was central to 
the theology of the Federal system. Theologians in this tradition directed their energies to the 
distinguishing of the different covenants that governed God’s relation to the created order. 
Covenant thus became the framework in which all theological thinking was cast. At the heart of 
this framework was the hard and fast distinction between the Covenant of Works or Covenant of 
Nature and the Covenant of Grace. J.B. Torrance notes the meaning of this distinction, 
observing, 
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According to this scheme, God made Adam the child of nature, who could discern the 
laws of nature by the light of reason. On the basis of this, he entered into a covenant or 
contract (the so-called Covenant of Works) that if he obeyed the laws of nature (which 
are the laws of God) and fulfilled the conditions of the Covenant, he would find eternal 
life. This is the foedus naturale – the contract of nature upon which all society is based. 
Adam as such is not a private individual but the federal head of the race. Thus when he 
disobeyed, he brought the curse not only on himself, but all for whom he contracted. But 
God in his sovereign grace does not destroy the human race, but elects out of the mass of 
fallen humanity a number for himself and makes a covenant of grace for them in Christ. 
God then calls the elect of his Spirit and brings them to saving faith by the 
instrumentality of Word and Sacrament, the signs and seals of the covenant of Grace.170  
 
 Regardless of the widely shared assumption that the federal system derives from the work of 
John Calvin, Torrance points out that the distinction between covenants was unknown to Calvin 
nor was Calvin ever likely to teach such a distinction. According to Calvin there was only one 
eternal covenant of grace. The distinction between Old and New covenant does not denote two 
different covenants, but two forms of the one eternal covenant.171
 Two features of Torrance’s critique of Federal theology are germane. Firstly, his 
observation that “the whole federal scheme is built upon the deep-seated confusion between a 
covenant and a contract.” As Torrance points out a covenant (theologically speaking) is a 
promise whereby two people or two parties bind themselves to love one another unconditionally. 
A contract is a legal relationship in which two people or parties bind themselves together on 
mutual conditions as in a business arrangement where one party agrees to pay another a set 
amount when a certain service has been provided. While there is room for some flexibility of 
definition in legal or social arrangements based on a contract, when they are employed in 
theological language they must be carefully distinguished. “The God of the Bible, the God and 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,” cautions Torrance, “is a covenant God, and not a contract God. 
God’s covenant brings its promises, its obligations and its warnings. But the obligations of grace 
are not conditions of grace and it is false in Christian theology to articulate moral obligation in 
contractual terms.”172  
 A second important feature of Torrance’s critique concerns the way the federal scheme 
creates a radical dichotomy between the sphere of nature and the sphere of grace or in other 
words a firm distinction between natural law and gospel. Two problems flow from this 
dichotomisation of nature and grace according to Torrance. Firstly, there is a return to the 
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medieval view that grace presupposes nature and that grace perfects nature. This is a marked 
departure from the central emphasis of the Reformation that declared that nothing is prior to 
grace. Therefore, secondly, the created order, including humanity, is related to God as to a 
judge, under natural law and exposed to the sanctions of law. As Torrance points out this means 
that “the relationship between Church and the world, Church and State, is no longer understood 
Christologically as by Calvin and Knox, but in terms of Gospel and natural law.”  
 By offering a critique of the federal system Torrance is not trying to suggest that 
covenant is somehow unimportant. His intent is the opposite. By failing to make the required 
distinction between a covenant and a contract the federal scheme obscures the true nature of 
God’s covenant with the world, thus even though covenant was central to federal theology, 
Torrance’s point is that they have missed the true significance of covenant. As Torrance points 
out the conceptuality of covenant sits at the heart of Judaism and frames and directs the entire 
exposition of the Hebrew Bible. The history of God’s people is interpreted by way of the 
category of covenant and God’s covenant faithfulness or hesed. If, under Torrance’s influence 
we reject the version of covenant adopted by Federal theologians what do we suggest as an 
alternative conceptuality? Three aspects of the Hebraic understanding of covenant are 
noteworthy. 
 Firstly, the covenant between God and Israel is unilateral. Unlike a marriage where both 
parties offer their free consent and commitment, God unilaterally establishes a covenant with 
Israel. Secondly, this is a unilateral covenant without conditions. God makes a free commitment 
to Israel irrespective of merit or obligation. This in particular allows us to differentiate between a 
covenant and a contract. Whereas the conditional ‘if’ clause is inherent in the logic of a contract, 
the conditional ‘if’ becomes incoherent if placed within a unilateral, unconditional covenant 
relationship. Thirdly, the unilateral and unconditional covenant established by Yahweh carries 
unconditional obligations. At this point we note that the unconditional nature of God’s covenant 
is not to be confused with the ‘cheap grace’ critiqued by Dietrich Bonhoeffer173. As those 
included in God’s covenant community, Israel is to be faithful both to God and to one another. 
The Ten Commandments lays out in simple terms what this vertical and horizontal faithfulness 
looks like. Crucially the unilateral and unconditional nature of the covenant does not eradicate 
the importance of human response. However, rather than an attempt to fulfil conditions the 
response to the covenant is an apodictic or natural response to God’s prior faithfulness. The 
identity of Israel is bound up with the covenant relationship, therefore the obligations ask them 
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to live in a way that corresponds with their identity.174 Covenant obligations are prevented from 
being interpreted as conditions by the recognition that God’s covenant faithfulness is prior to the 
expected response. As J. B. Torrance often put it, the indicatives of grace precede the 
imperatives of law, “I am the LORD, your God, who has brought you out of the land of 
Egypt...therefore, have no other gods before me...”175 Following the inscription of the ‘Ten 
Commandments’ the rest of the Hebrew Bible tells the story of Israel’s inability to offer an 
appropriate response to God’s gracious covenant. Israel’s sin was her unfaithfulness as a 
covenant partner. By recovering the meaning and implications of covenant Torrance exposes the 
relational logic that sits at the heart of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. A logic that is definitional 
for God’s Trinitarian life as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, for the relationship between God and 
creation and for the Church’s calling to service in the world. 
While this analysis of Protestant dogmatic history is interesting it is important to ask 
what bearing it has on a discussion of the theology of social reconciliation. By recognising that 
God’s fundamental orientation towards the world is filial rather than legal, covenantal rather 
than contractual Torrance allows both the correction of an errant strain in the tradition and the 
development of a fresh perspective on theological, ecclesial and political questions. From the 
outset of this chapter we have made the assertion that the Christian gospel is a message of 
reconciliation, and that this message has profound significance for situations of deep social 
division and conflict. Yet, the message of reconciliation has frequently failed and thus its social 
significance is rarely understood with sufficient clarity. This failure is directly related to the 
confusion over covenant and contract and the way concepts central to Hebrew theology have 
been misunderstood as they have been translated from Hebrew to Greek to Latin to English. 
Alan Torrance uses the following diagram to illustrate the conceptual confusion that results as 
central theological terms evolve from Hebrew to English.176
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
berith – covenant (Heb) → diatheke (Gk) → foedus (Lat) → contract. 
 
torah – covenantal law (Heb) → nomos (Gk) → lex (Lat) → Roman/stoic/juridical law. 
  
tsedaqah – righteousness (Heb) → dikaiosune (Gk) → iustitia (Lat) → justice. 
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Alan Torrance’s diagram represents the ease with which a term such as covenant can slowly 
over time become understood as contract. The implications, according to Torrance, are far-
reaching. 
The effect of this [mistranslation] has meant that God’s filial purpose (unconditional, 
unilateral) comes to be conceived as denoting a somewhat impersonal legal purpose – 
too often conceived in bilateral and, indeed, conditional terms. The relational or filial 
categories of God’s covenant love, unconditional faithfulness and righteousness are 
translated into the individualistic categories of contract, conditional acceptance and a 
forgiveness conditional upon the satisfaction of legal requirements.177
 
The consequences of western Christianity’s mistranslation of terms central to the Hebraic 
depiction of God’s relationship to the created order are felt in a number of areas and not merely 
in the field of dogmatic theology. Torrance notes that this misconception of the divine life and 
purposes with its focus on contract, lex and iustitia has “compounded our tendency to interpret 
social relations between human beings in contractual terms – as a ‘social contract.’” 
 
The preceding discussion allows us to make an interesting connection with an aspect of political 
ideology embraced by sections of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland. In his award-
winning study of unionism Norman Porter makes the following observation as a way of 
developing a distinction between cultural and liberal unionism. 
The cultural unionist idea is sometimes conveyed through the language of contract, in a 
manner reminiscent of Locke, but more often through the language of covenant. And this 
latter language is appropriated from Calvinist theology in general and a Scottish 
Covenanters tradition in particular. To make matters even more complex the term 
‘covenant’ is at times invested with a specific theological content and at times not.178
 
In a description of a theological theory of covenant, of the type most associated with Ian Paisley, 
Porter highlights three ideas that typify this approach. Firstly, the version of covenant believes 
that God has entered into a covenant with his people (Protestants) whereby they are assured of 
his faithfulness if they honour his ways. Secondly, the British sovereign, by virtue of the oath 
taken upon coronation and the declaration made upon accession to the throne, “incurs covenantal 
obligations to God. These include not only upholding ‘true religion’ but opposing false, which is 
to say Catholicism, since not to do so is to invite God’s curse upon the nation.”179 Thirdly, as 
part of their covenantal obligations Protestants are required to obey the sovereign and the laws 
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of the state in so far as they reflect or are not in conflict with the law of God.180 In sum, Porter 
notes 
Ultimate authority derives from a divine principle, the sovereign is presumed to have a 
divinely ordained duty to uphold a particular faith and to oppose another, obedience is 
tied to a government’s faithfulness in maintaining and implementing God’s law, and it is 
Protestants who are envisaged as the covenanting partners of God and of the 
sovereign.181  
 
Taken together the work of the Torrances and Porter’s depiction of Unionism paint a 
discouraging picture. Western theology has misunderstood concepts at the heart of the Judaeo-
Christian tradition and lost sight of God’s filial relation to the world, meanwhile theologically 
inclined Unionists in Northern Ireland, under the influence of Protestant orthodoxy, have 
developed an additional covenantal framework whereby the political relationship of a particular 
section of Northern Ireland’s population is bound up in a covenantal relationship with the British 
sovereign and the Judaeo-Christian God.   
  From our discussion of covenant we can draw out a number of negative implications. 
Firstly, we can see that a certain perception of covenant allows certain sections of Northern 
Ireland’s population to hold potentially dangerous views about the way society should be 
ordered. The centrality of God’s partnership with Protestants offers a theological underwriting of 
sectarianism, thus giving rise to Protestant paramilitaries choosing ‘For God and Ulster’ as their 
motto.182 Secondly, a mistaken understanding of covenant has negative implications for an 
understanding of forgiveness and reconciliation and thus the message of reconciliation that we 
have suggested is found at the heart of the New Testament. Where individuals feel that God’s 
relationship to them is mediated by way of a legal contract and where God is conceived in legal 
terms rather than filial it is likely that reflection on forgiveness at the social level will follow the 
same pattern. Thus forgiveness is withheld on the grounds that repentance or at least a 
demonstration of contrition is the condition for grace. If and only if one’s enemy repents can 
they receive forgiveness. We have suggested that the Christian message of reconciliation has 
profound implications for an approach to social reconciliation. It is important to say that if the 
Christian message is misunderstood or corrupted it can have profoundly negative implications 
for society. The recent history of Northern Ireland illustrates this observation.183  
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 Metanoia and Social Reconciliation 
At the heart of Torrance’s understanding of the doctrine of reconciliation is an emphasis on the 
epistemological significance of on the one hand, human sinfulness and on the other the way 
salvation overcomes the noetic effects of human sin. Both sin and salvation have undeniable 
epistemological importance. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this emphasis is a discussion of 
how Torrance understands the concept of repentance. Crucial to any discussion of repentance is 
an analysis of the prior theological decisions that dictate how one understands the concept. In 
keeping with what we have seen Torrance delineates two possible approaches: the legal and the 
filial. If God’s interaction with the world is construed in juridical terms, whereby legal 
obedience functions in a contractual sense and conditions God’s love, repentance will be 
perceived in moral terms as the individual’s act of turning away from a life of sin. Torrance 
locates this mistaken conception of law at the heart of an errant strain in Protestant theology. 
Where law is interpreted as Lex there is a loss of the meaning of law as Torah. Introducing John 
McLeod Campbell’s The Nature of the Atonement, Torrance notes 
If our basic concept of God is primarily that of the lawgiver (interpreted in terms of the 
Latin concept of Lex, law of contract, as in Western jurisprudence) then our doctrine of 
atonement will imply that God has to be conditioned into being gracious, either by 
human merit, or by Christ satisfying the conditions of such a law that the Father might be 
gracious to the elect, as in certain forms of scholastic Calvinism. This can also lead to a 
stress on the conditions we must fulfil or the evidences of repentance we must show if 
we are to enjoy any assurance of salvation.184
 
Despite the popularity of the conception of God as lawgiver and the attendant legal apparatus 
that guides our interpretation, Torrance attempts a recovery of what he believes to be a more 
accurate doctrine of God and therefore a renewed sense of what salvation means. 
If our basic concept of God is that of the Triune God of grace who has being in 
communion as Father, Son and Holy Spirit and who has created us to share in that life of 
communion, then our doctrine of atonement will be seen rather as God in grace bringing 
those loving purposes to fulfillment in redemption…Law is then seen, not as some 
impersonal law of contract, but rather (as in Torah in the Bible) as spelling out the 
unconditional obligations of grace as the Father’s loving heart coming out to us in the 
form of commandments, and Christ is then seen as the Father’s loving heart coming out 
to us in the fulfilling of that law. On such a view we see the priority of grace over law, 
the filial over the judicial, and that God is a covenant-God of faithfulness, not a contract-
God.185
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These two ‘basic’ conceptions of God, which essentially boil down to God as lawgiver or God 
as loving Father necessarily result in two divergent views of forgiveness and repentance. As we 
already explained a conception of God as divine lawgiver interprets theological categories via a 
judicial lens so that everything we think about God is somehow understood as inherently legal. 
If our ‘basic’ conception of God is filial there is a shift away from the legal and an interpretation 
of God’s posture towards creation as inherently gracious. These two divergent understandings of 
repentance are a good way of illustrating this phenomenon. Few people saw with the clarity of 
Torrance how a legal interpretation of repentance was in fact a misinterpretation. For where 
repentance becomes a moral imperative the true meaning of what repentance is has been lost. To 
fully appreciate Torrance’s point it is important to note, firstly, the importance of Calvin’s 
distinction between legal and evangelical repentance and secondly, the epistemological 
significance of repentance.  
 Torrance notes that Calvin in Book III, chapter 3 of his Institute makes a distinction 
between legal repentance and evangelical repentance. As Torrance notes 
Legal repentance said, ‘Repent, and if you repent, you will be forgiven!’ This made the 
imperative prior to the indicative, and made forgiveness conditional upon an adequate 
repentance. So the medieval world said that if the sinner is truly contrite, if he confesses 
his sins and makes due amends (contrition, confession, satisfactio) then he may be 
forgiven and restored…Calvin argued that this inverted the evangelical order of grace 
and made repentance prior to forgiveness, whereas in the New Testament forgiveness is 
logically prior to repentance. Evangelical repentance, consequently takes the form 
‘Christ has borne your sins on the Cross, therefore repent!’ Repentance, Calvin argues, is 
our response to grace, not a condition of grace.186
 
From Calvin we note a number of implications. (1) For Calvin anything we choose to describe 
as an ‘act’ of repentance is a response to grace rather than any attempt on the part of human 
beings to condition God into showing grace or as the fulfillment of law. Repentance is the 
response of those who have already been forgiven. 
(2) The theological decision that posits a basic conception of God as divine lawgiver 
rather than loving Father obscures a central aspect of both the problem of human sinfulness and 
the ‘solution’ as presented in the Christian gospel. That this has a significant bearing on the 
question of the theology of social reconciliation will soon become clear.  
(3) Thus far we have claimed that repentance is misunderstood if it is conceived as a moral 
category or moral act, for example the way repentance is often conflated with the act of 
apologizing. However, if we remove repentance from the locus of morality what then do we 
claim for repentance? To what aspect of human life does it refer? To answer this question and 
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obtain a correct understanding of repentance it is helpful to look at how repentance is understood 
in the New Testament. The key is in the Greek rendering of repentance, which is metanoia. 
When we consider that metanoia is to be articulated in epistemological rather than moral terms 
we begin to see something of the difference between the normative conception of repentance as 
actions and metanoia. Noia comes from the Greek noein, which means ‘to think’, and thus 
metanoia can be translated as denoting a ‘change of mind’ or perhaps the ‘transformation of our 
minds.’ Obviously it is not difficult to see how a certain strain in the Protestant tradition could 
make the move from an epistemological to a moral category. This is illustrated by Richard A. 
Muller’s definition of metanoia in his Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms 
metanoia: repentance, change of mind; e.g., Luke 15:7. The Protestant scholastic will 
frequently conjoin metanoia, defined as a change of mind, with metameleia, defined as 
the feeling of regret or anguish over sin, in their definitions of repentance and 
conversion.187
 
By conjoining metanoia with regret or anguish over sin the emphasis of the term is placed on 
prior acts of sinfulness and subsequent regret rather than the epistemological transformation that 
metanoia is intended to convey. By focusing on acts of contrition or the feeling of regret the 
focus is on the experience and acts of the individual human being rather than the Triune act of 
transforming the mind of the individual.188 The problem of sin is neither moral nor a lack of 
one’s ability to be sorry for sin. At the heart of human sinfulness is our alienation from God, 
while it is fair to say that acts of sin flow from this alienation it has its root in our minds, rather 
than the realm of morality. The transformation required to overcome this state of 
epistemological alienation is not within the purview of fallen human beings. Rather than an act 
of human volition, i.e. ‘changing one’s mind,’ this is a transformation from above. While Alan 
Torrance has pointed out we are given “eyes to see and ears to hear what we cannot otherwise 
see, namely God, ourselves and not only our loved ones but also our enemies in a radically new 
light. It is to discern them ‘in truth’.189 It is at this point that we begin to get a sense of how 
significant this version of repentance is for the construction of a theology of social 
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reconciliation. Our relationship with others is disordered and dysfunctional because of the 
inherent alienation within our minds. The first step towards the transformation of our 
relationships both with God and fellow human beings is this metanoia or transformation of our 
minds from above, or what we might call an epistemological reconfiguration that allows us to 
perceive things in a new light. 
 
Thus far we have argued that the construction of a theology of social relations requires that we 
approach the topic from a christological basis. As we have seen christology needs to interpret 
both our estimation of the problem of deep division and our conceptualisation of how this 
problem might be overcome. To this end we have argued that a christological basis has both 
methodological and epistemological ramifications. In reality it is fair to say that we would 
expect any epistemological ramifications to result in methodological changes and vice versa. As 
we shall hopefully demonstrate in subsequent chapters the theological advantages of making 
christology the basis of our theology of social reconciliation are far-reaching.  
 Throughout this chapter much has been made of the distinction between an ‘ethic’ of 
reconciliation and an ‘ontology’ of reconciliation. In this regard we recall Speidell’s distinction 
of “an objective reality of reconciliation” from a “subjective potentiality of making ourselves 
good.”190 The theoretical difference is clear, yet what are the wider ramifications of making such 
a distinction and how does it contribute to a theology of social reconciliation? Much has been 
made in our analysis of the problems with what we have called an ‘ethic of self-improvement’. 
Alongside the methodological and epistemological ramifications of exploring reconciliation 
from a christological basis we now see the way christology allows us to avoid an ethic of self-
improvement. By constructing an ontology of reconciliation we are able to circumvent the idea 
that encourages people to pull their ethical socks up and be better persons, or more loving, 
patient, compromising etc. On this scheme reconciliation has a concrete ground and is no longer 
something out there or some sort of abstract ideal. By placing the accent on what Christ has 
already achieved we avoid the situation whereby the message of the gospel is reduced to an 
ethical yardstick.  
Torrance’s christology alerts us to a truth that is widely underestimated in theological 
social ethics, namely the predictable tendency towards seeing Jesus Christ as inaugurating some 
sort of potential movement for human begins to resume communion with God and 
concomitantly with each other. On this scheme Jesus begins the process, but we must provide 
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the continuing momentum and conclude what Jesus began. Torrance’s understanding, put 
simply, asserts that the job is finished, that a theology of social reconciliation needs to eschew 
the debilitating exertion of an exemplarist christology and explore the significance of 
participation in Christ. Thus there is a sense that it is not the stereotypical ‘Saints’ who are 
called to the work of reconciliation, but ordinary human beings with their shortcomings and 
contradictions who, by virtue of their participation in Christ, are called to a ministry of 
reconciliation. As Speidell observes,  
He [Jesus] does not merely leave his life and teaching for us to copy and embody in the 
world, but he continues to re-present himself as the ongoing reality of social 
reconciliation and true humanity. We do not need to become poor, pacifist and powerless 
like him – unless Christ freely chooses to lead us into this lifestyle. Rather, we must be 
who we are – poor or rich, black or white, male or female – in him.191
 
Karl Barth captures this idea precisely when he reflects on the concept of loving one’s 
neighbour. To love one’s neighbour, according to Barth, does not require the repetition of the 
love of Christ, but that we bear witness to God’s reconciling activity in Christ by meeting “our 
neighbours truly and honestly only as lost ourselves, i.e., exactly as we are, and not in the role of 
saviours.”192  
 
   Conclusion    
We began by asserting that the Christian gospel has at its heart a message of reconciliation. The 
preceding discussion sought to stress that this message has profound implications for the social 
order. Where reconciliation is founded on an abstract ideal the connection between the message 
of the gospel and social conflict is often limited to spiritual platitudes that fail to exploit the 
social significance of the gospel. Thus we see the popularity of models of reconciliation that 
require people to engage in the ethics of self-improvement where they increase their love for 
their neighbours. Yet the problem of social division remains untouched, as the gospel message is 
prevented from challenging our very concept of neighbour or humanity or personhood. The 
logic of this model appears in a variety of forms in both secular and religious versions of 
reconciliation. We have argued that a theology of social reconciliation should eschew an ethics 
of self-improvement and offer an understanding of reconciliation built on a substantive 
christology. The resulting understanding of reconciliation offers a diagnosis of the problem of 
deeply divided societies and suggests that overcoming division requires that we attend to the 
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epistemological and ontological aspects of the problem with as much vigour and determination 
as the ethical. We have deliberately avoided any attempt to extract ‘principles’ for a theology of 
reconciliation in the hope that we can move away from a practice whereby the heart of social 
theology is lost for the sake of principles that are available to anyone, regardless of their 
estimation of the overtly theological logic that supports the entire edifice. Of course our 
theology of social reconciliation must face the difficult question of how we face up to the past, 
in particular questions of justice and forgiveness. In the subsequent chapters we shall attempt to 
bring the logic of our theology to bear on the questions raised by the challenge of facing the past 
and moving towards the future in societies burdened by deep division. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 
Seeking “Justice” as a Means of Facing the Past 
 
Today we know that the dream of everlasting peace can become a reality only if there is 
vigilance and a continual effort for peace through justice and reconciliation. 
 
Luiz Carlos Susin, ‘Reconciliation in a World of Conflicts,’ Concilium 2003/5. 
 
Justice is set off on the path to failure from the outset…not simply because humanity 
cannot be that good but because injustice is irreversible. Once injustice has been 
committed, no future can ever make good the suffering of the past…justice can re-
establish the precarious balance of rights, but even then the offense is not offset. This 
problem comes into high relief when the injustice is a matter of the tortured and 
murdered. 
 
Daniel Bell Jr., Liberation Theology After the End of History193
 
 
 
Reconciliation represents an attempt to repair past injuries. The injuries are various, emotional, 
physical, personal and public. Yet all of those involved in the process of reconciliation are 
attempting to address what has already occurred. However, even though certain events may have 
occurred in the past the product of those events is very much part of the present. It is foolish and 
dangerous to believe that simply righting the wrongs of the past will guarantee peace in the 
future. Ignoring what we know about deeply divided societies guarantees that our attempts 
towards reconciliation will fail. Having reminded ourselves of reconciliation’s complexities we 
turn now to an exploration of one way in which the project of reconciliation attempts to address 
the injuries of the past, namely the understanding that sees justice as a means of contributing to 
reconciliation. Central to this chapter is the question of whether justice, as defined as the justice 
of contemporary western legal systems, makes a positive contribution to the project of 
reconciliation, whether it has the capability of putting the past to rest and contributing to the 
healing of deeply divided societies.  
 
1. The Blood that cries out from the ground 
 
Conflict changes everything. As we have previously noted, when we talk about reconciliation it 
is important to bear in mind that there can be no return to the way things were before. Even if 
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peaceful coexistence actually occured in some distant past, conflict imposes a permanent 
transformation of relationships. Thus we are reminded that reconciliation is not so much about 
returning to the innocence of an Edenesque existence, but managing the violent history and 
differences of the present. The impact of societal conflict varies in its significance and intensity, 
certain issues, such as the creation of a healthy democratic process, may seem daunting but exist 
within the realm of possibility. However, the prospect of attempting to resolve other issues can 
easily dampen enthusiasm. The most potent and lasting legacy of violence is given profound 
voice in scripture’s narration of primal conflict: Responding to God’s question about his 
brother’s whereabouts, Cain, with struggling nonchalance, shrugs, “Am I my brother’s keeper?” 
only to be met with God’s damning response, “Listen! Your brother’s blood cries out to me from 
the ground.”194 But what, we might ask, does the blood of Abel cry out for? Various answers are 
possible. Revenge, or perhaps vengeance, yet for most of us, who shrink back from the idea of 
giving voice to revenge, the blood of the victims cries out for justice.  
 Yet as the quotations above demonstrate talk of justice is problematic. For Susin justice 
is an essential means to the realization of ‘everlasting peace.’ On this account there can be no 
question of approaching peace or the reconciliation of divided peoples without a strong 
emphasis on justice. Yet, at the same time Daniel Bell Jr suggests that justice ultimately fails. 
Not because humanity is lacking, but because injustice cannot be undone. The blood that cries 
out from the ground signals an absence that ‘justice’ cannot overcome.195   
 
 
This chapter will argue that justice fails as a means of achieving reconciliation. We will support 
this assertion with reflection under two broad ideas that are encapsulated in the following 
proposition: As a means of contributing to the goal of reconciliation, justice, that is the justice of 
western liberal society, is neither practically efficacious nor theologically adequate. In terms of 
its practical effects justice divides rather than unites and fails to break the cycle of division 
inherent in deeply divided societies. At its best justice merely sanctions division, at its worst 
justice exacerbates existing societal divisions. Secondly, justice is far from monolithic, thus even 
if we decide to pursue justice Alasdair MacIntyre’s question, “Whose Justice?” surely 
complicates any attempt to conceive justice as a helpful way of dealing with the past. At the 
theological level, contemporary notions of justice are a far cry from the form of justice enshrined 
in the New Testament. Any attempt to develop a theology of social reconciliation is required to 
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think carefully about the obvious dissonance between criminal justice and the justice of the 
gospel. While a great deal of effort is expended in theological formulations of social justice, that 
is the Church’s attempt to represent the poor, weak and disenfranchised members of society, the 
current study will concentrate on making a theological comment on the norms and assumptions 
of justice as it is conceived in liberal western societies.  
 To do ‘justice’ to this argument we will have to explore a number of avenues of thought. 
Along with the issues raised above it is important to ask why justice is frequently at the heart of 
thinking about reconciliation. Where does our preoccupation with justice come from? It will also 
be important to consider the possibilities of restorative justice. Does this increasingly popular 
approach to dealing with crime avoid the problems that the standard approach to justice 
contains? 
 It is important to make clear from the outset that this chapter is not an attempt to explore 
justice per se, but rather an attempt to explore the extent to which an emphasis on justice should 
form part of a theology of social reconciliation.196 As we have suggested above there are a 
number of reasons why an emphasis on justice is a mainstay of reflection on reconciliation. Our 
goal in this chapter is to explore the basis of justice’s popularity.  
 
2. Understanding the Importance of Justice 
 
Before commencing a discussion of justice it is important to restate our understanding of 
reconciliation and the nature of the problem that our analysis of reconciliation seeks to address. 
Our discussion in chapter one highlighted the elasticity of the term ‘reconciliation’ and we 
discussed approaches to reconciliation that focused on the interpersonal version of 
reconciliation, i.e. repairing a ruptured friendship and the national form whereby a change in the 
system of government requires a clean break from the past and the legitimization of the new 
regime. While it is fair to say that projects towards reconciliation are generally concerned with 
the same issues and questions it is important to pay close attention to the particular context of 
each move towards reconciliation. The popularity of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
over the past fifteen years highlights the importance of reconciliation, yet has the tendency to 
homogenize reconciliation by giving the impression that an emphasis on reconciliation and a 
desire to attend to historical injustices presents a category of countries where populations are 
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preoccupied with reconciliation. A brief analysis of some examples of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions demonstrates that it is both unwise and inaccurate to group these countries 
together. Three examples will suffice.  
Firstly, in Latin America populations that had suffered under military dictatorships made 
a transition towards democratic rule and sought to explore historical human rights abuses.197 The 
point of the Truth Commissions was to bring to light the details surrounding the murder of 
dissidents and those deemed a problem by the military rulers.198 Secondly, the map of Eastern 
Europe has changed dramatically in the light the collapse of the Soviet bloc.199 Again 
populations sought to make the transition from life under soviet regimes to democratic rule. In a 
move similar to that taken in Latin America it was deemed necessary to address the abuses of 
the former regime. This decision was in part due to the belief that the stability of the democratic 
process required a clear break with the past. Central to achieving this clean break was the 
attempt to prevent those who had previously been in power from reclaiming powerful positions 
in the new government. This process of lustration was particularly concerned with instilling 
confidence in a population who had grown to mistrust those in power. There are strong 
similarities across the geographical boundaries, as Neil Kritz points out, “new terms are created 
for the country or region in question – denazification in Germany after Hitler, defacistization in 
Italy, dejuntafication, decommunization – but they all express the same attempt of a liberated 
society to purge the remnants of its vilified recent past.”200
The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa represents a third type of reconciliation. 
In South Africa the minority white population had consistently oppressed the majority black 
population, denying them basic human rights and organizing governance along racial lines. 
Gross human rights violations took place over a period of many years, yet South Africa made a 
peaceful transition from apartheid to representative democracy. The Truth Commission in South 
Africa placed the emphasis on telling the story of those who had suffered under the old regime 
rather than making an attempt to seek out and punish those who had either ordered or committed 
offences. The approach to dealing with former regimes in these three situations demonstrates a 
number of commonalities. Firstly, they are all making a transition from a form of unjust 
governance to democracy. This is important as we note that the move towards democracy is that 
which requires the focus on reconciliation. The interest in reconciliation is of course concerned 
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with individual people and the way they have suffered, but the priority is the stability of the new 
democratic rule. This becomes clear when we note that the practical concerns of governance 
sometimes outweigh the ethical or moral concerns of addressing the abuses of the past regime. 
Krtiz notes that sometimes those who are implicated in the injustices of the past are essential to 
the smooth transition to democracy. 
Particularly in those countries where the ousted regime was in power for many years, 
these people may be the only one with the knowledge and experience to staff the 
ministries and the banks and the other institutions without which the national 
infrastructure would surely collapse. Practical considerations may make them 
indispensable.201  
 
A second common feature of countries making the transition from repressive regimes to 
democracy is the potential for victor’s justice. Clearly where a transition to democracy is 
possible the old regime has lost and there is an obvious demarcation between those who have 
achieved a political victory and those who have lost political power. While the manner of how to 
implement a victor’s justice is debatable, there is little question surrounding the old regime’s fall 
from power.  
 A third feature is the totality of change. Military juntas, authoritarian regimes and the 
apartheid rulers of South Africa impacted society at every level. Nothing in the ordinary lives of 
the population was left untouched by the regime. The shift to democratic rule is thus rightly 
discussed in revolutionary terms as people witness historic changes in nearly every sphere of 
their lives. The dramatic collapse of a former regime brings with it inevitably dramatic changes 
for the population. 
 
Having briefly sketched out some of the salient features of some of the contexts where 
reconciliation has been central to the success of emerging democracies it is easy to see why 
justice is so prominent. To rehabilitate a population that has suffered under an oppressive regime 
an emphasis on justice inspires confidence and can spearhead the movement away from the 
negative patterns of governance that marred the old regime. Stability is crucial for the success of 
emerging democracies; by prioritizing justice the new political rulers can present a stable and 
cohesive political culture where the grey areas and complete disregard for due process created a 
deeply unstable and uncertain political culture. Those who have been unjustly punished by 
former regimes need to be reintegrated into mainstream society. Their treatment and demands 
for justice can make a significant difference in communities that have suffered the worst 
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excesses of the former regime. Neil Kritz’s three-volume contribution to the conversation about 
transitional justice shows the central importance of the justice dilemma and highlights the fact 
that it is impossible to deal with former regimes without pursuing justice. The importance of 
Kritz’s contribution and also the work of Priscilla B. Hayner is that it takes note of contextual 
differences and how the priorities in South Africa are different from those in Argentina or 
Albania.202 With this in mind it is crucial to ask about the particularities of Northern Ireland. 
Regularly included in lists of countries facing up to their past and a potential location for another 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is Northern Ireland comparable with South Africa, or 
Latin American or Post-Soviet experiences? Northern Ireland is undoubtedly in a period of 
transition, but is this the same sort of transition as those we have just reviewed? This is an 
important question, as it seems that the answer is integral to the sort of reconciliation we 
construct. 
 
Even in the worst days of violence in Northern Ireland it remained a functioning democracy. 
There is clearly a strong argument to be made that prior to the evolution of the civil rights 
movement in the late 1960s there were inherent problems in Northern Irish democracy and it is 
fair to say that Northern Ireland represented a dysfunctional democracy that was preoccupied 
with the interests of the Protestant unionist section of the population and discriminated against 
Catholics at the highest level.203 Housing, employment and education were key areas where the 
Catholic section of Northern Ireland’s population was treated unfairly. The success of the Civil 
rights movement was its ability to highlight these abuses and the fact that the old sectarian form 
of governance was challenged and an emphasis placed on non-discriminatory practices 
constitutes a testimony to the achievement of early civil rights protestors. It is hard to see how 
the violence that irrupted in the late 1960s achieved little more than a hijacking of the civil rights 
movement and a shift in thinking towards a more absolutist ideology on both sides. Northern 
Ireland suffers from the remnants of a protracted political conflict. Central to that conflict and its 
legacy is the problem of a deeply divided society. Thus our approach to the question of justice 
will be particularly concerned to explore the possibilities for justice in a situation of deep 
division. Does justice contribute to the development of reconciliation and the amelioration of a 
deeply divided society?  A violent political conflict leaves a justice deficit in its wake, or at least 
causes a problem that many believe only justice can solve. As the forgoing discussion makes 
                                                 
202 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 
2002).  
203 See Tim Pat Coogan’s The Troubles:Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1997 (Lanham, MD: Roberts Rinehart, 1997) for a 
compelling rehearsal of this argument.  
 71
clear, justice makes repeated appearances in both the academic literature and the media’s 
discussion of reconciliation. While the contextual examples above shed some light on the 
reasons for the prominence of justice it is worth reflecting further on the abiding significance of 
justice.  
 
3. Justice and Reconciliation 
There are at least three reasons why justice is central to a discussion of reconciliation. Broadly 
speaking these are: (i) the moral sense, (ii) political utility and (iii) the legal imperative. While 
its meaning and significance are open to debate it is clear that human beings possess a moral 
sense of or perhaps for justice. This sense can vary from person to person or community to 
community, but it is clear that people share a feeling, intuition or impulse that deems certain acts 
wrong and demands that something happens to rectify the situation. The broad range of 
emotions, traditions and ideologies involved in the moral sense for justice makes this 
particularly difficult to quantify. However, it does have philosophical pedigree in Immanuel 
Kant’s formulation of deontological ethics. As Michael Sandel points out, Kant’s version of the 
primacy of justice understands justice in a straightforward moral sense, 
It says that justice is primary in that the demands of justice outweigh other moral and 
political interests, however pressing these others may be. On this view, justice is not 
merely one value among others, to be weighed and considered as the occasion arises, but 
the highest of all social virtues, the one that must be met before others can make their 
claims.204  
Sandel goes on to show that a fully deontological ethic is not simply about morals, but 
concerned with the foundation of morals or what Kant would have called its ‘determining 
ground,’ 
On the full deontological view, the primacy of justice describes not only a moral priority 
but also a privileged form of justification; the right is prior to the good not only in that its 
claims take precedence, but also in that its principles are independently derived. This 
means that, unlike other practical injunctions, principles of justice are justified in a way 
that does not depend on any particular vision of the good. To the contrary: given its 
independent status, the right constrains the good and sets its bounds.205
 
There are, of course, many questions raised by Kant’s understanding of the genesis of morality. 
Yet his transcendental arguments, i.e. his attempt to seek out the presuppositions of certain 
indispensable features of experience, do resonate with what the person in the street would 
describe as their moral sense, a sense that leads to moral outrage when individuals perceive 
injustice. This is well illustrated by the apparent majority who complain angrily when prisoners 
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are provided with therapeutic leisure activities to aid their recovery or given legal aid to argue 
that their human rights have been violated by conditions in prison. While the evidence for this 
outrage is hardly empirical it is clear that some sense of justice fuels complaints of this kind.206  
 A second reason for the prominence of justice in moves towards reconciliation is found 
in its political utility. This is particularly relevant where a nation makes a transition from one 
form of governance to another, usually from a negative form to a positive. From a political 
perspective the break from an authoritarian rule or dictatorship is not simply a matter of 
removing high officials and initiating a people’s revolution. Once the initial excitement of 
revolution has petered out it is essential for politicians to bring stability and initiate reforms that 
will demonstrate both a clean break from the past and legitimize the new from of government. 
Crimes against citizens during the old regime and questions about those who have been deprived 
of civil or human rights are a potentially destabilizing factor that must be explored. Civil 
servants or politicians who worked within the structures of the old system who remain in their 
jobs are also likely to prompt questions about the legitimacy of the new system. Both of these 
factors force politicians to confront the past and engage in ‘Transitional Justice’. This factor 
explains why a great deal of literature on reconciliation focuses in on justice.  
 A final reason for the centrality of justice in thought about reconciliation is found in the 
legal imperatives that frame life in modern societies. These legal imperatives can be both 
internal in that they stem from the legal traditions of a nation or external in that they come via 
the pressure of international law. Modern society takes a highly legislated form. By that we 
mean to say that our activities as individuals or members of a collective have legal consequences 
and are framed by the limits of the law. Regardless of our position in society we all live under 
certain legal restrictions that serve to outlaw certain types of behaviour and practice. These laws 
are not revoked in situations of political conflict. Thus while in moments of crisis less emphasis 
may be placed on enforcing a particular law or ensuring prosecution for particular offences, the 
law still stands. That this is the case has cultural implications and thus when the legal 
imperatives or assumptions of modern life in Northern Ireland coalesce with a sense of moral 
outrage a formidable recommendation of justice occurs.  
In Northern Ireland all three reasons for the importance of justice work together. Thus 
talk of reconciliation and exploration of forgiveness, amnesty or investigation of the past 
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encounters strong opposition where individuals have a strong sense of injustice, where these 
same individuals have their perception of communal life shaped by legal imperatives and where 
other high profile attempts towards reconciliation have prioritized justice and insisted that it is 
essential to their transition.  This is not an attempt to evaluate critically each of the three reasons 
for the prominence of justice. It is rather an attempt to explain the self-evident importance of 
justice and explore why a prioritization of justice continually recurs in the literature on 
reconciliation. For those involved in reconciliation in Northern Ireland there is a complex mix of 
reasons that drive demands for justice. A mixture of reasons and motivations that are already in 
place before we turn to the equally complex question of talking about justice where conflicted 
communities possess divergent and competing understandings of what justice means and how it 
might be achieved. For further insight on the question of justice we turn to the work of Alasdair 
MacIntyre.  
 
4. Reading MacIntyre in Northern Ireland 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on justice, in particular his seminal study, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? is germane for an analysis of justice in Northern Ireland.207 At its most basic level 
MacIntyre’s contribution alerts us to the important question of differing conceptions or 
rationalities concerning justice. Thus when faced with the question of justice or a set of demands 
for justice it is essential, according to MacIntyre, that we avoid a univocal conception of justice. 
This has obvious significance for ethical and moral questions that go far beyond the bounds of a 
discussion of reconciliation, for example the ‘popular’ dilemmas concerning the development 
and use of nuclear or chemical weapons, military intervention, the death penalty or abortion. 
From the outset MacIntyre asks us to consider the intimidating range of responses to these 
dilemmas that stems from beliefs about the requirements and demands of justice. Often justice 
demands or requires contradictory or incompatible courses of action.208 MacIntyre points out, 
Underlying this wide diversity of judgments upon particular types of issue are a set of 
conflicting conceptions of justice, conceptions which are strikingly at odds with one 
another in a number of ways. Some conceptions of justice make the concept of desert 
central, while others deny it any relevance at all. Some conceptions appeal to inalienable 
human rights, others to some notion of social contract, and others again to a standard 
utility. Moreover, the rival theories of justice which embody these rival conceptions also 
give expression to disagreements about the relationship of justice to other human goods, 
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about the kind of equality which justice requires, about the range of transactions and 
persons to which considerations of justice are relevant, and about whether or not a 
knowledge of justice is possible without a knowledge of God’s law.209  
 
According to MacIntyre, national debates about issues of justice are impossible in pluralistic 
societies given the incommensurability of perspectives on justice. For MacIntyre social groups 
in contention over justice cannot agree on rational grounds and thus appeal to their rival 
convictions, making no attempt to offer a rational justification. As MacIntyre observes, 
Disputed questions concerning justice and practical rationality are thus treated in the 
public realm, not as a matter for rational enquiry, but rather for the assertion and counter 
assertion of alternative and incompatible sets of premises.210
 
As MacIntyre’s argument proceeds we see that while he has much to say about justice and our 
attempts towards rational discourse in the public square, he is equally preoccupied with his role 
as a philosophical town crier, vigorously proclaiming the death of a central aspiration of the 
Enlightenment. For Enlightenment thinkers debate in the public square required methods and 
standards of rationality and justification that would permit the rational adjudication of 
contentious issues. Thus, “it was hoped, reason would displace authority and tradition.”211 As 
MacIntyre points out, this is a noble aspiration, yet the thinkers of the enlightenment and those 
who carried on their legacy failed to provide the essential formulation of principles that could be 
agreed upon by all rational persons. MacIntyre laments, “Consequently, the legacy of the 
Enlightenment has been the provision of an ideal of rational justification which it has proved 
impossible to attain.”212 Our social location has a profound impact on our beliefs and practices 
and this is not necessarily a bad thing. As Michael Sandel points out, “To imagine a person 
incapable of constitutive attachments is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to 
imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth.”213 The failure of the 
Enlightenment ideal prompts MacIntyre to assert the tradition-bound nature of theories of 
justice. He explains, 
Theories of justice and practical rationality confront us as aspects of traditions, 
allegiance to which requires the living out of some more or less systematically embodied 
form of human life, each with its own specific modes of social relationship, each with its 
own canons of interpretations and explanation in respect of the behaviour of others, each 
with its own evaluative practices.214  
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The relevance of MacIntyre’s work for Northern Ireland is clear. When we talk about justice as 
an essential part of a process of reconciliation it is imperative that we consider the divergent 
understandings of justice that are embodied in the multiple traditions that exist in Northern 
Ireland. At least three traditions are relevant to the discussion. Firstly, there is a 
Republican/Nationalist tradition that is made up of mainly Catholic members of the population. 
It is of course a ‘broad church’ so it is difficult to say that conceptions of justice will be shared 
by all those who might identify themselves with this group. This tradition has frequently 
understood itself, as having suffered discrimination and injustice, thus rights and the 
reassessment of historical injustices are important. Certain acts of violence may, for some, be 
interpreted as necessary and justified under certain conditions.215 Secondly, we have the 
Unionist/ Loyalist tradition. Again this is an unfortunately wide-ranging category. But it can be 
said that members of this tradition typically see themselves as law-abiding citizens who were 
forced into a conflict for defensive purposes. Where certain members of the first tradition 
refused to recognize the authority of British justice, members of the Unionist/loyalist community 
found it confusing when they were imprisoned in one of her Majesty’s prisons. As graffiti in 
loyalist areas proclaimed, “Their only crime was loyalty.”216 Finally there is a third tradition. 
This is the institutionalized form of justice embodied in the British legal system that is 
normative in Northern Ireland. This tradition is important as it plays a significant role in shaping 
perceptions of justice and is an essential ingredient in how the first two traditions approach the 
question of justice. The existence of all three traditions needs to be taken into consideration in 
any attempt to think through questions of justice in the Northern Irish context. 
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 The importance of MacIntyre’s contribution to the debate is made clear when we look at 
the way people approach the question of justice in Northern Ireland. Father Gerry O’Hanlon’s 
essay ‘Justice and Reconciliation’ serves as a good example of one who hasn’t taken MacIntyre 
into consideration.217 O’ Hanlon covers most of the key issues involved in an analysis of justice. 
His essay explores a biblical approach to justice and attempts to integrate this biblical 
conception with interpersonal and socio-political queries about justice. However, O’Hanlon 
conducts his discussion of justice without ever reflecting on the problem of how divided 
communities may hold incommensurable perceptions of justice. It is all very well to talk about 
the importance of justice and the need for victims to be given a sense that their experience of 
injustice has been addressed. Yet, O’Hanlon’s approach suggests that he believes in a univocal 
form of justice. Thus his initial questions are not concerned with addressing divergent 
understandings or rationalities, but raising the apparent tensions that exist between a desire for 
reconciliation and the demands of justice. This is an important question, but it would seem to be 
crucial that we discuss the problem of tradition-bound justice before we begin to treat justice as 
an uncontested idea. Media and community-level demands for justice are replete with examples 
of strong calls for justice or the assertion that justice must be done without ever acknowledging 
the problem that one version of justice may be perceived as injustice to another community. The 
point of our argument is not to say that tradition-bound justice needs to be abandoned. The work 
of MacIntyre and Sandel amongst others shows that the Enlightenment ideal of a “view from 
nowhere” is impossible. Instead, at least three insights follow from MacIntyre’s work. Firstly, as 
we have pointed out, there needs to be recognition that justice is not a singular or univocal 
concept. If this insight is taken seriously it will become an essential part of our reflection on 
justice. Secondly, and closely related to the first observation, is the realization that divided 
communities need to converse about justice, rather than simply highlight individual cases of 
injustice. Rather than beginning with a focus on addressing individual examples communities 
need to engage in an exchange of ideas about their perceptions of justice and, perhaps more 
importantly, their perceptions of injustice.  
Judith Shklar in her important book The Faces of Injustice ponders the peculiarity of 
how our understanding of injustice is usually defined as the absence of an abstract form of 
justice.218 Explaining the thesis of her book she notes, 
The conventional pictorial representation of injustice shows a devil breaking the scales 
of justice, tearing the blindfold from her eyes, and beating her up. Injustice simply 
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destroys justice. Moreover, although almost all versions of the normal model begin with 
a brief sketch of injustice, it is clear that it is significant only as the sort of conduct that 
the rules of justice are designed to control or eliminate. Injustice is mentioned to tell us 
what must and can be avoided, and once this preliminary task has been quickly 
accomplished, one can turn with relief to the real business of ethics: justice. I propose to 
question this program because it does not treat injustice with the intellectual respect it 
deserves.219
 
Shklar’s argument alerts us to an aspect of the justice debate that is frequently overlooked. 
Namely that energy is typically poured into efforts to establish the nature of justice, rather than a 
conversation about injustice. A move towards reconciliation in Northern Ireland would profit if 
efforts were made to explore definitions of injustice, rather than simply assuming that injustice 
is an absence of an abstract understanding of justice. As Shklar points out injustice is not simply 
breaking rules, “Most injustices occur continuously within the framework of an established 
polity with an operative system of law…often it is the very people who are supposed to prevent 
injustice who, in their official capacity, commit the gravest acts of injustice, without much 
protest from the citizenry.”220  
Thirdly, it is important to note that MacIntyre’s understanding of how our definitions of 
justice are bound by tradition does not mean that we ignore those voices that call for justice. 
Recognizing the complexity of defining justice does not result in an abdication of any attempt to 
establish a just society or address past injustices. However, MacIntyre’s work should sound a 
note of caution to any attempts to approach reconciliation as something that simply requires the 
implementation of justice or to assume that justice is an unambiguous key to the process of 
reconciliation. We have already shown how the idea of justice takes root in people’s minds in 
such a way that its importance becomes an unquestioned assumption. By way of MacIntyre we 
want to complicate that assumption and suggest that a singular focus on justice will not 
necessarily further the aims of reconciliation. Deeply divided societies may in fact feel the need 
to substitute other ‘goods’ for justice as they try to overcome the divisions that have perpetuated 
political conflict.  
 
5. Ineffective and Inadequate: Justice as suum cuique 
 
In modern liberal societies justice is understood primarily in a distributive sense. The idea or 
ideal of suum cuique  - ‘to each what is due,’ is central to our conception of what justice is and 
what justice requires. The problem with this conception of justice, as we shall demonstrate, is 
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that distributive justice is inherently divisive and contributes nothing to the unification of 
divided societies. Thus we suggest that distributive justice is inimical to the aims of 
reconciliation. To argue this point successfully we are required to offer a brief summary of the 
development of understandings of justice from the classical conception, through the medieval 
version to today’s “rights-based” understanding of justice.  
Daniel Bell, Jr. tells the story of the evolution of justice to great effect in his various 
analyses of Liberation Theology and the way Latin American theologians construe justice.221 
Bell begins by pointing out that the classical understanding of suum cuique begins with 
Aristotle. For Aristotle justice was both general and particular. General justice was concerned 
with the good or end (telos) of society as a whole, particular justice addressed the good of 
individuals, making sure that they shared in the common good by receiving what was due to 
them. Particular justice was subdivided into distributive and corrective forms of justice. As we 
might imagine, distributive justice deals with the division of goods among individuals, 
corrective justice attempts to rectify any harms that may occur during the course of individual 
relations. Central to the classic conception of justice was the belief that the good had priority 
over the right. So when deciding what is just the classical conception depends on a prior 
determination of the good for humanity or society. An agreement on the nature of justice is only 
possible after the agreement of what constitutes the proper end or good for humanity.  
 Various technological and philosophical factors associated with the rise of modernity 
brought about a radical departure from the classical view. As Bell points out, “the classical view 
of justice carried the day for over a millennium, when developments associated with the birth of 
modernity and the ascendancy of liberal political philosophy gave rise to a host of competing 
theories of justice erected upon a very different vision of society.”222 Modernity brought about a 
shift from the classic sense of community as a matter of solidarity in a shared telos to a more 
fragmented understanding of community with a thinner conception of the good that brings 
people together. Liberalism conceives society as a mass of individuals, each with their own 
interests, ends and conceptions of what constitutes the good life. As Anthony Arblaster 
observes, 
Liberal individualism involves seeing the individual as primary, as more ‘real’ or 
fundamental than human society and its institutions and structures. It also involves 
attaching a higher moral value to the individual than to society or to any collective or 
group. In this sense the individual comes before society in every sense. He is more real 
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than society…he is seen as existing before society temporally as well. Finally, his rights 
and demands come morally before those of society.223
 
 While the classical conception prioritized the good over the right, liberalism inverts this logic 
and gives the right priority over the good. Thus the determination of justice is reached before 
any agreement about what might constitute the good or telos of society. As this evolution 
progresses justice becomes increasingly distributive. This in turn sees “right” become a matter 
of discrete “rights” which are located in sovereign individuals who possess them prior to any 
communal bonds. According to this scheme justice is understood as a police force that 
supervises the competition of rival interests as individuals compete for society’s resources in 
pursuit of private ends.  
 This modern vision of justice is clearly evident in three dominant philosophical accounts: 
deontological theories, utilitarian theories and contractarian theories. Deontological theories of 
the sort associated with the work of Immanuel Kant, stress the strict adherence to universally 
applicable rules and a respect for individuals. By stressing universal rules and emphasizing the 
place of individuals, deontological theories lead towards an ethic based on rights. Secondly, 
Utilitarian theories, of the sort associated with John Stuart Mill or Jeremy Bentham, understand 
justice as ‘the greatest good for the greatest number.’ However, given the absence of any 
agreement about what might constitute the ‘greatest good’, utilitarian theories tend to focus on 
individual rights. Thus individuals may pursue their own goods, with the sum of these 
individuals pursuing private goods amounting to the greatest good for the greatest number. 
Finally, contractarian theories, such as those associated with John Locke or more recently John 
Rawls, cast justice as the product of a social contract between individuals who surrender their 
individual rights to the state for the sake of mutual advantage and protection. Once again justice 
is construed in terms of rights. Individuals cooperate and agree on certain rules or procedures of 
justice to maximize their ability to pursue private ends.  
 The point of Bell’s argument is to draw attention to the divisive tendencies inherent in 
the prevailing western notion of justice. For our purposes Bell’s estimation of contemporary 
notions of justice further problematises the question of justice. As Bell points out, 
Justice that is primarily distributive rather than unitive essentially becomes simply the 
regulator of conflict; it becomes a matter of maintaining the peace between the multiple 
private goods that compete for society’s resources…a tenuous balance of power that 
could at any moment issue in renewed conflict and violence…[Distributive justice] only 
perpetuates the violence and prolongs the conflict that afflicts people. This holds true 
even when it is successful in reasserting violated rights and re-establishing the volatile 
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equilibrium between competing claims on the fruits of society. Even when successful it 
does not pave the way for new relations among peoples, relations that might transcend 
the truce of mutual advantage. Instead it keeps humanity trapped in an agonistic logic 
where the mutual recognition of rights is constantly threatened by the pull of competing 
visions of the good.224
 
The prevailing notion of justice as a means of securing individual rights will inevitably fail to 
contribute positively to attempts to overcome societal divisions. As Bell reminds us, this 
conclusion does not stem from an overly pessimistic estimation of human beings, but from a 
consideration of the logic of how justice is understood in liberal western societies. Justice is not 
a neutral ‘force’ or reality but a concept set on a particular trajectory. This trajectory will result 
in a greater sense of division in already divided societies and a failure to meet the needs of those 
who are the victims in violent societies or societies living with the burden of internecine 
violence. Having highlighted the practical insufficiencies of justice we turn now to the question 
of its theological adequacy. 
6. The Inversion of Justice 
 
Justice as suum cuique offers an inadequate understanding of the Christian message of salvation. 
While it is safe to say that the theme of justice is central to both the Hebrew bible and the New 
Testament, the idea that God operates on the principles of ‘rendering what is due’ in his attitude 
and acts towards the world finds little support. As we shall argue there is strong sense of deeply 
ingrained human conceptions of justice being overturned in God’s economy of salvation.  
 Our concern in this chapter is an attempt to show God’s inversion of human categories of 
justice. Yet, this strain of the Christian message has been muted by a louder, more influential 
theology of the atonement that provided the theological justification for an overtly punitive 
strain of criminal justice. As Timothy Gorringe argues in his persuasive study, God’s Just 
Vengeance the satisfaction theory of the atonement exercised a potent ideological function when 
it came to the justification of retributive justice.225 In his important study, Beyond 
Retribution,226 Christopher D. Marshall begins by asking what it is that the Apostle Paul meant 
when he described the gospel as the revelation of the justice of God.227 Marshall, who places 
particular emphasis on restorative justice, argues that Paul’s understanding of justice has been 
obscured by the imposition of western legal categories, noting,  
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Paul’s interpreters have unwittingly brought to the text an essentially western concept of 
retributive justice based on a metaphysical law rather than a Hebraic concept of covenant 
justice based on relationship…this [western] concept of justice is based on the notion of 
an abstract moral order in which imbalances must be righted and each person receive 
precisely what is due. 
 
Marshall’s observation invokes what Alan Torrance describes as the ‘myth of the scales’ that is 
central to a great deal of thinking about justice in the west. That this ‘myth’ has exercised 
considerable influence over Christian understandings of atonement is clear. According to the 
‘myth of the scales’ justice is understood as a metaphysical reality that quite literally must be 
kept in balance. The myth of the scales takes us to the heart of retributive justice. Where an 
offence occurs it must be balanced out with an appropriate punishment. Appropriate on this 
scheme means a punishment that will restore metaphysical equilibrium to the scales of justice. 
According to the logic of this metaphor justice and mercy are caught in perpetual tension.  For 
showing mercy involves a disruption of the scales of justice; failing to restore balance is 
unthinkable. As Marshall points out, 
On this scheme God is duty bound, by God’s own righteous character, to punish 
wrongdoers and thus uphold the moral order God has created. God cannot overlook 
breaches of universal law, for then the universe would become a disordered and irrational 
place. While God is loving and merciful, God cannot simply forgive sin, for God’s 
justice also demands satisfaction.228
 
One could even go beyond the thought expressed here and say that it not merely ‘God’s justice’ 
that demands satisfaction, but an external reality of justice that cannot be violated, even by God.  
For obvious reasons Christ’s crucifixion is essential to the logic of retribution. While the 
demands of justice prevent God from showing mercy to humanity, the cross allows God to 
satisfy justice by inflicting the penalty of sin on Jesus Christ. This version of events highlights a 
number of important aspects of the theology of justice in Christian tradition. Firstly, the way that 
justice and mercy are routinely placed in an agonistic framework, as if both impulses war against 
each other in God’s seemingly schizophrenic personality. Secondly, at the very point where 
biblical testimony would seem to prioritize mercy, namely the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus, the retributive tradition sees a perfect example of the triumph of justice and the 
opportunity to show mercy. Rendering what is due is clearly an inescapable part of the logic of 
justice on this scheme.  
 Yet Marshall and others seek to remove what they see as the obfuscating façade of this 
interpretation. For Marshall the retributive theory with its emphasis on satisfaction, the 
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balancing of an abstract, metaphysical justice and rendering what is due completely misses the 
emphatic subversion of the myth of the scales that is narrated by the New Testament. Marshall’s 
point is to suggest that the gospel is indeed the revelation of the justice of God, but that this 
justice is a far cry from the justice of retribution. The telos of God’s action in the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus is not an attempt to restore a metaphysical equilibrium but to overcome the 
breach in a relationship. A telos, as Marshall and others are quick to point out that cannot be 
served by retribution. Attempting to reconfigure our understanding of justice, Thomas Talbot 
asks, “What specifically does perfect justice require? What sort of thing would make up for, or 
cancel out, sin? If we accept the Christian view, according to which sin is anything that separates 
us from God and from each other, then the answer to our question is clear: Perfect justice 
requires reconciliation and restoration.”229 We note that Marshall, Talbot and others do not 
jettison the language of justice. The opposite is in fact the case as Marshall is at pains to show 
just how significant a theme justice is in the pages of scripture. Their strategy is instead to 
endow justice with new meaning. To recover what they see as ‘true justice’ and thus challenge 
the satisfaction version that has held sway over the tradition for centuries.230
 For the purposes of our argument it is sufficient to see that the justice of suum cuique is a 
theologically inadequate way to configure justice as it fails to capture accurately the way God 
subverts the norms of justice in the gospel and forces a semantic revision on the part of those 
who subscribe to the myth of the scales. Marshall captures the essence of this subversion of the 
normal canons of justice in the following observation, 
True justice resides in the restoring of relationships and the recreation of shalom. It is 
only when the cycle of evil is broken and as far as possible, the consequences of criminal 
action remedied, consequences which blight the lies of both crime victims and their 
abuses – only then is true justice modeled by God, attained in measure.231
 
Marshall et al leave us with the distinct impression that a program of restorative justice should 
replace the prevailing retributive paradigm. This prompts us to see the potential significance of 
restorative justice in a deeply divided society. Does restorative justice avoid the difficulties we 
have outlined?  
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7. Reconciliation and the Promise of Restorative Justice 
 
Howard Zehr’s Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice makes an important 
contribution to the debate on restorative justice. Zehr’s passion for photography informs the 
conceptualities of his approach to crime and punishment and his central metaphor of ‘changing 
lenses’ is derived from his experiences as a photographer. Zehr’s work is important for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, he offers a robust critique of our standard understanding and practice of 
criminal justice. Secondly after rejecting the prevailing model, he offers a compelling 
articulation of why the restorative justice paradigm is a potentially constructive and much more 
helpful way of approaching crime and punishment. To understand Zehr’s approach to restorative 
justice and how it may serve our own interests we need first to turn to his critique of the standard 
approach taken to crime and punishment in criminal justice.  
 Central to Zehr’s analysis of theories of criminal justice is his analysis of the way we 
conceptualise crime and the victims of crime. Zehr notes that once a crime is reported and the 
offence considered serious enough for prosecution, the question of the identity of the victim 
becomes unclear. Once the police, lawyers and the courts become involved the victim is no 
longer an individual who has suffered at the hands of another, but rather the victim of the crime 
is now understood as society in general and society, embodied in a court of law, will punish the 
offender. Zehr considers this shift problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, he notes that 
once this shift occurs the original victim is left out of the whole process. Unless he or she is 
required to give evidence in court they are now “peripheral to the justice process. In the legal 
process, victims represent footnotes to the crime.”232 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
the original offence is no longer understood as an act perpetrated against an individual human 
being with entirely negative consequences, but is now conceived as an offence against society or 
the state and more importantly as an insistence of law breaking. This move has problematic 
consequences for the offender’s perception of the crime. “The idea that [an] offence is against 
society,” notes Zehr, “rarely makes sense to offenders. It is too abstract and their own 
identification with society is too limited.”233 Thirdly, it is clear that one of Zehr’s key concerns 
is that offenders learn lessons of responsibility. Much of what we call crime can be seen, 
according to Zehr, as particularly potent examples of irresponsible behaviour, or what might be 
described as the culmination of a pattern or lifestyle of irresponsibility. For Zehr a crucial step in 
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undoing the damage done by crime or at least preventing re-offending is for offenders to learn 
responsibility. This latter point prompts his trenchant criticism of our presumption that 
imprisonment is the only possible destination for those convicted of crime and worse still the 
unquestioned belief that prison allows the individual time to contemplate their actions and see 
where they went wrong.234 Zehr argues that these assumptions about prison and its potential for 
the rehabilitation of the offender are fictional. The prison experience of the average offender will 
afford little opportunity to learn about responsibility or alternatives to violence. It will in fact 
result in the opposite. Prisons are notoriously violent places where individuals learn how to 
survive in the harshest of social environments. Rather than learning responsible citizenship 
prisoners enter a situation where they have no decisions to make about the basic aspects of their 
life, eating, dressing, interacting with others and work. They are highly institutionalised and may 
learn only how to be devious. Zehr notes that another lesson learned in prison is that 
“manipulation is control. How else after all, can such few prison authorities manage so many 
prisoners, given such limited resources? In short the convict learns to con.”235 Or as Jude Dennis 
Challeen puts it: 
We want prisoners to have self worth…. 
So we destroy their self worth… 
We want them to be responsible… 
So we take away all responsibilities… 
We want them to be positive and constructive… 
So we degrade them and make them useless… 
We want them to be non-violent… 
So we put them where there is violence all around.236
 
Zehr’s critique of the way criminal justice understands crime and how society seeks to deal with 
crime rests on his own understanding of crime and its ramifications. For Zehr crime is a 
violation, a desecration of who we are and of what we believe, it is an invasion of our private 
space, an attack upon our personhood. As we can see this conceptualisation of crime is a far cry 
from the broken laws of an abstract state.237 In an instance of crime the individual victim of 
crime experiences a loss of control and an overwhelming sense that someone else is in control of 
their life. For Zehr crime undermines two fundamental assumptions. Firstly, the assumption that 
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the world is “an orderly, predictable, understandable place.”238 Secondly, the assumption that we 
have personal autonomy, as Zehr points out “to be deprived unwillingly of personal power, to be 
involuntarily in the control of others, is intensely degrading and dehumanising.”239 Crime 
destroys our sense of autonomy. Zehr’s concern is to highlight the psychological ramifications 
of crime. Of course he acknowledges that victims of crime may suffer physical violations and be 
damaged physically in an instance of crime. However, he clearly believes that the essence of 
what makes crime so traumatic lies in the psychological experience of an unpredictable event 
taking control of one’s life, rather than broken bones or wounds. Crime raises difficult questions, 
questions that are similar to those asked by someone diagnosed with a life threatening illness: 
Why did this happen to me? What did I do to deserve this? For Zehr we fail victims if we do not 
attempt to answer these questions, for it is in these questions that victims assert their feelings 
about crime.  
 Conceptualising crime as law breaking will fail to address any of these questions because 
it fails to acknowledge the victim’s experience of crime. As Zehr notes, “Instead of 
concentrating on the actual harm done or on what the victim and offender have experienced, we 
focus on the act of breaking the law. The act of breaking a law, not the damage or conflict, 
defines the offence and triggers the justice process. Zehr’s account of criminal justice raises five 
assumptions that he believes we make when we think about crime and punishment: (1) crime is 
essentially law-breaking; (2) when a law is broken, justice involves establishing guilt; (3) so that 
just deserts can be meted out; (4) by inflicting pain; (5) through a conflict in which rules and 
intentions are placed above outcomes.240 The drama of criminal justice is played out underneath 
the figure that epitomises justice; in the architecture of our courts justice is conceived as a 
blindfolded goddess balancing scales. Two foundational ideas are bound up in the statue of 
justice. Firstly, the metaphor of the scales, justice requires that we correct an imbalance and thus 
proportionality is given a metaphysical grounding. Secondly, the blindfolded goddess suggests 
an ideal of equality, justice is blind to external factors, only the hard facts of the case are 
required and everyone is treated equally. Yet, this naïve vision of equality is easily shattered 
when one thinks about the actual workings of justice. Two factors are worth considering. Firstly, 
external factors are not incidental to a crime, social, moral and personal factors are all part and 
parcel of a person’s participation in an offence. While the law may attempt to be abstract, crime 
is highly subjective. Secondly, society does not operate on the principle of equality. One 
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individual may have access to better legal advice and thus the abstract blindness of justice may 
further inequality rather than promote equality. Moreover while the courts may idealise the blind 
goddess it is clear that race, gender, class and creed all play a part in one’s experience of justice. 
While the workings of justice may be abstract in the legal sense those who bring the workings of 
law to fruition are neither blind nor abstracted from the process.  
The justice enshrined in the western legal system fails to make a positive contribution to the goal 
of reconciliation. However, a program of restorative justice would surely help achieve the goal 
of reconciliation. Marshall et al suggest that a concept of restorative justice is much closer to the 
biblical understanding of justice than the overly punitive strain that many believe the bible 
teaches. If we are serious about allowing the concept of reconciliation to inform our thinking 
then restorative justice rather than criminal justice should be the focus of our attempts to 
incorporate justice into our approach to reconciliation. Criminal justice divides and prevents the 
restoration of relationships. It is abstract and does not permit the victim or perpetrator to engage 
in any meaningful way. Restorative justice refuses to abstract the victim from the perpetrator 
and offers a potential way of addressing past events while simultaneously allowing a 
conversation to develop between victim and perpetrator.  
 
Conclusion 
In the end justice fails. As a means of dealing with the past and healing the deep divisions of the 
present, justice, as it is normally understood does not contribute positively to the project of 
reconciliation. Rather than putting the past to rest justice often makes societal divisions more 
permanent. By becoming fixated on justice as the means of making wrongs right we fail to see 
that injustice can never be undone, that innocent victims cannot be brought back by punishing 
perpetrators, that punishing one person does not restore society’s equilibrium. The painful 
fractures of deeply divided societies are pushed further into the fabric of society with every 
attempt to pursue justice. As we ask these questions it is crucial that we be willing to move 
beyond mere rhetoric and the assumptions we rarely scrutinize. For example much is said and 
done on the part of victims who died in a conflict, yet no one can ever know what those victims 
would want said or done in their name. Secondly, while it is important that the wishes of victims 
are not ignored, it is equally important that others have a say about the direction of 
reconciliation, thus enabling reconciliation to remain linked to the past, while always looking to 
the future.  
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While we are arguing that justice, as it is normally understood, fails, it is important to 
face the difficult consequences of such a judgment. Unfortunately it is rarely admitted that 
reconciliation is a bitter and painful medicine that requires people to deny their most 
understandable emotions and reactions. While reconciliation is undoubtedly positive and brings 
with it good and necessary changes to society it frequently brings further pain before the 
promised peace. It requires that those with the greatest claim to what they understand as justice 
settle for something that is often less than what they expect or deserve.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
 
 
After the Violence: 
   Forgiving, Forgetting and Facing the Past    
 
 
History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake. 
 
Stephen Dedalus, in James Joyce’s Ulysses. 
 
The past isn’t dead and gone it isn’t even past. 
 
William Faulkner 
 
 
Central to any process of reconciliation is the question of how we address the past. As tentative steps 
towards future co-existence are taken the challenge of the past is rarely far away. We have seen that the 
justice represented in our courts and enshrined in our legal systems too easily fails to address the past in 
such a way that the goal of reconciliation remains central to the process. Justice risks causing division 
rather than unity and adds permanence to social divisions. In this chapter we turn to an exploration of 
forgiveness as a possible way of addressing the past. To argue in favour of forgiveness requires that we 
face a number of conceptual difficulties that appear with the suggestion that forgiveness succeeds where 
justice fails. The following chapter will further analyse the question of what we mean by the past, assess 
the viability of forgetting rather than forgiving and attempt to offer a theological response to the question 
of forgiveness and agency.   
 
Conceptualising “The Past” 
 
Regardless of our personal histories we all have something in our past that we wish we could 
change. Yet by talking about a regrettable aspect ‘in’ our past we are actually signalling that this 
event or action is still very much in the present. If it were truly past would we still regret it? 
What would there be to regret? While our own complicated struggles with the past may prove 
disturbing they pale significantly when compared to the challenges faced by divided 
communities as they attempt to address the painful memories of their violent history. As we 
think about Northern Ireland’s bitter and divisive history we see that even talking about ‘the 
past’ is problematic, as at least three different versions of the past emerge.  
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Firstly, there is the past of a grieving widow or a son or daughter who lost a parent 
during the many years of internecine violence. This is a highly personalised sort of past, where 
the absence of an individual person leaves a particular space in the present lives of those left 
behind. Perhaps the most emotive of the pasts we face, it is the least influential at the political 
level. Given its highly personal nature it is a delicate and difficult past to address.241  
Secondly, we face the past of the political activist. This is the past that inspires the 
politics of the present and is often highly influential on contemporary political development. 
Marie Drumm, a Sinn Fein leader who was murdered in October 1976, gave voice to this 
version of the past when she wrote, 
We will not take any steps backwards; our steps will be onward; for if we don’t, the 
ghosts of the martyrs who died for you, for me, for this country will haunt us for 
eternity.242  
 
While Drumm’s statement could be dismissed as poetic political rhetoric it is important to 
recognise that this highly idealised vision of the past is (a) part and parcel of the way certain 
quarters of Northern Ireland’s population actually view the past and (b) a highly effective way of 
influencing current political decision making.243  Similar to the way we use the putative future 
of our descendents as a means of encouraging peace or the responsible treatment of our natural 
environment, the ‘ghosts’ of the past are a potent force in the political imaginations of many. 
Despite the passing of time these ‘volunteers’ or ‘martyrs’ play an important role as political 
lodestars for contemporary activists. As Malachi O’Doherty observes, 
The virtue that is most admired in Republican culture is the tenacity of one who never doubts and 
who deals with the doubts of others. The dead are honoured for keeping faith with a tradition and 
passing it on.244
 
Ignoring this version of the past risks the creation of historical somnambulists, dangerous creatures who 
stagger into the future never quite waking from the dreams and nightmares of the past. Yet addressing 
this version of the past presents a complex and highly political challenge. How does one deal with those 
                                                 
241 See D.McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney and C. Thornton, eds. Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and 
Children who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company, 
1999), for an imaginative attempt to memorialise the victims of ‘The Troubles’.   
242 Quoted in Malachi O’Doherty The Trouble with Guns (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1998), 141.  
243 One only needs to look at Northern Ireland’s political wall murals to see examples of the differing ways that both 
sides of the conflict have chosen to idealise Northern Ireland as either the lost province of ancient Ireland or a last 
bastion of loyalty to the British crown. See Bill Rolston, Politics & Painting: Murals and Conflict in Northern 
Ireland (London: Associated University Press, 1991), Drawing Support: Murals in the North of Ireland (Belfast: 
Beyond the Pale, 1992) and Jeffery A. Sluka, ‘The Writing’s On the Wall,’ Critique of Anthropology 16 (4): 1996, 
381-394.  
244 Ibid. 142 
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whose status as martyrs may be hotly disputed by a different section of the population? In our present 
political situation how do we take the wishes of those in the past into consideration?245  
Finally there is the past of the ‘ordinary citizen’. This individual may not have lost a loved one or 
taken part in direct action for political purposes. However, their life has been irrevocably shaped by the 
years of conflict. Their self-understanding, the way they interpret themselves and their surroundings and 
their attitude towards ‘the other’ are directly related to the history of Northern Ireland’s civil conflict.  
This person also has a past to face, a less particular past and with less political currency, but a past that 
requires attention. “The past is tenacious,” writes Michael Ignatieff, “simply because it holds so many 
clues to the present.”246 Citizens of Northern Ireland have lived through many years of bitter violence and 
they also seek to understand what has happened and how that past can inform their present. 
 By differentiating between these three versions of the past we are able to see the challenge that 
faces us as we think about the possibilities of reconciliation. It is not enough to talk simply about ‘dealing 
with the past’ as if the past could be described in a generic sense, as if everyone’s experiences and 
perceptions of both past and present are somehow similar. It is rather the case that there are particular 
pasts that need to be dealt with. 
 
Northern Ireland: Four complicating factors 
Suggesting that intergroup forgiveness presents a significant opportunity to overcome social and 
political divisions in Northern Ireland disturbs a hornet’s nest of political and emotional 
problems. As we have seen there is no single generic sense of ‘the past’ that we can easily come 
to terms with. Northern Ireland also poses a particularly challenging case when it comes to the 
practice of forgiveness. Even before we get to a discussion of the act of forgiveness at least four 
inter-related factors pose a significant obstacle to the easy progress of forgiveness: (1) the 
passing of time, (2) the economics of suffering, (3) the locus of blame and (4) early prisoner 
release. 
 
                                                 
245 Malachi O’ Doherty offers an interesting example of the way contemporary politicians sometimes have to 
‘negotiate’ with the ghosts of the past when he recalls a meeting where Sinn Fein’s Gerry Kelly presented a lecture 
to the Bobby Sands Discussion group. “His lecture that night was like an exposition of holy writ. He took the 
famous lines from Bobby Sands the hunger striker: ‘Everyone, whether republican or not, has his or her own part to 
play.’ They are mundane words, the sort of thing a team coach would use, but Kelly derived from them the 
authority of the republican movement to work alongside constitutional nationalists in the SDLP. Spoken by Sands, 
the words sounded as if they were meant to extend the campaign to the weak and the weary...Kelly was using the 
words to explain something Sands could never, in his day, have envisaged. At the end of the hunger strikes, with 
Sands and nine other hunger strikers dead, the IRA prisoners described the SDLP as ‘imperialist lickspittles’ who 
had ‘occupied their time trying to make political gain by attacking those who did genuinely endeavour to end the 
issue honourably.’ But now, in 1995, Sands’ words offered the key to explaining to republicans that working with 
the SDLP need not amount to a sell-out.” The Trouble With Guns, 5.  
246 Michael Ignatieff, The Warriors Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Chatto & Windrus, 
1998), 181.  
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(1) The period known as the modern ‘Troubles’ runs from approximately 1969 to the late 
1990s. The problem we face when attempting to address the many deaths and injuries 
that were a direct result of the ‘Troubles’ is that these events took place over a protracted 
period of time. Many of those deeply affected by violence in the 1970s may already be 
dead. Yet there may be those whose loved ones have faded from our collective memory 
who long for some sort of public recognition that what happened to their family was 
unjust and who perhaps want to offer forgiveness to those responsible. The passing of 
time can threaten the integrity of a process of forgiveness as there is a tendency to make 
general pronouncements, rather than attending to individual cases. 
(2) A second challenge posed by the situation in Northern Ireland is the practice of offering 
financial compensation to victims. Recent news reports claimed that as many as 1800 
murders from the period of ‘The Troubles’ remain unsolved.247 If the practice of paying 
compensation to victims and the relatives of victims continues it may be the case that 
politicians and government agencies lack the political will to shoulder the financial 
burden of so many claims. A related issue concerns the nature of our attempts to deal 
with the past. How exactly does a country attempt to remember its victims? Should 
financial compensation play a part in this process? Does money muddy the waters of 
memory? Or is it unjust to commemorate the dead and not make a financial gesture to 
back up our commemoration?248 Restitution or compensation raises difficult questions.  
(3) A third problem highlights the complexity of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The dead 
and injured came from many sectors of society: paramilitaries, civilians, police officers, 
government officials, legal professionals and soldiers. A number of atrocities prompted 
public enquiries, the events of Bloody Sunday being a prime example. The problem this 
poses is the tendency of enquiries of this nature to deal solely with the institutional 
nature of the events. While it is important to bring illegal or unjust government policies 
to light it complicates the question of forgiveness. Can the family of one of the victims of 
                                                 
247 ‘NI Commission could heal wounds’ www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/northern_ireland/3499613.stm 
accessed 18/02/2004.  
248 The issue of financial reparations was central to South Africa’s Truth & Reconciliation Commission. Antjie 
Krog, a journalist who reported on the TRC for the South African Broadcasting Company, observes, “The 
reparation and Rehabilitation Committee could make or break the Truth Commission. It will help little if the 
transgressors walk away with amnesty, but the victims, who bear the appalling costs of human rights abuses, 
experience no restitution. No gesture of recognition or compensation.” Krog’s moving narrative underlines the 
tension between the impulse to offer financial reparation and the limits of the new South Africa’s ability to offer 
financial compensation to so many victims. See Country of My Skull: Guilt, Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness 
in the New South Africa (New York: Random House, 1998) 218-221, 170-172, passim.  
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Bloody Sunday forgive the British Government of the late 1960s?249 Can that same 
government ask for forgiveness? What sort of forgiveness are we talking about? 
(4) Finally there are problems posed by aspects of the political agreement that offer the 
possibility of reconciliation. A number of concessions were granted to political parties as 
part of the process of the Good Friday agreement. Perhaps the most controversial was the 
early release of those designated political prisoners. This group represented the majority 
of Northern Ireland’s prison population and included members of all the main 
paramilitary groups. Many people in Northern Ireland were outraged by this move, yet it 
would seem that political progress was impossible without this particular concession. 
Political prisoners have always had a highly significant place in both the lore and 
activities of the Republican movement, especially since the hunger strikes of the 1980s. 
Any concessions, such as early release, made to one side would of course have to be 
offered to the other. We will leave the controversy surrounding prisoner releases to one 
side. However, it is important to note that the manner of the releases makes the whole 
question of forgiveness and reconciliation even harder. These ‘political prisoners’ have 
been released from their sentences and by virtue of that fact have been informed, albeit 
implicitly, that their acts were political and perhaps served some purpose in bringing 
Northern Ireland towards cross-party political agreement. Yet for many their ‘acts’ 
involved the killing of other human beings. How do we address their forgiveness when 
(a) the state has suggested by its actions that they may have had an acceptable motive 
and (b) the releases mean we have lost the opportunity for victims to confront 
perpetrators in order to address their feelings, anger and perhaps offer forgiveness? 
 
Demolishing Memory lane: Coping with the past by Forgetting 
 
Given the complexity of facing the past and attempting to talk about forgiveness it is 
understandable that some have suggested that a form of corporate amnesia might be a more 
appropriate route to take rather than digging up the past and all the emotional and political 
                                                 
249 See P. E. Digeser’s discussion of ‘Forgiving the Government’ in Political Forgiveness (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 168-190. Digeser makes some interesting observations, however, he restricts his analysis to 
what he describes as ‘nearly just’ governments. The reasons for a government being ‘nearly just’ are described as 
“the unavoidable presence of historical wrongs, procedural imperfections and tragic choices.” Yet it is difficult to 
argue that this description covers some of the activities of the British government during the worst years of the 
Troubles. However, on the other hand, it would inaccurate to argue that rather than ‘nearly just’ the British 
government was wholly unjust, Digeser’s alternative. Time will tell us much about the activities of successive 
British governments in Northern Ireland. However, it seems safe to say that while the government attempted to 
remain just there were decisions and policies that were unequivocally immoral and this is much more serious than 
“tragic decisions” or “procedural imperfections”.   
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turmoil that accompanies it. It is helpful to recall that our resurrection of some past event is not 
merely ‘dealing with the past’ it is in fact creating a new moment in time, even if the details of 
that new moment have a retrospective concern. History, at least the type with which we are 
concerned, is not a filing cabinet from which we can withdraw documents and simply return to 
their appropriate location without consequence. Those who suggest that we should simply draw 
a line under the past are attempting to avoid this experience.  
Instead of engaging in the messy and distressing business of facing the past, forgetting 
may allow a smoother transition from violence and enmity to a peaceable future. Deliberate 
amnesia bypasses our scarred history and perhaps suggests a much more sophisticated, even 
mature, way of coping with the past. Today’s citizens may have ties to the past, but their chief 
concern should be the future, a future freed from the ghosts of past conflicts. A number of 
factors encourage the view that forgiving by way of forgetting may be a viable option for the 
reconciliation of estranged peoples.  
 One factor concerns the inexorable movement of time. Every day that passes sees us 
moving away from the past and taking important steps towards the future. While we may have a 
genetic connection with our ancestors as ‘moderns’ we are preoccupied with the forward reach 
of time. Advances in technology and economic growth create a discontinuity with what is past. 
Thus in the aftermath of protracted civil conflicts this discontinuity should encourage the 
dismantling of historical ties to one’s family or tribe, especially if those ties are blood stained. 
Decisions in contemporary political discourse prioritise the economic not the historical. Writing 
about his own country’s history of racism and slavery, the American writer, C Eric Lincoln, 
recommends that we cultivate a discontinuity with the past. 
What was remains in fact what it was. But we can and we must separate ourselves from the 
psychological trauma of a history we did not commit and which does not require our 
endorsement for its justification. The justifications for the dehumanization and enslavement of 
the Africans were invented before the fact. They were institutionalized in the fact, and they died 
with the fact. Let them rest where they are. They belong to another time, another order, another 
civilisation. They do not belong to us, or to our children. We are beyond the past. It is 
irrevocable, and our chief loyalties must be to the future, to a new beginning.250
 
We do not share the concerns of our ancestors and our way of life has insured a loosening of the 
bonds that connect us to the past. Thus Lincoln calls for a “no-fault reconciliation” as the only 
possible way for America to overcome racial tensions. In an inversion of Faulkner, Lincoln 
assures us that the past is indeed dead and gone and very much in the past. 
                                                 
250 C. Eric Lincoln, Coming Through the Fire: Surviving Race and Place in America (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1996), 132-133.  
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Yet it is important to note that this version of forgiving amnesia is not simply the 
creation of a blank space, but is in fact a forgetting with content. As Hauerwas writes, “Money is 
but another name for loss of memory in modernity.”251 Examining reactions to the questions of 
America’s past, Hauerwas detects a strong economic element in the desire to forget. 
Summarising the commentary of one of America’s most respected journalists, George Will, 
Hauerwas writes, “From Will’s perspective, the wonders of capitalism combined with liberal 
democracy mean that the battles of the past are just that, battles of the past that we are foolish to 
continue to fight. In a society that promises to make us all rich, all free, what is a little slavery 
between friends?”252 Hauerwas admits that this may seem like an unfair characterisation. 
However, Will himself in a previous article demonstrates the accuracy of Hauerwas’ summary. 
Reviewing a Church-State decision made by the Supreme Court, Will observes,  
The Founders, like Locke before them, wished to take and domesticate religious passions 
of the sort that convulsed Europe. They aimed to do so not by establishing religion, but 
by establishing a commercial Republic – capitalism. They aimed to submerge people’s 
turbulent energies in the self-interested pursuit of material comforts.253
 
Hauerwas concludes by pointing out that Will and others believe that “what worked for 
domesticating religion...will also work for ending the conflicts between the races in 
America.”254
 So forgiveness by way of forgetting requires not so much the deletion of the pain of the 
past, but rather the substitution of the material comforts of the present and future as a means of 
covering the pain of history. Why risk the benefits of a liberal democracy, when it offers so 
much in the way of individual comforts? Norman Porter touches on similar issues in his analysis 
of reconciliation in Northern Ireland. In a summary of various versions of reconciliation, Porter 
describes capitalism’s forgetting as assimilation. According to Porter the assimilation version of 
reconciliation argues,  
As a consequence of the emergence of capitalism, modern societies are organised in 
terms of an economy based on growth and change. To function effectively such societies 
need a centralised homogeneous culture...accordingly sources of say, cultural difference 
between citizens must be deprived of any central role in public life.255  
 
                                                 
251 Stanley Hauerwas, A Time to Heal: Why Time Cannot and Should Not Heal the Wounds of History But Time has 
Been and Can Be Redeemed (Belfast: ECONI, 1999), 21.  
252 Hauerwas, A Time to Heal, 19.  
253 George Will, ‘Scalia Missed Point But Made Right Argument on Separation of Religion,’ Durham Morning 
Herald (Sunday, April 22, 1990), Section F. I. Quoted in Hauerwas, A Time to Heal, 19-20.  
254 Hauerwas, A Time to Heal, 20.  
255 Norman Porter, The Elusive Quest: Reconciliation in Northern Ireland (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 2003), 47.  
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The point of this shift away from shades of cultural difference or what Ignatieff describes as “the 
narcissism of minor difference,” is to pave the way for an efficient and prosperous society. Thus 
reconciliation involves “transcending the sources of our differences through assimilation; that 
Unionism, Nationalism or any other local variant of cultural and political identification should 
be exchanged for a kind of modern cosmopolitanism.”256 Porter’s response to this cosmopolitan 
version of reconciliation is to question both its inner logic and its claims to neutral superiority. 
He finds it implausible to suggest that the “best route to [common] ground lies in trying to 
transcend the obstacles that block its path.”257 Attempting to ignore cultural difference, 
especially in a situation of political conflict fails to make these differences any less real. Porter 
goes on to criticise the “unacknowledged bias” inherent in the idea that all our differences 
should be assimilated into one homogeneous culture. This culture, it is claimed, exists in a 
neutral detachment and has only our best interests at heart. However, Porter strongly objects to 
this tone, claiming that “we are not dealing with a strictly neutral ideal...[but one] with an 
unavoidable claim to superiority over local cultural variants.”258 Finally, Porter asserts that the 
link between homogeneity and cosmopolitanism is a fiction. While the ideal exists, it has yet to 
be realised. Citing the example of the United States of America, Porter points out that a 
particular brand of American patriotism is central to social cohesion. He continues, “The point is 
that inasmuch as homogeneous cultures exist within specific societies, they depend upon 
particular forms of patriotism or nationalism rather than upon cosmopolitanism.”259 The 
prevailing political culture in contemporary societies is not neutral, but typically reflects the 
dominant ethos. For Porter, assimilation means, “buying into” this ethos and “sacrificing the 
public ambitions of a minority culture is the price it exacts.”260  
It should also be noted that the benefits of cosmopolitanism are typically construed in a 
financial sense. Yet, these benefits are unlikely to be made available to those who suffer most in 
deeply divided societies especially those who live along the fault lines of the conflict, who are 
typically the weakest financially, politically and whose homes and places of work have been 
marked by violence. The beneficiaries of a market driven reconciliation are not those who 
populate the interface areas of Belfast.261  
                                                 
256 Porter, The Elusive Quest, 48.  
257 Ibid.  
258 Ibid., 49.  
259 Ibid., 50.  
260 Ibid.  
261 Analysis of the distribution of the sources of violence has highlighted the disproportionately high levels of 
violence located within working class neighbourhoods. See Fay, M.T., Morrissey, M., Smyth, M., Northern 
Ireland’s Troubles: The Human Costs (London: Pluto Press, 1999). 
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 It is in the work of Michael Ignatieff that the idea that we can overlook the past finds its 
strongest challenge. In his analysis of protracted civil conflicts Ignatieff does not bring the 
solutions of an enlightened western democrat, but rather listens to the rationale of those who 
fight and suffer the consequences of political violence. In doing so Ignatieff describes a radical 
discontinuity between perceptions of history. As we have seen for many in the west history is 
irrelevant and can be cut off and prevented from encroaching on the present. However, for those 
actively involved or simply caught up in civil conflict, the divisions between past and present 
are not so stark. Those in places of conflict “are not living in a serial order of time,” writes 
Ignatieff, “but in a simultaneous one, in which the past and the present are continuous, an 
agglutinated mass of fantasies, distortions, myths and lies.”262 So, in a widely reported example 
from the Balkans, journalists who were told about atrocities were uncertain whether the accounts 
they heard related to events that took place yesterday or in 1941 or 1841 or 1441. Ignatieff 
explains, “Simultaneity is the dream time of vengeance. Crimes can never be safely fixed in the 
historical past; they remain locked in the eternal present, crying out for blood.”263 Ignatieff does 
not find such reactions surprising and in fact goes on to challenge what he describes as “morally 
superficial” modern sensibilities. In our haste to dispense with the past and move on to a 
prosperous future we become superficial people. For Ignatieff, “Good people, morally 
substantive people, rightly want revenge.”264 While modern sensibilities condemn contemporary 
conflicts as immoral, Ignatieff is raising the possibility that far from being morally inferior, 
these people may in fact be the opposite: a group of people who care deeply about the past and 
are willing to kill or be killed for the sake of their people. While we need to take care to avoid 
idealising political violence there is a depth to the empathetic analysis carried out by individuals 
like Ignatieff that one does not find in the suggestion that we should forget the past for the sake 
of material comfort.265 As Hauerwas puts it, “Warriors, as well as peacemakers, will have their 
                                                 
262 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Chatto & Windrus, 
1998), 186 
263 Ibid.  
264 Ibid.  
265 There is an important link here between the way we treat the past and the potential for social cohesion. Modern 
western societies struggle to find a way to bind their populations together despite unprecedented levels of 
prosperity. A large amount of ink has been spilled in both newspapers and scholarly articles on the breakdown of 
community in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States. Politicians frequently lament the way 
society has taken a ‘turn for the worse’ during the last one hundred years. It seems clear that Ignatieff’s reflection 
on the lack of moral substance of modern westerners and our willingness to cut our ties with the past are connected 
to the impoverished nature of contemporary social cohesion. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse 
and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).   
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fair share of cruel and sociopathological people...irrespective of how conflict may be misused by 
some, the conflict itself is morally worthy.”266
Porter, Ignatieff and Hauerwas all in their own way challenge the assumption that 
amnesia is the best route to forgiveness. What unites them is their assertion that there seems to 
be something immoral about either forgetting for the sake of financial reward or insisting that 
we should downplay our ethnic differences for the sake of a ‘neutral’ cosmopolitanism. Rather 
than dismissing those who take the past seriously as primitive they suggest that perhaps these are 
individuals of serious moral substance.   
God, Memory and Redemption 
 
Having explored one version of forgiveness as forgetting we now turn to a highly theological 
account of why forgetting may be a crucial aspect of any process of forgiveness. Miroslav Volf’s 
important work, Exclusion & Embrace attempts to come to terms with the problem of memory 
and forgiveness. In an important divergence from our previous versions of forgetting, Volf has a 
different perspective on the issue of forgetting. Rather than seeing forgetfulness as a means to 
forgiveness, Volf believes that forgetfulness completes the process of redemption. Once we have 
forgiven our enemies and made space for them, reconciliation will only be completed by the act 
of forgetting the evil suffered. In order to do justice to Volf’s account it is important that we 
acknowledge the caveat he places at the beginning of his account of forgetting.  
[This is] a forgetting that assumes that the matters of truth and justice have been taken 
care of, that perpetrators have been named, judged and (hopefully) transformed, that 
victims are safe and their wounds healed, a forgetting that can therefore ultimately take 
place only together with the creation of all things new.267  
 
While we are placing Volf’s version of forgetfulness alongside that of secular pragmatists such 
as Eric Lincoln and George Will, it is clear from this quotation that his conception is 
qualitatively different.  
Entitling this section of his discussion ‘Paradise and the Affliction of Memory’ Volf 
predicates his argument on the assumption that the memory of suffering will prevent a victim 
from full participation in the joys of redemption in heaven. Thus Volf begins by questioning the 
normative view that “remembering is always good and nonremembering (sic) is always bad.”268 
Developing his understanding of memory, Volf writes, “When it comes to the complex and 
                                                 
266 Hauerwas, A Time to heal, 15.  
267 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and Reconciliation 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 131. 
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ongoing relationship between friends, complete restitution of the past is not only impossible; its 
very thought is terrifying. Memory is much more complex than simple retention; its opposite is 
not oblivion.”269 The complex nature of memory requires us to see that memory and forgetting 
are intertwined. We remember some things and forget others, the important things are 
remembered the less important forgotten. Thus Volf asserts, “Forgetting is itself therefore not so 
much our enemy; rather, it is those who would rob us of the right to decide for ourselves what to 
forget and what to remember, as well as when to do so.”270   
While Volf admits that there is a positive aspect to memory his views in this section are 
on the whole negative. This is illustrated when we note his reference to memory as a “shield”.271 
While a shield can be understood in a positive sense, it can protect against attack; when we place 
this metaphor within the context of Volf’s exclusion and embrace paradigm we see that a shield 
is wholly negative, for while it protects, it “inserts itself between me and the enemy; it shelters 
by redoubling the boundary between the self and the other.”272 Thus memory becomes the final 
barrier to reconciliation. Yet Volf’s use of the metaphor of the shield as a way of characterising 
memory raises questions about his conception of memory. By describing memory as a shield he 
makes memory something external; emotional armour that can be picked up or put down. 
However is this an accurate characterisation? Is memory best described in externalist 
terminology? Is memory not better understood in an internal sense? Rather than something we 
can pick up or put down surely memory is part and parcel of the very fabric of our identity. We 
recall the popular metaphor of the ‘scar’ of memory. Describing negative memories as a scar 
rests on the idea that scar tissue becomes part of us; it changes us and can even be used as a 
unique mark of identification. Only invasive medical procedures can cover a scar, yet even those 
procedures usually leave a scar elsewhere on one’s body.  The purpose here is not to begin a 
competition to develop the most profound metaphors for memory. However, Volf’s decision to 
describe memory as a shield alerts us to the way he understands memory, in particular the 
externalist perspective he brings to the debate. In an extension of his metaphor Volf writes, 
“Though we would be unwise to drop the shield of memory from our hands before the dawn of 
the new age, we may be able to move it cautiously to the side by opening our arms to embrace 
the other, even the former enemy.”273 This quote makes clear that Volf views negative memory 
as a potential barrier, yet it also shows that memory is something we can “move to the side.” 
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 In an attempt to summarise his argument Volf offers a densely packed paragraph that is 
worth quoting in full, 
Since no final redemption is possible without redemption of the past, and since every 
attempt to redeem the past through reflection must fail because no theodicy can succeed, 
the final redemption is unthinkable without a certain kind of forgetting. Put starkly, the 
alternative is: either heaven or the memory of horror. Either heaven will have no 
monuments to keep the memory of the horrors alive, or it will be closer to hell than we 
would like to think. For if heaven cannot rectify Auschwitz, then the memory of 
Auschwitz must undo the experience of heaven. Redemption will be complete only when 
the creation of ‘all things new’ is coupled with the passage of ‘all things old’ into the 
double nihil of nonexistence and nonremembrance.274
 
This quote contains a great deal and an exposition of it allows a greater understanding of Volf’s 
argument. We note first the mention of the failure of theodicy. This failure occurs on two fronts 
for Volf. On the one hand attempts to make sense of suffering will fail. Evil, in the words of 
Paul Ricoeur, remains a “permanent aporia.”275 For Volf there can be no eschatological 
rationalisation of suffering, as this would lend justification to evil. On the other hand to say that 
evil can remain a “non-sense” is equally disturbing, “In the glory of God’s new world – 
especially there – the ‘non-sense’ of past suffering will be insufferable – as insufferable as 
would be its sense.”276 If neither sense nor non-sense are acceptable and theodicy finally fails, 
Volf concludes that the only way to ‘solve’ the problem of past suffering is “the nontheoretical 
act of nonremembering.”277 We see now why Volf introduces the stark either/or choice when it 
comes to the question of memory and redemption. Heaven cannot memorialise suffering lest 
redemption be undone by the memories of suffering. If redemption is to be complete then rather 
than rationalising, i.e. making sense of, suffering, redemption brings about the final forgetting of 
the pain of the past. Put bluntly, the nightmare of the past presents an insurmountable obstacle to 
redemption; the only possible ‘solution’ is to forget that past. 
 There are a number of difficulties with Volf’s logic at this point in his argument. Firstly, 
the way he presents the discussion in the format of a stark either/or makes it very difficult for 
him to resolve the issue in any other way. Methodologically he has painted himself into a corner. 
However, more importantly, some of his assumptions are highly questionable, for example his 
discussion of the ‘sense’ and ‘non-sense’ of suffering. While we agree with Volf’s rejection of 
crass and insensitive attempts to rationalise suffering, there is surely another way, aside from 
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theodicy, to understand suffering. The approach of theodicy is typically an attempt to reason 
with suffering, to find some way of making sense, as Volf says, of what has happened. However, 
despite Volf’s aversion to the term, there is surely a need to retain language that speaks to the 
‘non-sense’ of suffering, the tragically surd reality of suffering, where there is no point or wider 
purpose served by the suffering and death of an individual. An energetic search for meaning in 
suffering can sometimes obscure the pointlessness of an incidence of suffering. Talk of the non-
sense of suffering does not necessarily devalue the life of that individual. It may well allow us to 
grieve and galvanise attempts to prevent other ‘pointless deaths’.  
However, from the perspective of Christian theology it seems that Volf’s either/or is not 
the only option. One does not have to search for wider meaning to recover from the ‘non-sense’ 
of suffering. If we reject Volf’s assertion that redemption is undone by suffering, unless 
suffering is forgotten, we can say that redemption is that which makes the memory of suffering 
potentially bearable. Not by erasing our memory of suffering or by offering a way for us to 
understand the ‘sense’ in suffering, but simply by redeeming it. Saving it from both the 
horrendous mathematics of ‘God’s wider purposes’ and the frightening nihilism of a pointless 
suffering. 
 Hauerwas offers a second theological objection to Volf’s argument by questioning an 
aspect of his doctrine of God. Aside from concerns about the impact Volf’s suggestions about 
forgetting may have for people, Hauerwas detects problematic implications for the life of God. 
According to Hauerwas, Volf’s belief that God forgets sin seems to call into question a central 
aspect of how God’s relationship to the created order is normally understood. Rather than 
forgetting, Hauerwas suggests, “God remembers because if God does not remember then God is 
not the timeful God we find in Israel and the cross and the resurrection of Christ. That God, the 
God of Israel, the God that raised Jesus from the dead, is the God that makes time, makes 
memory, possible.”278 By suggesting that God forgets, Hauerwas believes Volf’s argument 
relies on a ‘false eternity’ where God’s eternity is the “simple contradiction of time.”279 
Hauerwas employs an insight from Robert Jenson to develop his point,  
What [God] transcends is any limit imposed on what can be by what he has been, except 
the limit of his personal self-identity, and any limit imposed on his action by the 
availability of time. The true God is not eternal because he lacks time, but because he 
takes time. The eternity of Israel’s God is his faithfulness. He is not eternal in that he 
secures himself from time, but in that he is faithful to his commitments within time.”280  
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By stressing the timefulness of God Hauerwas is attempting to draw a close connection between 
God, time and memory. Redemption includes, for Hauerwas, the redemption of time and 
therefore the redemption of memories embedded in time past. Where Volf sees no way for future 
joy while the memory of suffering remains, Hauerwas sees God’s redemption of time in Christ, 
time future and time past. Christian forgiveness, according to Hauerwas, “is not that our sins no 
longer matter, but that our sins are now made part of an economy of salvation for the 
constitution of a new community otherwise impossible.”281 Therefore forgiveness cannot be 
understood as an isolated event whereby an individual has his or her past ‘dealt with’. For 
Hauerwas God’s forgiveness of humanity is a community building reality where forgiven 
individuals meet, not with blank spaces in their personal narrative, but as forgiven and redeemed 
members of timeful community. While the past may not be gone in the sense of forgetfulness, 
the past has been redeemed which for Hauerwas is a much more significant reality than the form 
of amnesia suggested by Volf. The ‘way forward’ for Hauerwas is “not forgetting, but having 
our memories transformed through the discovery that our sins cannot determine God’s will for 
our lives.” 
 In summing up his argument Volf makes one final connection between divine forgetting 
and human forgetting. 
How can God forget the wrongdoings of human beings? Because at the centre of God’s 
all embracing memory there is a paradoxical monument to forgetting. It is the cross of 
Christ. God forgets humanity’s sins in the same way God forgives humanity’s sins: by 
taking sins away from humanity and placing them upon God’s self. How will human 
beings be able to forget the horrors of history? Because at the centre of the new world 
that will emerge after ‘the first things have passed away’ there will stand a throne, and on 
the throne there will sit the Lamb who has ‘taken away the sin of the world’ and erased 
their memory.282
 
There are two aspects of this quotation that are troubling. Firstly, while Volf is right to 
concentrate some of his reflection on forgiveness on the crucifixion of Jesus, it seems strange to 
speak of the cross as a monument to divine forgetting. If we speak of any ‘monument’ in heaven 
surely we have to focus our attention on the risen Christ, rather than the cross. If this is the case 
then the locus of any memorial will be the scars on Jesus hands and side, rather than the cross. 
These scars were clearly evident in his resurrection appearances and one sees in them a strong 
means of connecting redemption and the memory of suffering. However, the memory clearly 
does not prevent Jesus from bringing about a full redemption for the world. A second and related 
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problem with Volf’s quote is his focus on the Lamb who has taken away the sin of the world. 
Elsewhere in his vision John describes the lamb “looking as if it had been slain,”283 an 
observation that Volf conveniently overlooks! Christian theology doesn’t tend to recommend 
forgetfulness, but rather promises forgiveness and redemption, a redemption that somehow deals 
with the messy business of memory. Many would claim that they have experienced redemption 
in this life, a form of redemption that balances forgiveness and memory. One can only assume 
therefore that God’s final redemption and solution to the problem of memory bears some 
resemblance to what we currently understand of redemption.  
 
The Sunflower: Forgiveness and the Problem of Agency 
 
Who forgives? Another difficulty that an emphasis on forgiveness as part of any process of 
reconciliation raises is the question of agency. Deeply divided societies, like Northern Ireland, 
face a challenge on two fronts. On the one hand they are involved in a struggle to work towards 
reconciliation for contemporary and present generations, on the other hand they attempt to face 
their divided past and come to terms with the bloodshed that has been part and parcel of life. As 
we talk about forgiveness and even recommend that people need to forgive and move beyond 
destructive patterns of enmity and vengeance we realise that the difficulty of forgiving events in 
the past is compounded by the question of agency. The most obvious victims of civil conflict are 
dead, their deaths occurring as a result of political violence, who forgives on the part of those 
who are dead? Who forgives perpetrators who are dead, dying before they could face up to their 
crimes? This difficulty is heightened by the importance we have placed on the personal aspect of 
forgiveness. As we have seen the most ‘successful’ moves towards forgiveness occur as part of a 
process whereby those intimately involved in the events that require forgiveness are involved in 
the forgiving. Elected officials or community leaders may attempt to offer or seek forgiveness 
on the part of their community, however, this short-circuits the process of forgiveness and 
disallows individuals the opportunity to meet face to face and move towards the place we are 
calling reconciliation. By shifting the centre of gravity away from a general forgiveness to 
individuals we make the challenge of agency even more acute. 
 The classic study of the problem of forgiveness and agency comes not from a 
Psychologist or Theologian, but from the pen of a concentration camp survivor. In his celebrated 
work The Sunflower, Simon Wiesenthal tells the story of his encounter with a dying SS soldier 
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who seeks forgiveness for his involvement in the murder of Jews.284 Wiesenthal’s story is a 
powerful and profoundly challenging reflection on the possibilities and limits of forgiveness.  
As part of their daily work Wiesenthal and his fellow prisoners are helping with waste 
disposal at a local hospital. Not long after he arrives a nurse calls him to one side and asks if he 
is a Jew, when Wiesenthal confirms he is Jewish she leads him into the hospital and into a 
private room. Inside this room lies a dying man covered in bandages. The injured man is a 21-
year-old SS soldier who had taken part in the murder of a large number of Jews. The young 
soldier is haunted by the memory of a particular family who were among the murdered Jews. In 
a town called Dnepropetrovsk the SS had forced nearly two hundred Jews, including many 
women and children, into a building into which they had placed drums of gasoline. After the 
doors of the building were locked the SS men were ordered to throw grenades into the building 
and stand with their guns ready to shoot anyone who tried to escape. As the fire began to 
consume the building and the people cried for help the young soldier noticed a man with a small 
child in his arms standing with a woman by a window. With one hand gripping the child and the 
other covering the eyes of the child the man and woman jumped into the street below only to be 
shot dead by the SS soldiers who surrounded the building.  
As the young man tells Wiesenthal his life story and recounts in detail the events he took 
part in he moves towards the reason for their conversation. Wiesenthal narrates the soldier’s 
testimony in painful detail, “I cannot die…without coming clean. This must be my 
confession.”285 Aware of the importance of what the young man is telling him Wiesenthal notes, 
“In his confession there was true repentance…the fact that he spoke to me was a proof of his 
repentance.” As their meeting draws to a close the young man makes his plea, “I know that what 
I have told you is terrible…I have longed to talk about it to a Jew and beg forgiveness from 
him…without your answer I cannot die in peace. After reflecting on what has taken place during 
the hours that have passed, Wiesenthal makes his decision, “At last I made up my mind and 
without a word I left the room.”286 We learn that the young soldier dies the next day and witness 
the genesis of a question that haunts Wiesenthal for the rest of his life, “Did I do the right 
thing?” The final line of The Sunflower asks simply that readers change places with Wiesenthal 
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and ask themselves “What would I have done?”287 It is hard not to see the morality of 
Wiesenthal’s reaction, George Steiner’s comments are instructive 
Only those who actually passed through hell, survived Auschwitz after seeing their 
parents flogged to death or gassed before their own eyes (like Elie Wiesel), or who found 
their own kin amid the corpses from which they had to extract gold teeth, a daily 
encounter at Treblinka, can have the right to forgive. We do not have that right. This is 
an important point, often misunderstood. What the Nazis did in the camps and torture 
chambers is wholly unforgivable, it is a brand on the image of man and will last; each of 
us has been diminished by the enactment of a potential sub-humanity latent in all of us. 
But if one did not undergo the thing, hate or forgiveness are spiritual games – serious 
games no doubt – but games none the less. The best now, after so much has been set 
forth, is, perhaps, to be silent; not to add the trivia of literary, sociological debate, to the 
unspeakable.288
 
The strengths of Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower as a work of literature are manifold. At first it 
strikes us as a intensely moving piece of autobiography; Wiesenthal does not forget the 
emotional turmoil of life in a death-camp and his ability to simultaneously convey fear and 
moral outrage makes The Sunflower a disconcerting read. Yet, surely the most important aspect 
of the story is the way Wiesenthal gets to the heart of the question of forgiveness. By focusing 
his attention on the questions of agency and scope Wiesenthal’s work is required reading for 
anyone involved in reflecting on the nature and practice of forgiveness. Dostoyevsky offers an 
equally challenging reflection on forgiveness and agency in his The Brothers Karamazov. Ivan 
Karamazov narrates the story of a General who has his dogs kill a peasant boy as punishment for 
injuring the paw of his favourite dog. Ivan is offended by the suggestion that anyone other than 
the boy could forgive the General. Reflecting on whether the boy’s mother could forgive on 
behalf of her dead child Ivan comments, 
I don’t want the mother to embrace the oppressor who threw her son to the dogs. She 
dare not forgive him. Let her forgive him for herself, if she will. Let her forgive the 
torturer for the immeasurable suffering of her mother’s heart. But the sufferings of her 
tortured child she has no right to forgive; she dare not forgive the torturer, even if the 
child were to forgive him.289
 
 In an attempt to take Wiesenthal and Karamazov seriously we will first isolate the key 
challenges and then move on to offer an analysis and possible response to the dilemma of The 
Sunflower. 
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In thinking through the issues raised by The Sunflower Alan Torrance adds an insight 
gleaned from Plato’s Phaedo. The question of agency in forgiveness clearly concerned Plato; the 
Phaedo offers a potential solution. A murderer who has killed in a fit of passion and yet lived a 
life of repentance thereafter will be cast into Tartarus, one of the four rivers of the underworld. 
After a year has passed those in Tartarus will be swept along to a point near the Acherusian Lake 
from where they call to those whom they have slain or despitefully used, begging and 
beseeching them that they would suffer them to come forth into the lake and give them a 
hearing. If their beseeching is successful they come forth into the lake and find and end to their 
trouble, if not they are swept into the river again. Their woes will continue until they prevail 
upon those whom they have injured, for such is the penalty appointed by their judges.  The point 
of turning to Plato is to note that he clearly believes that only the victim can forgive the 
perpetrator of an offence and that an offence retains the character of offence for eternity or until 
such times as the victim allows the perpetrator to come forth.  
Informed by Plato the sunflower dilemma is thrown into high relief. Put succinctly, “the 
implication of The Sunflower,” writes Torrance, “is not only that the right to forgive belongs 
exclusively to the one against whom the offence has been perpetrated but that any forgiveness 
offered by the victim can only relate to that element of the offence of which he or she was the 
victim.”290 This latter part of Torrance’s summary of the dilemma becomes particularly 
problematic when we think about what constitutes a ‘victim’. It soon becomes evident that it is 
very difficult to say definitively who the victim of an offence actually is. An offence committed 
against a single individual has repercussions for more people than one individual. For example if 
a woman is assaulted the assault affects her parents, siblings, friends and colleagues. It could 
even be argued that the assault affects all of the women in the locality, robbing them of a sense 
of security. Beyond this level we could say that the entire community is affected as women feel 
unsafe and men feel under suspicion. Because of this one assault that at first seems to have only 
one victim numerous relationships, important social ties and community relations are negatively 
affected. Reflecting on the question of how we describe victims forces the realisation that if 
there can be no response to the questions raised by Wiesenthal’s dilemma then forgiveness of 
any sort is actually impossible. Even if the ‘primary victim’, in the case above the assaulted 
woman, forgives the offender there remains a large number of people who might equally claim 
that they have suffered due to the offence. While some of these claims are stronger than others 
the point remains that the ‘ripple effect’ of suffering/crime creates a surplus of victims. Each of 
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these individuals has the right to forgive that element of the offence that relates to their 
particular experience of the offence, yet to forgive beyond the boundaries of their own particular 
experience of the offence would be to violate the rights of another and thus compound the 
original offence. Thus the parents of the victim of an assault who forgive on her behalf “commit 
a further sin against her personhood and dignity.”291 However, if even one of these ‘victims’ 
withholds their forgiveness we are presented with a situation whereby it cannot be said that the 
perpetrator is forgiven. “Do we not have to acknowledge,” asks Torrance, “a further principle of 
solidarity which suggests that the forgiveness of every victim requires to be seen as contingent 
upon the forgiveness of the perpetrator by every other victim?”292 After unpacking the 
implications of Wiesenthal’s story Torrance teases out the social implications by noting  
“Unless the ‘Sunflower dilemma’ can be addressed, we can never be in a position to 
forgive the Nazi perpetrators of the Holocaust, nor those associated with the Rwandan 
atrocities…none of us has the right to forgive or adopt an attitude of forgiveness towards 
anyone for any crime which is not perpetrated exclusively against me and the scope of 
which is limited exclusively to me.”293
 
However, this is only one aspect of the dilemma. A second problem occurs when we see the 
theological implications of the ‘sunflower dilemma,’ for along with the question of forgiveness 
at the social level it poses an important question concerning God’s ability to forgive sin. 
According to the logic of the argument one wonders how it is possible for God to offer 
forgiveness for sins that contain an element of sin against others. Upon reflection we see that 
aside from sins associated with blasphemy and idolatry it is difficult to see how the majority of 
what we classify as ‘sin’ does not contain an element of sin against others. If we stay faithful to 
the insights about agency we have gleaned from Plato and Wiesenthal we are forced to ask how 
God can forgive sin or on what grounds God forgives human sin? Can God’s forgiveness extend 
beyond that aspect of the sin that is an offence against God and God alone?  
 In an attempt to offer a theological solution Torrance steers towards familiar territory as 
we find him making use of aspects of the theological approach we explored in chapter two. He 
constructs an argument that contains the following steps. Firstly, he reminds us that the Christian 
tradition affirms that “God became incarnate as a marginalized Jew and vicariously in an act of 
solidarity with humanity took to himself the suffering of the sinned against – the brutality, the 
physical and psychological (even sexual) abuse, the sadism, the torture, the humiliation and the 
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inconceivable pain associated with death by crucifixion.”294 Jesus Christ, as the One on behalf 
of the many is in perfect solidarity with the sinned against. This implies that “sin against a 
fellow human is not simply sin against that human but additionally and in parallel sin against 
God…the sin against the victim requires to be seen, first, as sin against God conceived as one 
and the same object as the victim. Second, it requires to be seen as the same sin against 
both.”295The solidarity that exists between humanity and Jesus Christ works in both directions, 
as we are, Christologically and pneumatologically conceived, en Christo and he is in us. Thus it 
is in the vicarious humanity of Christ that we see a way around the twin dilemmas of agency and 
scope. 
 Torrance goes on to point out that it is in the vicarious humanity of Christ that Christian 
theology finds a way beyond mere exhortations to forgive based on the example of God, what 
Torrance calls an ethic of forgiveness and what we have described as an example of the ‘ethics 
of self-improvement’. By configuring an understanding of forgiveness based on the vicarious 
humanity of Christ and his solidarity with humanity we are able to speak of an ontology of 
forgiveness. 
In God crucified we have the One who alone is entitled to forgive on behalf of the victim 
because the victim is ‘in him’, and he ‘in the victim’. But not only does he, in forgiving, 
do what he is entitled to do, he does it as the one who does not dishonour the victim in 
this act, but upholds the eternal dignity of the victim not least those who are dead. 
Indeed, for reasons, which should hopefully be clear, God’s forgiveness is not only 
compatible with upholding and affirming the dignity of the victim, it is intrinsic to it.296
 
By drawing on the resources of the vicarious humanity of Christ, Torrance suggests a way round 
a number of the challenges presented by the ‘sunflower dilemma’. Firstly, he allows us to see 
one possible way of talking about forgiveness when the victim is dead; secondly he 
demonstrates the possibility of a theology of forgiveness that sees God making forgiveness 
available on horizontal and vertical levels without violating the rights or dignity of the 
individual victim. While the theological lines of Torrance’s argument are neatly drawn it is 
important to note that this is a provocative and potentially controversial suggestion. If we turn 
again to The Sunflower with this perspective in mind we could say that had Simon Wiesenthal 
known of the vicarious humanity of Christ he could have approached the situation in a different 
manner. Of course this is not to make a judgement on Wiesenthal’s behaviour, but rather to push 
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the logic of Torrance’s argument. It is in fact a response to Wiesenthal’s despairing challenge 
“Change places with me and ask yourself the crucial question, ‘What would I have done?’”297 
Rather than leaving the young SS soldier in the understandable silence of judgement, Wiesenthal 
could have said,  
Regardless of my Jewish ethnicity and the potential ethnic ties I have with the people 
you killed, I cannot forgive you for what you have done. However, another Jew can. A 
marginalised Jew who is not only inextricably tied to other Jews, but to humanity as a 
whole; Jesus Christ can forgive you for your sins, for when you murdered innocent Jews 
you murdered him. It is Jesus Christ who so identifies with humanity that he can say ‘In 
as much as you have done it unto the least of these, you have done it unto me’. He alone 
can heal you from the nightmarish memories that haunt you and he alone can uphold the 
dignity of those you cruelly killed. My ties to other people are an accident of birth; his 
ties are fundamental and an intrinsic part of God’s plan of salvation for the world.  
 
Obviously it is problematic and potentially controversial to place an overtly Christian version of 
forgiveness in the mouth of a Jewish victim of Nazi death camps. However, this version of 
Wiesenthal’s response is merely the logical outworking of Christ’s vicarious humanity. It is 
important to recognise that Wiesenthal’s symposium poses the question in a context completely 
abstracted from the horror of Wiesenthal’s original situation. Any answer we give to his 
dilemma is not so much what we would have done but what we hope we might have the courage 
to do. Interestingly these words are not unlike those of another Jew asked to respond to 
Wiesenthal’s dilemma. With the benefit of hindsight Milton Konvitz suggests the following as a 
possible response to the dying SS man, 
I cannot speak for your victims. I cannot speak for the Jewish people. I cannot speak for 
God. But I am a man. I am a Jew. I am commanded, in my personal relations, to act with 
compassion. I have been taught that if I expect the Compassionate One to have 
compassion on me, I must act with compassion toward others. I can share with you in 
this hour of your deep suffering, what I myself have been taught by my teachers: “Better 
is one hour of repentance in this world than the whole life of the world to come” (Avot, 
IV, 17). “Great is repentance, for it renders asunder the decree imposed upon a man” 
(Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashana, 17b). It is not in my power to render to you the help 
that could come only from your victims, or from the whole of the people of Israel, or 
from God. But insofar as you reach out to me, and insofar as I can separate myself from 
my fellow Jews, for whom I cannot speak, my broken heart pleads for your broken heart: 
Go in peace.298
 
The Christological response we have offered is not unlike the thrust of Konvitz’s suggestion. It 
is important to note that common to both responses is a denial of the obligation for the 
individual to offer his particular forgiveness. The confessor is pointed to the goodness of God 
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and the ability of God to forgive and deal with the man’s sin. This is more constructive than 
withholding forgiveness because it seems inappropriate or immoral. The violence that has 
brought about the need for forgiveness has had a wider impact on the two ethnic groups 
involved and as George Steiner has observed on humanity as a whole. While we agree that it is 
problematic for an individual to forgive on the part of another there is still something very 
important about that individual choosing to forsake vengeance and pursue forgiveness. In the 
very least this allows for the possibility of a move towards reconciliation between the two sides 
of a conflict and offers hope to those who survive. Although Wiesenthal’s dilemma is highly 
instructive for any serious consideration of forgiveness its strength is found in the extremity of 
the situation. We know from the story that the soldier dies the next day and thus his forgiveness 
was centred on a deathbed experience. Later in life Wiesenthal manages to track down the 
soldier’s mother and finds that she knows nothing of the nature of the atrocities her son took part 
in. Wiesenthal does not shatter her perceptions and leaves her with good memories of her son. In 
both these cases there is no ‘life’ for the individuals beyond their brief meetings. The soldier 
dies and Wiesenthal never sees the soldier’s mother again. Yet in situations of violent conflict 
where individuals live in close proximity there is a ‘life’ beyond the moment of confession and 
forgiveness, both at an individual and group level. Wiesenthal’s story tends to focus our minds 
on a momentary instance of forgiveness, perhaps in its most extreme manifestation as a deathbed 
confession. The problem with this momentary understanding of forgiveness is its failure to set 
forgiveness within its proper context as a journey towards the recovery of positive social 
relations, a journey that may take many years, or even a lifetime. “The goal of forgiveness,” 
writes Jon Sobrino, “is not merely the alleviation of guilt but is the goal of all love – positive 
reconciliation.”299
Embodied Forgiveness 
 
L. Gregory Jones qualifies the concept of forgiveness by insisting that we move beyond an 
understanding of forgiveness based on a one off statement of sorrow or a fixed moment of 
contrition. For Jones forgiveness must be embodied; in other words, forgiveness is not spoken, 
but lived. This requires us to see forgiveness as a way of life rather than an isolated point in 
time. Jones’ insistence on “embodied forgiveness” is in part informed by his belief that 
forgiveness is a craft, a lifestyle that he frequently associates with woodworking.300 The craft of 
                                                 
299 Jon Sobrino, The Principle of Mercy (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994), 63-64. 
300 L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness: A Theological Analysis (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 1995). See 
also Jones’ reading and analysis of Anne Tyler’s novel Saint Maybe in ‘The Craft of Forgiveness,’ Theology Today 
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forgiveness requires a process of life-long learning, a combination of becoming an apprentice 
under the tutelage of those who have become exemplars of forgiveness and an ability to 
understand one’s own particular place and circumstances. 
Methodologically Jones combines a Barthian insistence on the priority of theology with 
an Aristotelian-Thomist emphasis on the continuities of habits, crafts and traditions. The 
Aristotelian-Thomist emphasis allows Jones to stress that forgiveness be “understood as a 
human practice, one that is best understood as a craft within an ongoing tradition.”301 Jones 
notes that it is interest in Aristotelian moral philosophy and its attendant themes of virtue, 
character and emotion that has brought about a renewed interest in the philosophical significance 
of forgiveness.302 Yet philosophical treatments of forgiveness typically focus on forgiveness as 
an act and “pay only minimal attention to notions of forgiveness as a specific practice or trait of 
character.”303 Jones points out, 
From the Christian perspective, forgiveness is not primarily a word that is spoken or an action 
that is performed or a feeling that is felt. It is a way of life appropriate to friendship with the 
triune God. As such it includes within it appropriate words, actions and feelings. But it cannot be 
confined to any one of them. In this light, it would seem that insofar as philosophical accounts 
attend to forgiveness, they might more fruitfully do so within a broadly Aristotelian-Thomist 
perspective that emphasizes forgiveness as a craft in the context of learning virtue.304
 
Jones believes there are a number of advantages if we begin to see forgiveness as a craft. In 
particular it relativizes the question of when forgiveness has been accomplished.305 For Jones 
forgiveness is not something we intuitively “know” as if the only question that remains is 
whether forgiveness is a good or a bad thing to do, or whether forgiveness is appropriate in this 
situation or that. According to Jones, forgiveness must be learned as any craft, such as 
woodwork, must be learned. Those who forgive in a dramatic fashion, such as Jo Berry who 
forgave her Father’s killer, don’t forgive on impulse.306 For Jones they are an example of 
successful apprentices, their reactions to a crisis are “determined by the habits and practices 
[they] have developed leading up to a crisis.”307 While forgiveness is never easy for Jones, those 
                                                                                                                                                            
50 (October 1993) 345-357. Tyler develops an analogy between learning the craft of forgiveness and the craft of 
woodworking. See George Elliot’s Adam Bede for another example of this analogy.  
301 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 210.  
302 Particularly influential in the renaissance of Aristotelian moral philosophy is the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. 
See especially MacIntyre’s,  After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984).  
303 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 218. 
304 Ibid.  
305 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 233.  
306 Jo Berry’s Father, Sir Anthony Berry MP, was amongst those killed in an IRA bomb attack on the Grand Hotel 
Brighton in October 1984. Berry’s journey to forgiveness and eventual reconciliation with Patrick Magee the IRA 
bomber is well known and a series of their meetings were recorded as part of the BBC’s ‘Everyman’ series. The 
program “Facing the Enemy’ was shown on Thursday 13 December 2001 at 9pm.  
307 Ibid. 234. 
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who are schooled in the practice of forgiveness will find it much easier to discern and embody 
appropriate forgiveness.”308 Jones’ observation that we do not intuitively ‘know’ about 
forgiveness is helpful as we think back to our initial observations regarding the challenge of 
forgiveness. The first obstacle we face is not simply the question of whether we can bring 
ourselves to forgive or be forgiven, but rather the challenge of ‘thinking’ or conceptualising 
forgiveness.  
 For Jones we err if we rush forgiveness and overlook the importance of what he calls the 
“timefulness” of forgiveness. C.S. Lewis’ claim that it took him thirty years to forgive a 
particular individual is seen as a favourable example of an honest appraisal of the nature of 
forgiveness.309 This sense of timefulness “indicates the significant yet limited relevance of 
performative declarations such as “I forgive you.” “Forgiveness cannot be confined to a 
moment,” writes Jones, “even a moment at the conclusion of a long, timeful process.”310
For our own purposes Jones’ model offers a number of challenges to an understanding of 
forgiveness. Firstly, his insistence on a shift away from the elocutionary aspect of forgiveness to 
an embodied forgiveness presents a fresh way of thinking about forgiveness in a deeply divided 
society. Proclamations of both contrition and forgiveness are liable to misinterpretation and a 
healthy dose of scepticism. Jones does not prohibit an annunciation of forgiveness, but by 
shifting the centre of gravity to a long-term embodiment of forgiveness, rather than a statement 
of absolution, he provides a way to protect forgiveness from both misinterpretation and 
scepticism. 
 Jones description of forgiveness as a craft also offers a great deal to a situation where 
large sections of a population face the challenge of forgiveness. The danger of a wholesale 
recommendation of forgiveness is that we throw people back on themselves, perhaps assuming 
that they are in possession of the requisite moral resources. By insisting that forgiveness is a 
craft, Jones makes no presumptions about people’s abilities to forgive. He acknowledges the 
need for forgiveness, but crucially does not believe that we all know how to forgive. By 
characterising forgiveness as a craft, Jones acknowledges the inherent difficulty of forgiveness. 
An apprentice woodworker will make many attempts in the early part of his career. Yet, while 
acknowledging difficulty, Jones offers hope. Forgiveness may be a demanding craft to learn, but 
                                                 
308 Ibid.  
309 C.S. Lewis, Letters To Malcolm: Chiefly on Paper (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), 106. Quoted 
in Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 236. See also C.S. Lewis ‘On Forgiveness,’ in W. Hooper, ed., Fern- Seeds and 
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310 Jones, Embodying Forgiveness, 230.  
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practice, patience and discipline will create people who will know how to forgive when the time 
comes.  
 113
Conclusion 
 
While it is uncontroversial to conclude that forgiveness is an essential component of 
reconciliation this chapter has attempted to develop a number of caveats.  
Firstly, as we have seen talking about ‘the past’ is beset with difficulties. Where social 
divisions have been exacerbated by conflict there is no concord when it comes to the question of 
history. In fact a great deal of effort goes into contemporary efforts to exert control over the 
‘facts’ of history. This issue presents a serious challenge to the process of forgiveness whereby 
some form of agreement about what happened in the past is required.  
Secondly, the question of agency represents a challenging obstacle to any attempt to talk 
about forgiveness for actions in the past. If the victims cannot speak for themselves we fail to 
honour their memory by speaking words of forgiveness on their behalf. Even more troubling is 
whether any pronouncement of forgiveness made by anyone other then the victim has any 
meaning? Even those closest to victims can only speak from their own experiences and forgive 
what they have suffered.  
Thirdly, the memory of past sufferings has troubled many of those who have taken time 
to think seriously about the question of forgiveness. Yet, the suggestion by some that this 
difficulty might be resolved by a final amnesia raises more questions than it seeks to answer and 
in the end represents an unacceptable resolution of the problem.  
It is perhaps helpful to observe that many of these difficulties arise when forgiveness is lifted 
from the sphere of interpersonal relationships and spoken of as something that communities can 
engage in or even whole societies. It might be suggested that forgiveness loses much of its 
power when it is no longer the attempt of victim and perpetrator to come to terms with what has 
happened. 
  
The chapter began by suggesting that forgiveness offers a potentially constructive way to 
address the past, a way that coheres with the goal of reconciliation. Yet while this chapter has 
argued in favour of forgiveness it is important that we do not ignore the inherent difficulty of 
forgiveness. In reality forgiveness presents the harder path. Once we overcome the challenge of 
marrying radically divergent interpretations of the past, settle the question of agency and 
understand the far-reaching implications of a process of forgiveness we are left with the even 
greater challenge of bringing victims and perpetrators together, of constantly protecting the 
fragile integrity of forgiveness, an integrity that is particularly vulnerable when forgiveness 
enters the political arena. Forgiveness offers no easy answers or quick fix solutions. The 
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prospect of forgiveness may in fact seem deeply offensive to those who have suffered injustice. 
Yet those who have forgiven report that forgiving one’s enemy brings about changes that are 
essential to the success of reconciliation. Forgiveness allows the naming of injustice, but also 
opens the circle of dialogue and relationship that is closed by violence and narrow political 
personalities. Where legal processes remove the victim and make the state central, forgiveness is 
painfully intimate and promises to change both victim and perpetrator. Forgiveness is a step on 
the road to something else, something greater; namely the reconciliation of a damaged 
relationship. We don’t simply forgive an individual and then carry on as normal. Forgiveness 
opens up the channels, where an event or act has caused a breach in a relationship; forgiveness 
allows one to overcome the breach. In situations where individuals have been driven apart by 
violent political conflict, forgiveness needs to be understood as a means of overcoming past 
enmity and paving the way for a move towards a reconciled society. Forgiving allows 
conversation, it brings us over or around the obstacles that prevented interaction and allows 
individuals to face one another. There is a need for this understanding of forgiveness to 
incorporate a space for anger, a space for confusion and fear. Forgiveness need not follow the 
simplistic metaphor of wiping the slate clean. One can forgive and still have questions to ask, 
one can forgive and still remain confused by events in the past. However, forgiving one’s enemy 
allows one to revisit this past, to uncover one’s own story and the story of those who hurt us.  
The practice of forgiveness presents a robust challenge to this narrowing of identities and 
cultural insecurity. To take part in a process of forgiving one’s enemies necessitates that one 
looks beyond the narrow perimeter of one’s own identity and cultural norms. It requires an 
empathy that allows one to begin to view the world from the perspective of the other. Rather 
than narrowing identity, forgiveness expands one’s identity to include the ‘other’ and results in a 
broadening vision of the self and one’s place in society. Rather than seeking security by 
redefining boundaries forgiveness attempts to overcome insecurity by making oneself vulnerable 
enough to view life from the perspective of the other. When this happens it is possible that the 
process may impact the macro level political process. The politics of conflict feeds off insecure 
populations and an exacerbated sense of conflict between culture and religion. If members of 
conflicted communities begin to take part in a process of forgiveness and open themselves to 
each other the politics of fear and insecurity will no longer make sense, their changed perception 
of the other will allow them to substitute facts for myth and personal experience for the 
vicarious experience of political representatives. 
Forgiveness can take divided communities to places that the pursuit of justice cannot. 
Where justice perpetuates the process of division by merely policing the boundaries between 
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communities, forgiveness questions the necessity of boundaries and is willing to forego our 
typical understandings of justice for the sake of something greater. While forgiveness calls for 
truly extra-ordinary behaviour it should be high on the list of priorities of any theological 
approach to reconciliation. By high on the list of priorities we mean that the business of 
forgiveness or even merely working towards forgiveness should be central to any discussions 
about reconciliation and not seen as a peripheral issue and relegated to the extra-curricular 
aspects of the process of reconciliation. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
was by no means perfect, yet it represents a brave attempt to marry a highly public process of 
dealing with the past with the deeply personal activity of forgiving and seeking forgiveness. 
Such a project will never be neat and tidy and will sadly rarely succeed in satisfying the 
expectations of all those involved. However, the end result presents an opportunity to address 
the past and move towards the possibility of a shared future.  
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Conclusion 
 
The importance of reconciliation in Northern Ireland is confirmed by the tension that exists 
between positive political developments and the reality of current social divisions. Pressure from 
Westminster has recently offered the prospect of a return to power sharing and the renewal of 
the Northern Irish assembly based at Stormont. If agreement were reached the DUP and Sinn 
Fein would have to cooperate as the principle players in Northern Irish politics. Yet, for all the 
symbolism of old enemies working together, social divisions in Northern Ireland are at an all 
time low. Writing in The Observer the Northern Irish journalist Henry McDonald notes 
Social survey after social survey since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement has shown that sectarian 
attitudes and lack of interaction, most strikingly among males under 18, has increased. The men, 
including politicians, who started the Troubles almost four decades ago have never been 
challenged over their actions. Instead, they are venerated as heros of Ireland or Ulster...On such 
unstable social foundations a lasting power sharing settlement is unlikely.311
 
Reconciliation addresses the issue of unstable social foundations, yet in Northern Ireland an 
enduring social division continues to affect large portions of the population. One particularly 
worrying trend is the attitudes held by the generation of young men mentioned by Henry 
McDonald. These young men grew up in the 1990s and unlike their parents have little memory 
of the dark days of Northern Ireland’s past, yet sectarian attacks and behaviours continue. It 
would seem that Lederach’s definition of a deeply divided society remains an accurate 
description of Northern Ireland, despite the period of political development since 1998. While 
the ambiguity surrounding the Northern Ireland Assembly and its long period of suspension may 
have contributed to the longevity of social divisions, the analysis of this thesis is less sanguine. 
Politicians in Northern Ireland have no history of framing political debate and leading their 
constituents towards fresh interpretations of social realities. Rather, politics in Northern Ireland 
is an excellent example of Plato’s allegory of the ‘large and powerful animal,’ which the shrewd 
politician learns how to manipulate.312 The current generation of politicians have built their 
careers on the basis of the politics of narrow identities and understand Northern Irish society as a 
place where social divisions can only be managed and never overcome. The need for a wide-
ranging move towards reconciliation has never been greater, yet the current political climate 
offers little hope. 
However, despite the discouragements of the current situation the strong desire for 
reconciliation and the unwillingness of many to tolerate sectarian attitudes and behaviours 
                                                 
311 Henry McDonald, The Observer 14th May 2006. 
312 Plato, The Republic (London: Penguin, 1955). 
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suggests that community leaders, politicians and church leaders will have to grapple with the 
question of reconciliation. In the hope that that is the case this thesis offers a number of 
suggestions to those attempting to construct a theological response to the challenge of deeply 
divided societies.  
 Firstly, it is clear from chapter one that the language we employ when attempting to 
describe both the goals and processes of reconciliation must be careful, precise and balanced. 
Much of the work of reconciliation involves conversation, description and explanation. Careless 
use of terminology or thoughtless language can prove to be an enormous obstacle to 
reconciliation. A theological understanding of social reconciliation must work hard to accurately 
portray the social implications of God’s reconciliation of humanity. Using language that 
prevents these implications from being clearly understood risks losing sight of the social 
implications of the message of the Christian gospel. 
 Secondly, as we have seen there is an inherent flexibility with the term reconciliation 
where it can be understood as a process or a goal or a combination of both. Regardless of the 
which version of reconciliation we feel suits our particular context it is crucial that the goal of 
reconciliation, that is, the conquering of the deep divisions that damage societies, constantly 
informs the activities that take place in the name of reconciliation. Thus if reconciliation is the 
overarching goal then each discrete step towards reconciliation must be analysed and tested to 
see if it makes a positive contribution to the putative goal of reconciliation. As we have seen in 
our discussion of ‘justice’ some of the central assumptions we make about justice and 
punishment may be found wanting when weighed in the balance of reconciliation. It is 
encouraging to see that recent legislation in Northern Ireland takes seriously the deep division 
affecting every aspect of social life. This legislation is written with the intention that 
reconciliation also affects every aspect of social life. The Government’s A Shared Future 
document, published in the spring of 2005 and recent ‘Good Relations’ legislation will attempt 
to ensure that decisions taken by public bodies, and regional and local government reflect the 
intent of A Shared Future. Obviously this will take time to ‘trickle down’ and bring change. 
However, it is an encouraging step in the right direction.  
 Thirdly, while it is clear that the process of reconciliation is a positive activity it requires 
a great deal of negative and frequently painful activity if it is taken seriously. Those whom we 
invite to take part in reconciliation need to be reminded that this is a potentially painful journey 
that is unlikely to yield short-term gain. To promise otherwise would be untrue and unfair. Like 
forgiveness, reconciliation has a fragile integrity that is constantly under threat when it is 
propelled into the political arena. The temptation to use reconciliation to remove skeletons from 
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a political closet or expedite the success of a new set of political arrangements runs the risk of 
failing those who live in cycles of deep division. The work of reconciliation is complicated, 
arduous and protracted. Those involved in reconciliation are required to think in terms of 
generations not electoral cycles. It seems wise that in some situations, in particular Northern 
Ireland, political representatives should not be the primary actors in the move towards 
reconciliation, at least not for a generation.  
 Fourthly, a reconciliation that is not merely piecemeal requires that deeply divided 
societies are willing to take drastic measures if they are to successfully break with negative 
patterns of division and narrow identities. While local projects are helpful and working with 
people on an individual basis is important, a society like Northern Ireland can only be different 
in the future if reconciliation is allowed to impinge on all aspects of society. This will sometimes 
require taking decisions that are highly unpopular; the early release of paramilitary prisoners is a 
case in point. The question of justice is another good example. As this thesis has suggested, 
normative criminal justice does not help the cause of reconciliation. Therefore if we are truly 
serious about reconciliation we need to wrestle with normative patterns of social behaviour and 
perhaps be willing to experiment. Yet this requires legislators to make controversial decisions. It 
is at this stage that the public will for reconciliation may falter, when people release that the 
good of reconciliation has a difficult price. At this juncture it is crucial that the good of 
reconciliation is highly publicised, but also that those who have doubts about reconciliation or 
those who feel that is doing more harm than good should be heard. 
 Reaching definitive conclusions about reconciliation is difficult, as each particular 
context generates its own particular version of reconciliation. However, it would seem that 
making reconciliation a major social and political priority is central to its success. Until 
reconciliation becomes a priority its potential will always be checked and other concerns will 
eclipse the goals of reconciliation. Perhaps the society that does not make reconciliation a 
priority is not ready for reconciliation and all it entails. There is surely some wisdom in 
refraining from forcing reconciliation upon those who are not yet ready for it. However, it seems 
unwise to put reconciliation off indefinitely. There is a need to address the past, especially in 
situations where social life has been shaped by long-term division. For long periods of Northern 
Ireland’s recent history divided social relations have been normative. The consequence of this 
situation has had a negative impact on life in Northern Ireland. From the administration of basic 
council services to the way people relax, worship and explore their communal identity, every 
facet of life in Northern Ireland has been shaped by deep-seated social divisions. Political 
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developments alone will not bring about a reversal of this situation; only a concerted effort 
towards the goal of reconciliation can challenge social division.  
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